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Abstract
This thesis is made up of three essays on international corporate taxation. This
thesis answers three important questions. First, what is the size of strategic spillovers
from international tax competition? Second, what determines the magnitude
and direction of corporate tax base spillovers? Third, what is the fundamental
reason for taxing !rms and what does this imply for the optimal design of the
corporate income tax?
The theory of tax competition tells us that when governments compete for
mobile capital, tax rates fall below the social optimum, leading to the under-
provision of the public good. But magnitudes matter—how big a problem is
the under-provision of the public good? That depends on how big strategic tax
rate spillovers from corporate tax competition are. In the !rst essay, I estimate
the size of strategic spillovers. To do so, I identify tax competition as being an
optimal response to base spillovers. Using the stock of foreign direct investment
between countries to approximate bilateral base spillovers, I estimate a spatial
autoregressivemodel of tax competition. I !nd strategic spillovers to be a third of
the magnitude of previous estimates. More speci!cally, I !nd that governments
respond to a 1 percentage point reduction in the foreign average tax rate with a
0.23 percentage point cut of their own. This implies low revenue loss from tax
competition andmodest under-provision of the public good—much lower than
is commonly implied.
Corporate tax reforms do not occur in a vacuum. In the second essay, I esti-
mate corporate tax base spillovers on a country-by-country basis for European
countries. Corporate tax base spillovers are the international externalities that
occur when one government’s tax rate change a"ects another country’s tax base.
We normally assume that tax base spillovers are substitutionary—that a cut in
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the tax rate in one country must lower corporate pro!ts in neighbouring coun-
tries. I !nd that spillovers are, on average, substitutionary. However, spillovers
vary across country-pairs in size and signi!cance. Some spillovers are even com-
plementary. I isolate theories that help us to understand this heterogeneity in
spillover semi-elasticities and try to determine whether variation in the esti-
mated semi-elasticities is explained by the structural features predicted by these
theories. This essay seeks to enrich our understanding of corporate tax base
spillovers.
In the third essay I derive an optimal bene!t-based corporate tax rate for-
mula as a function of the public input elasticity of pro!ts and the (net of) tax
elasticity of pro!ts. I argue that the existence of the corporate income tax should
be justi!ed by the bene!t-based view of taxation: !rms should pay tax accord-
ing to the bene!ts they receive from the use of the public input. I argue that
bene!t-based corporate taxation is normatively fair. Since the public input is a
location-speci!c factor, a positive bene!t-based corporate tax rate is also feasible
even in a small open economy. The bene!t-based view gives three clear prin-
ciples of corporate tax design. First, we should tax corporate pro!ts at source.
Second, the optimal tax base is location-speci!c rents. Third, pro!t shifting is
normatively wrong. An empirical application of the formula suggests the opti-
mal bene!t-based corporate tax rate on public corporations in the United States
lies in the range of 35 to 59 percent.
Together, these three essays provide a clear perspective of the mechanisms
of the international corporate tax system. By combining theory with evidence
throughout this thesis, I show that the international corporate tax system is a
complex creature. Importantly, I also provide concrete suggestions for the re-
design of the corporate tax so that it ful!ls a fundamental economic purpose.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The landscape of international corporate tax is contentious. It is littered with
stories of multinational !rms who do not pay their fair share of tax, who play
one government o" against the other, and who use extreme versions of tax plan-
ning to minimise their tax liability (Beesley, 2019; Schreuer and Stevis-Gridne",
2019). The actions of multinational !rms create and exploit fault lines in the
landscape. Economists, politicians, policy advisers, and tax professionals each
have their own strongly-held opinions ofwhat the corporate tax landscape should
look like. For the tax economist, the landscape should be shaped by the dual
principles of equity and e*ciency.
With each passing year, the corporate tax debate seems to draw closer to a
tipping point. There are persistent and loud calls for the urgent redesign of the
international corporate tax system (Lagarde, 2019). Yet governments all around
the world continue to cut corporate tax rates (see Figure 1.1). And some govern-
ments are !nding new and clever ways to o"er preferential tax treatment (Abbas
and Klemm, 2013). Meanwhile other governments enact unilateral action such
as taxes on digital companies (Govindarajan et al., 2019). In the midst of this,
tax havens of varying nature and intensity continue to operate despite the leaks,
blacklists, and crackdowns (Guarascio, 2017). From an objective perspective, the
international corporate tax system appears to be in turmoil.
And somehow—despite all of this apparent turmoil—corporate tax revenues
have not declined. It sparks wonder to think that the large decline in the average
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corporate tax rate over the past few decades has not led to the total decimation
of corporate tax revenue. For 48 of the largest countries in theOxford University
Centre for Business Taxation’s Tax Database, the average top statutory corporate
tax rate has almost halved from 1985 to 2017. This re%ects a monumental swing
in governments’ collective tax ideology. In vivid contrast, corporate tax revenue
as a percentage of gross domestic product has actually edged up since 1980. This
data is plotted in Figure 1.1. The Organisation for Co-operation and Develop-
ment’s (2019) recent Corporate Tax Statistics Database suggests that corporate
tax revenue now makes up 13.3 percent of total tax revenue in 88 countries in
2016, up from 12 percent in 2000. And this !gure is even higher for developing
countries.
Figure 1.1: Trends in Global Corporate Tax Rates and Revenues.
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Data on top statutory corporate tax rates comes from the Oxford University Centre for Business
Taxation Tax Database. Data on tax revenue comes from UNU-Wider’s Government Revenue
Dataset. Both tax rate data and revenue are for the same 48 countries.
Bond et al. (2000) ask the important question: is the observed decline in cor-
porate tax rates actually an e*cient response to increased corporate incomemo-
bility, or is it merely the result of an ine*cient process of corporate tax compe-
tition between uncoordinated governments? Were it simply uncoordinated tax
competition, then our theoretical economic models suggest that we should ob-
serve a severe decline in corporate tax revenue around the world.
Various authors have pointed out this complexing trend (Bond et al., 2000;
Devereux et al., 2004; Gri*th and Klemm, 2004; Sørensen, 2007; Loretz, 2008;
Clausing, 2007). For the most part, these authors have attributed this buoyancy
of corporate tax revenue to the broadening of the tax base. As documented by
Kawano and Slemrod (2016), governments havemade up for lower tax rates with
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a range of di"erent tax base reforms including thin capitalisation rules, trans-
fer pricing regulations, controlled foreign company legislation, depreciation al-
lowances, and investment credits. The consensus is that governments have en-
acted a combination of rate-cutting and base-broadening that has supported the
corporate income tax base, particularly across the developed world. Other po-
tential explanationsmight include the increased prevalence of high-pro!tmulti-
national !rms in the world economy, or an increasing share of economic activity
being conducted by incorporated !rms—either due to corporations growing in
size or due to an increased rate of company incorporation. Hau%er and Stähler
(2013) propose that the observed decline in corporate tax rates with steady tax
revenue might actually be an optimal response to the combination of increased
pro!tability and increased !rm mobility.
Curiously, academic advice on the design of the corporate income tax rarely
seems to be followed. For example, economists are uniform in their belief that
the normal returns to capital should not be taxed by the corporate income tax.
Instead, to reduce the distortions that the corporate income tax generates, we
should exempt the normal returns to capital and tax only economic pro!ts or
economic rents (Gri*th et al., 2010). This would limit the incidence of the cor-
porate income tax on workers and dampen any negative e"ects on output. Mul-
tiple concrete proposals exist for how to exempt the normal returns to capital.
These proposals include the allowance for corporate equity and the cash %ow tax.
Exempting the normal returns to capital seems like it would generate a Pareto
improvement and comes highly recommended in any policy reform package.
And yet, few governments in the world have adopted the idea that we should
exempt the normal returns to capital. For example, of European countries, only
Belgium and Portugal have found it expedient to switch to an allowance for cor-
porate equity tax system. And Italy repealed its own allowance for corporate
equity incentive as of January 1, 2019.
Similarly, governments have refused to engage in any substantial degree of
coordination on tax competition. Certainly there has been no coordination on
tax rates—the main policy proposal of decades worth of corporate tax competi-
tion literature. Even within the European Union they cannot agree to coordinate
on corporate tax rates or corporate tax bases. And policies to limit spillovers are
non-existent. While the European Commission attempts to police its members’
3
behaviour and how it might a"ect other member states, no member state has
taken any serious interest in how its own tax policy might work beyond its own
borders. Even the European Union’s attempt to crackdown on tax havens ap-
pears %awed, as it ignores the European Parliament’s !ndings that seven coun-
tries within its Union act like tax havens—Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, and the Netherlands (European Parliament, 2019).
Neither does public opinion appear to hold any real sway. In the United
States, survey evidence seems to consistently suggest that individuals would pre-
fer higher, not lower taxes on corporations. For example, in 2017, a Pew Research
Center (2017a) survey found that Americans’ greatest concern about the design
of the whole federal tax system was that corporations do not pay their fair share
of tax. This almost certainly implies an overwhelming desire for higher tax rates.
Yet, in December 2017 the United States passed the Tax Cut and Jobs Act, which
involved a reduction in the top corporate tax rate from 35 percent to a %at rate of
21 percent. Unsurprisingly, in 2018 a Gallup (2018) survey found that 62 percent
of Americans thought that corporations paid too little tax. Not only is the de-
sign of corporate tax policy consistently out of step with what academics think
is appropriate, but it also seems to %out the preferences of the population.
This highlights a fundamental problemwith the corporate income tax project:
there exists no consensus across stakeholders. Each group is pulling in a di"erent
direction. In particular, government policy seems to contradict both scholarly
advice and public opinion. It is almost as if governments have a di"erent set of
information or a di"erent set of preferences. From an academic perspective, the
di"erence in viewsmeans wemust pause and ask whether the corporate income
tax system is truly in crisis, or whether we missed something. The absence of a
policy consensus re%ects the absence of consensus on the e"ects and intent of
the corporate income tax. Can we forge a new global consensus about the pur-
pose of corporate income taxation? Can we generate convincing evidence of the
e"ects of the corporate tax? This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge on
the e"ects and intent of the international corporate tax system. In this thesis, I
seek evidence and ideas that informs the ongoing debate on a consensus design
of the corporate income tax.
4
1.1 The Main Actors
There are twomain actors in this thesis: the !rm and the government. Through-
out this thesis I examine the interplay between these two economic actors. In
the real world it is sometimes di*cult to distinguish whether the relationship
between the !rm and the government is antagonistic or symbiotic. At times,
governments appear to be trying in vain to tax an evasive !rm. At other times, it
appears that governments yield substantial favours to !rms—particularly large
multinational !rms. We can only be certain that the relationship between the
two is highly complex. This relationship is the focus of this thesis. The !rst es-
say focuses on how !rm behaviour induces government responses. The second
essay focuses on how government policies induce !rm responses. The third pro-
poseswhat amore constructive relationship between the twomight look like—an
inherently co-operative relationship founded quite literally on mutual bene!t.
The multinational !rm is an ever-present agent throughout this thesis. In
the !rst two essays I focus mainly on multinational !rms. In the second essay, I
include domestic !rms in my study to generate a counterfactual for the multi-
national !rm. In the third essay I engage amore general de!nition of the !rm, in
an attempt to consider a widely-applicable optimal tax system. Implicit in this
study is thatmultinational !rms generate large amounts of pro!ts, hold substan-
tial power, and have a vast range of outside options. The OECD estimates that
the multinational !rm accounted for approximately 12 percent of global output
in 2014. The multinational is also highly mobile across countries. Combining
this mobility with the signi!cance of their production gives the multinational
!rm substantial global power to alter countries’ economic outcomes and even
their economic policies. The multinational !rm is of great importance to the
government.
The other main character in this thesis is the government. The story of cor-
porate tax design is a story of government decisions. Their decisions de!ne the
landscape of international tax. Their preferences over the taxation of !rms—
particularly multinationals—have shaped the existing corporate tax system into
the complex beast that exists today. Whether they choose to cooperate or coor-
dinate determines the level of coherence in the global tax system. Therefore, in
spite of government policy often disregarding scholarly advice, it is their policy
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choices that matter for !nal outcomes. Their policy choices help us to under-
stand what issues are truly relevant in the design of the corporate income tax.
Government policy is therefore crucial to our ability to inform good economic
policy in the future.
1.2 The Approach
Each essay is built on a combination of simple theoretical models and straight-
forward empirical analysis. Throughout this thesis I emphasise the power of
the synthesis between these two approaches to answering economic questions.
Complex theoretical models can rarely be taken to the data, and theory criti-
cally disciplines the type of empirical analysis we need. In this thesis complexity
arises mainly in the conceptual approach to answering questions.
To deal with this conceptual complexity, I take an agnostic approach to an-
swering the questions I ask. In this thesis I ask: what is the size of strategic
spillovers, what is themagnitude and direction of tax base spillovers, and what is
the fundamental reason for taxing !rms? The research questions themselves are
important; for this reason I aim to answer them without prejudice. The answers
to some of these questions might be surprising in parts. Therefore, defending
the veracity of these answers requires that my approach be unbiased, logically
coherent, and objective.
I ask a combination of important positive and normative questions. The !rst
two essays are positive. I focus !rst on the international e"ects of the corpo-
rate tax. I target the two major cross-country concerns that the international
debate on corporate taxes identify—strategic spillovers and tax base spillovers.
These are the terminologies introduced by the IMF (2014) in their analysis of
the spillovers generated by the corporate income tax. In general, they de!ne
spillovers as the impact that one country’s policies have on another country’s
outcomes or decisions. A somewhat more economic term is the concept of ‘!s-
cal externalities’. Strategic spillovers occur when one government’s tax reform
alters the optimal tax rate of another government. Base spillovers occur when a
change in one country’s tax rate a"ects the tax base of another country.
6
The third essay is normative and therefore presents the greatest challenge. I
make the argument for a bene!t-based corporate tax on the grounds of fairness
and the ability to tax. In particular, I use the familiar economic idea of a public
input to show that public inputs give rise to location-speci!c rents that are cap-
tured by !rms. Such rents re%ect the deserved income of the government who
provides the public input. And such rents can be taxed since they are immo-
bile. I combine these normative ideas with the more popular theoretical tools of
modern tax theory. I also use data to show the empirical relevance of the public
input for corporate pro!ts.
In each essay I challenge consensus knowledge. In the !rst essay, I challenge
the notion that strategic spillovers from corporate taxation are very large. In
the second essay, I challenge the idea that all countries are equally and evenly
a"ected by tax base spillovers. In the third essay, I challenge the idea that we
should only care about the e*ciency of the corporate income tax.
1.3 Three Essays
Essay One The !rst essay begins from a salient issue in international corpo-
rate taxation—that of tax competition. We are told that governments compete
among themselves. This is described as the main reason for the decline in cor-
porate tax rates around the world (Overesch and Rincke, 2011). The theory of
tax competition predicts that corporate tax competition arises from a govern-
ment’s optimal response to a reduction of its tax base, which itself is the result
of a neighbouring country’s corporate tax rate cut. This chain of events—from
one tax cut to a base spillover to another tax cut—de!nes corporate tax compe-
tition. Without the tax base spillover, we cannot de!ne two tax rate cuts as being
tax competition for a mobile tax base. In the !rst essay of this thesis I estimate
tax competition as a response to expected tax base spillovers. In this essay, I re-
visit an important quantitative question using the lens of economic theory as the
means of identi!cation.
The theory of tax competition tells us that when governments compete for
mobile capital, tax rates fall below the social optimum, leading to the under-
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provision of the public good. But magnitudes matter—how big a problem is
the under-provision of the public good? That depends on how big strategic
spillovers from corporate tax competition are. This essay seeks to answer this
question. I estimate the magnitude of strategic spillovers on corporate tax rates
between governments. I extend the standard model of tax competition to a
three-country model with three multinational !rms. This model implies that
the size of the response to a neighbour’s tax cut depends on the size of the base
spillover implied by that tax cut. I use the stock of foreign direct investment be-
tween two countries tomeasure that bilateral base spillover. I convert these bilat-
eral foreign direct investment ties into a weight matrix using the approach typi-
cally applied to trade-weighted exchange rates. Using this weight matrix derived
from the theory of tax competition, I estimate a spatial autoregressive model of
tax competition. I therefore identify tax competition as being an optimal re-
sponse to base spillovers.
The results of this estimation suggest that a 1 percentage point reduction in
the weighted average foreign tax rate leads to a 0.23 percentage point tax cut by
the home country in response. This estimate of strategic spillovers is substan-
tially smaller than previous estimates using ad hoc weighting schemes. The ex-
isting consensus estimate using ad hoc weights suggests the home country would
respond by 0.6 to 0.7 percentage points. I show that these ad hoc weights do
not appropriately identify the structure of tax competition. In fact, only the
theoretically-implied bilateral foreign direct investment weights manage to sat-
isfy a simple test of identi!cation: that countries should respond more to a tax
cut by near neighbours than to a similar tax cut by far neighbours.
I use a back-of-the-envelope calculation tomeasure the di"erence in the pub-
lic good under-provision implied by the various weighting schemes. The ad
hocweights—uniform, GDP, aggregate foreign direct investment, anddistance—
all suggest public good under-provision between 10 and 14 percent of annual
revenue. The bilateral foreign direct investment weights suggest that the level
of public good under-provision is approximately 4 percent of revenue. This
study !nds that strategic spillovers on corporate tax rates between national gov-
ernments do exist, but the magnitude of these spillovers is around three times
smaller than existing estimates suggest. The implication is that tax competition
appears to result in modest under-provision of the public good.
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Essay Two The results of the !rst essay highlight the importance of the tax
base spillover in de!ning the process of tax competition. In the !rst essay, I
rely on bilateral foreign direct investment weights to approximate the expected
tax base spillover between the two countries. This assumes that governments
perceive the cross-tax elasticity to be constant for all pairs of countries. It is a
reasonable assumption since even the academic literature has not investigated
the heterogeneity of tax base spillover elasticities. We know nothing about the
heterogeneity of tax base spillovers.
In this essay, I examine the heterogeneity of corporate tax base spillovers.
Corporate tax base spillovers occur when one government’s tax rate reform af-
fects the tax base of a neighbouring country. These spillovers are typically as-
sumed to be substitutionary—a tax cut in one country must surely steal pro!ts
away from neighbouring countries. Using micro-data for European !rms from
2007 to 2016, I estimate the average spillover generated by each country chang-
ing its tax rate over the period and the speci!c country-by-country spillovers
these tax changes generated.
I !nd that, on average, corporate tax base spillovers are substitutionary. How-
ever, they are not uniformly substitutionary, and average e"ectsmask substantial
heterogeneity. Spillovers between a pair of countries can be either complemen-
tary or substitutionary. More surprisingly, many country-pair spillover e"ects
are very small and statistically insigni!cant. Corporate tax base spillovers ap-
pear to operate on a continuum between complementary and substitutionary.
Why is it that not all country-pair spillovers are substitutionary? Theory gives
us a few suggestions. The dominant tax competition theories of the multina-
tional !rm are of a horizontalmultinational and of arti!cial pro!t shifting. These
typically give unambiguous answers that tax base spillovers will be substitution-
ary. However, vertical multinational !rms may generate more complementary
spillovers, as might also happen if !rms rely on internal rather than external
capital for investment.
I examine this question further empirically. Using the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the estimated country-pair elasticities, I attempt to see whether there
are any clear patterns across elasticities. I !nd that countries which are more
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similar in purchasing power tend to have more substitutionary spillovers, while
countries with larger economic size and public capital intensity tend to limit sub-
stitutionary spillovers—likely due to location-speci!c rents. Surprisingly, I !nd
that countries with larger wage di"erential also generate more substitutionary
spillovers. These results provide a !rst clear step towards understanding how
country-pair tax base spillovers are determined.
Essay Three In the previous essays I !nd that tax competition is not very in-
tense, and tax base spillovers are quite limited. Having examined the mecha-
nisms of corporate tax competition, I take a step back to investigate the bigger
picture: even if corporate tax competition is leading to the decline of corporate tax rates,
is it actually a bad thing that corporate tax rates are falling? The corporate income
tax is known to be highly distorting given the mobility of multinational !rms
and the pro!t shifting options available to them. Falling corporate tax rates limit
the distortions of the corporate tax. Then by what yardstick are we measuring
the decline in corporate tax rates as ‘bad’?
If we are only concerned about e*ciency, then the optimal corporate tax
rate is zero. What justi!es our concern that the corporate tax rate is too low?
If there is only a revenue-raising justi!cation, then the corporate tax should be
eliminated in favour of a less distorting tax instrument, of which there aremany.
The distorting e"ects of corporate taxation can only be accepted if there is some
o"setting bene!t from taxing companies. That is, the relevance of the entire
corporate tax system depends on there being some fundamental economic jus-
ti!cation for the existence of the corporate income tax. There is no consensus
on what that reason might be, and economists have not bothered to take this
question seriously over the past two decades.
Then what is the fundamental purpose for the corporate income tax? The
third essay of this thesis makes an ambitious attempt to answer this question.
In providing a reason for the existence of the corporate income tax, I provide a
reason why we might not want corporate tax rates to fall to zero. As Weisbach
(2015) proposes, !nding a purpose for the corporate income tax gives us advice
on the design of the optimal corporate income tax and on the design of the in-
ternational corporate tax system. By depicting the corporate income tax as a
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balance between a fundamental purpose and traditional economic e*ciency, I
try to bring it in line with the methods of public economics that see taxation as
some balance between equity and e*ciency. In particular, I explore the idea of
inter-nation equity, a concept that has been low on the list of priorities in the
academic debate on corporate income tax.
In the third essay, I argue that the existence of the corporate income tax
should be justi!ed by the bene!t-based view of taxation: !rms should pay tax
according to the bene!ts they receive from the use of the public input. A bene!t-
based corporate tax satis!es both public andpolicy perceptions of fairness. It also
satis!es within-country and inter-nation notions of equity. I model the bene!t
tax by considering a model with a public input. The returns to the public in-
put appear as pro!ts to the !rm, but are actually the deserved income of the
government. And since the public input is a location-speci!c factor, a positive
bene!t-based corporate tax rate is also feasible, even in a small open economy.
Using the Lindahl (1919) approach to bene!t taxation, I propose an optimal
bene!t-based corporate income tax rate. I modify the Lindahl thought experi-
ment to incorporate the distortionary e"ects of corporate taxation. I derive an
optimal bene!t-based corporate tax rate formula that is a function of two es-
timable elasticities: the elasticity of pro!t with respect to the public input, and
the elasticity of pro!t with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This gives us a clear and
simple understanding of how a bene!t-based corporate tax should work: !rms
with higher public input elasticities (higher marginal valuations of the public in-
put) should paymore; !rms with higher tax elasticities will pay less because their
responses are more distortionary.
I show that the public input is an empirically relevantmechanism. Using data
on public corporations in the United States, I !nd that the public input elastic-
ity of pro!ts is quite high and economically signi!cant. I also estimate the tax
elasticity of pro!ts using the same data. Combining these results using the opti-
mal tax formula suggests that a bene!t-based tax on public corporations should
be at a rate between 35 to 59 percent. This is substantially higher than the new
corporate tax of 21 percent in the United States.
The bene!t principle also provides three clear principles of corporate tax sys-
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tem design. First, any government should have taxing rights over pro!ts that are
generated using its public input. That is—as was the original intent of the inter-
national tax system—corporate tax should be levied at source. Second, since the
aim of the bene!t-based tax is to transfer the returns on the public input from
!rm to government, then the government should narrow its base as close as pos-
sible to these returns. Practically, this implies the government should tax only
economic rents—improving both fairness and e*ciency in the process. Third,
the bene!t principle suggests a reason whywe can de!ne pro!t shifting as unfair.
Even if pro!t shifting is e*ciency-enhancing, it allows !rms to avoid contribut-
ing to the provision of public inputs.
The aim of this thesis is to push us to think clearly about the corporate in-
come tax. Is corporate tax competition as harmful as we thought? Are corporate
tax base spillovers as uniformly substitutionary as we thought? And do we have
a reason for protecting the corporate income tax? Each essay attempts to chal-
lenge our widely-held perspectives on the corporate income tax. In its totality,
the purpose of this thesis is to provide a fresh perspective on howwe think about
the corporate income tax.
1.4 This Thesis in Current Context
Howdoes this thesis relate to, and alignwith current events and issues? One event
has dominated the corporate tax landscape in the past few years: the United
States’ Tax Cut and Jobs Act. This tax reform included a number of alterations
to the corporate tax system, but the headline feature was the reduction in the top
corporate tax rate from a tax rate of 35 percent to a tax rate of 21 percent. This
is a massive reduction in the corporate tax rate for any country. For the world’s
most systematically important economy, this is potentially seismic.
Much of the debate outside the United States centred around the potential
e"ects of the reform. Beer et al. (2018) attempt to estimate the likely impact of
both strategic and base spillovers. My thesis contributes to our future attempts
to understand these types of salient and globally important tax reforms. In par-
ticular, mywork shows that tax base spillovers are likely to be relatively localised,
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but will depend on the nature of a country’s relationship with the United States.
Combining the idea that only a few countries likely experience signi!cant base
spillovers with the !nding that strategic responses are actually quite small, the
evidence from this thesis suggests that there will likely not be a mad global race
to the bottom resulting from the Tax Cut and Jobs Act. The estimated spillovers
in Beer et al. (2018) rely on average tax base spillovers and large estimates of
strategic spillovers from previous literature. My thesis contributes to our un-
derstanding of corporate tax rate events by providing a richer set of facts from
which we can draw policy predictions.
The Tax Cut and Jobs Act also drew substantial conceptual discussion about
the international tax system. In particular, the United States %irted with the idea
of a destination-based cash %ow tax. In the end, itmoved its residence-based cor-
porate tax system in the direction of a source-based corporate tax system. The
bene!t principle I put forward in this thesis implies that source-based taxation
is a fairer means of taxing corporations. This reform brings the United States in
line withmost of the world. It seems that we are slowly reaching a consensus that
source-based taxation represents a fairer distribution of corporate taxing rights.
The clearest contribution of this thesis to the discussion on the Tax Cut and
Jobs Act, however, comes in the form of estimating the optimal bene!t-based
corporate tax for public corporations in the United States. My estimates suggest
that the previous top tax rate of 35 percent represents a lower bound on what
would be an optimal bene!t-based corporate tax rate. This suggests, interest-
ingly, that the American public’s opinion that !rms pay too little tax is justi!ed
(Gallup, 2018).
Globally, the OECD, the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, and the Eu-
ropean Union continue to seek a consensus on the design of the corporate in-
come tax system. No consensus is forthcoming. There are very few topics on
which policymakers and governments agree. Stepping back from the minute
detail of policy design, one might notice that the consideration of fairness is
almost non-existent in the international corporate income tax debate. For ex-
ample, the words ‘fair’, ‘fairness’, or ‘equity’ (in the context of fairness) appear
only six times in the International Monetary Fund’s (2019) 91-page treatise on
Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy. This is striking since the fundamental
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public economics approach to tax is wholly centred on the trade-o" between
fairness and e*ciency. Almost every other tax is evaluated on how it manages
this trade-o".
As Weisbach (2015) indicates, there is unlikely to be any forthcoming con-
sensus on the design of the corporate income tax until we decide what exactly
we are trying to achieve through the corporate income tax. In the third essay of
this thesis I address this fundamental question that seems to be at the root of the
global disagreement on taxation. To answer this question requires a normative
approach. I build on the book by Pogge and Mehta (2016a), Global Tax Fairness,
and the review of their work byWeinzierl (2018a) to identify a fundamental pur-
pose for the existence of the corporate income tax. In the context of the current
policy debate, the third essay in this thesis does not serve as a full menu of policy
proposals such as is done in works by Auerbach et al. (2017) and Auerbach and
Devereux (2018). Instead, it forms an important normative foundation for a cor-
porate income tax project that !nds itself running out of steam. The proposal
that the corporate income tax should exist as a bene!t-based tax provides gov-
ernments with an appropriate reason to levy the tax, and provides governments
with a common understanding of what they should be trying to achieve in de-
signing their domestic tax systems and in cooperating to design the international
corporate tax system.
This thesis therefore addresses issues that are both current and important.
The aim of this thesis is to provide evidence and insight that is relevant for the
design of good economic policy. Each of the three essays that follow is inspired
by currents events, and is intended to address speci!c policy issues.
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Chapter 2
How Big Are Strategic Spillovers
from Corporate Tax Competition?
The central prediction of the theory of tax competition is that imposing dis-
torting taxes on mobile capital will lead to the under-provision of public goods
(Zodrow andMieszkowski, 1986). This happens because each government has an
incentive to lower their tax rate to attract more capital. And every other govern-
ment has an incentive to respond competitively by lowering their own tax rate
to recapture lost capital. Lowering the corporate tax rate as a strategic response
to another government’s tax cut is what we de!ne as tax competition. This pro-
cess of tax competition is predicted to lead to a Nash equilibriumwhere tax rates
are collectively below their social optimum (Keen and Konrad, 2014). And if tax
rates are below the social optimum, then governments receive less revenue and
are unable to provide the socially optimal level of public goods. The potential
for severe under-provision of public goods is why tax competition worries both
economists and policymakers alike.
But magnitudes matter. How big a problem is the under-provision of public
goods due to tax competition? This depends on how far below the social op-
timum tax rates fall due to tax competition. The di"erence between actual tax
rates and the counterfactual social optimum can be identi!ed by how large the
strategic response to a tax cut is. These strategic responses are de!ned as strate-
gic spillovers: the strategic best response to a neighbouring country’s tax rate
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change. Crucially, a tax cut can only be identi!ed as a strategic spillover when it
is an optimal response to the tax competition game.
Themagnitude of the under-provision of public goods is therefore identi!ed
by the magnitude of strategic spillovers: on average, how much does a government
change its tax rate in response to a collective one percentage point change in its neighbours’
tax rates? Existing evidence suggests that a 1 percentage point reduction in the
average foreign corporate tax rate induces the home country to lower its own
corporate tax rate by 0.6 to 0.7 percentage points. These are large spillover e"ects
that imply economically substantial under-provision of public goods due to tax
competition. Using this estimate, Beer et al. (2018) !nd that strategic spillovers
can more than triple the total spillover e"ects1 from a single country’s tax rate
reform.
In this essay, I revisit this important question: how big are strategic spillovers
from corporate tax competition? To identify a strategic spillover, it must be a tax
response to an expected or an actual tax base spillover. A tax base spillover (or
base spillover) is the direct e"ect one country’s tax rate change has on a neigh-
bouring country’s tax base. We cannot discern between tax competition, yard-
stick competition, or common intellectual trends if we do not identify a tax cut as
being competition over the allocation of amobile tax base (Wilson andWildasin,
2004).
To identify the base spillovermechanism driving strategic spillovers, I sketch
a model of tax competition with three countries and three multinational !rms.
A tax rate change in country C causesmultinational !rms to optimally reallocate
their capital across all three countries. This reallocation is the tax base spillover
which then induces an optimal change in country A’s tax rate. Importantly, the
relative response country A to countries B and C depends on the relative size of
the tax base spillovers from B to A and from C to A respectively. If there is no
tax base spillover, there is no strategic spillover.
Empirically, we can only identify strategic spillovers if there is some varia-
tion in the tax base spillovers that country B and country C would generate for
country A’s tax base. I measure the magnitude of the expected base spillover
1Total spillovers are tax base spillovers plus strategic spillovers.
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using the size of the stock of bilateral foreign direct investment between coun-
tries. The theoretical framework predicts that three capital stocks are important
for measuring base spillovers between two countries: !rst, the stock of capital
from country A invested in country B; second, the stock of capital from country
B invested in country A; and third, competition between countries A and B for
capital from countryC. I implement thismeasure of expected base spillovers us-
ing the weighting scheme used by the Federal Reserve of the United States and
the European Central Bank to produce trade-weighted exchange rates (Loretan,
2005; Buldorini et al., 2002).
I argue that tax rates are not ‘sluggish’. Rather, governments make discrete
decisions to change the tax rates when the bene!ts of doing so outweigh the
costs. The choice of tax rate in any period can therefore be modelled as a dy-
namic game with an adjustment cost. The standard model of tax competition
then acts as the underlying stage game. When governments choose to change
their tax rates, they play their best response. Only then can we be sure that we
are observing the best response to the change in the foreign tax rate. To empiri-
cally implement this, I employ a two-stage Heckman selection model that treats
only periods where the tax rate was changed as being a best response to the tax
competition game.
I !nd that a 1 percentage point reduction in the weighted average foreign
tax rate results in a 0.23 percentage point tax rate cut in response by the home
country. This is a third of the size of existing estimates. Importantly, it implies
substantially lower under-provision of the public good than previous estimates.
Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, I !nd that this estimate implies under-
provision in 2012 that is merely 3.7 percent of total tax revenue. In comparison,
alternative weighting methods such as distance, GDP or aggregate foreign di-
rect investment imply under-provision between 10 and 14 percent of total tax
revenue.
I show that this strategy is more convincing than previous studies using ad
hoc weight matrices such as distance, gross domestic product, population size,
or the size of aggregate foreign direct investment. I examine whether identi!-
cation is convincing through the theoretical model’s main prediction: a country
should respondmore to a tax cut by a ‘close’ neighbour compared to a similar tax
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cut by a ‘far’ neighbour. For any choice of weight matrix, we are implying that
these weights are an appropriate empirical measure of closeness. Using graphi-
cal evidence I show that this prediction is only true for the bilateral foreign direct
investment weights I propose. In contrast, this simple test of identi!cation is not
met by any of the alternative ad hoc weighting schemes. Further, a uniform
weight matrix cannot undergo any such identi!cation test since it assumes that
all countries generate the same base spillovers.
The central contribution of this essay is in combining the theory and em-
pirics of tax competition to more accurately identify and estimate the size of
strategic spillovers. This contribution is most clearly manifest is the derivation
and application of the theoretically-implied weight matrix to the estimation of
strategic spillovers. Achieving this central contribution relies on a number of
smaller contributions to knowledge. First, I derive the weight matrix using a
model of tax competition with three countries and three !rms. Second, I recast
tax competition as a dynamic two-stage game with an adjustment cost and im-
plement it using a Heckman two-stage correction model. Third, in contrast to
traditional literature on tax competition, I use the maximum likelihoodmethod
of estimation which requires the correct speci!cation of the weight matrix. Pre-
vious works rely on the spatial instrumental variable strategy, which has been
found to in%ate estimates of strategic spillovers. Fourth, to eliminate potential
endogeneity of the weight matrix, I use a gravity model to instrument for stocks
of foreign direct investment. Finally, I am able to provide graphical evidence of
convincing identi!cation of spillovers.
This paper is related to an interesting line of literature that interrogates how
governments set their corporate tax rates, particularly in relation to their neigh-
bours. This paper follows very closely the research question posed by Devereux
et al. (2008): how much do governments respond to a tax rate change in neigh-
bouring countries? It is also related to the following works of Overesch and
Rincke (2011), Redoano (2014), Davies and Voget (2008), and Exbrayat (2017)
who ask very a similar question, but answer with di"erent methods. This pa-
per also draws on important points made by: Heinemann et al. (2010), that tax
cuts are a discrete decision; Lyytikäinen (2012), that the standard spatial instru-
mental variable method gives in%ated answers to the main research question
of how much governments respond to their neighbours; by Davies and Voget
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(2008), that we shouldmeasure relative responses rather than absolute responses
to achieve identi!cation; and by Becker and Davies (2017), that governments
do not always correctly perceive tax elasticities. More detailed examination of
the empirical literature on corporate tax rate setting can be found in surveys by
Leibrecht and Hochgatterer (2012) and Devereux and Loretz (2013).
The central !nding of this essay is that strategic spillovers are much smaller
than we think. The implication of this !nding is that tax competition results in
very modest under-provision of the public good. This essay seeks to bring clar-
ity to the public debate on international corporate tax competition and public
good provision. In the following section, I sketch the theoretical framework of
tax competition. In Section 2.2 I describe my empirical strategy for identifying
strategic spillovers based on the theoretical model. I present the results of this
integration of theory and empirics in Section 2.3. Finally, in Section 2.4 I use
simple back-of-the-envelope calculations to show the implications of these new
results for public good under-provision.
2.1 A Model of Corporate Tax Competition
Tax competition is de!ned as “the uncooperative setting of source-based taxes
on corporate income where the country is constrained by the tax setting be-
haviour of other countries” (Devereux and Loretz, 2013). Theoretical descrip-
tions of tax competition begin from the seminal framework based on Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). This framework envisages tax com-
petition as governments engaging in Cournot competition as a result of !scal
externalities.
The series of tax competitionmodels originatingwithZodrowandMieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986) describe governments setting taxes on capital to in%u-
ence the after-tax return on capital in a bid to attract mobile capital. Were we
to consider a tax on the economic pro!ts of immobile !rms in such a context, we
would conclude it induces no behavioural response. In the same vein, Hau%er
and Schjelderup (2000) explain that a pro!t tax on domestic !rms would only
a"ect cross-border capital allocation to the extent that the pro!t tax is indirectly
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incident on capital due to imperfect tax deductibility of the costs of capital.
But !rms are themselves internationallymobile. These aremultinational !rms.
Foreign direct investment, mainly conducted by multinational !rms, reached
34.6 percent of world GDP in 2016. The value added of multinational !rm a*l-
iates was 11 percent of world GDP in 2016. And the foreign a*liates of multina-
tional !rms accounted for 33 percent of world exports in 1998 (UNCTAD, 2017).
Firm mobility is an important feature of the global economy.
The mobility of multinational !rms implies that even when taxes are levied
only on economic pro!ts, the pro!t tax still distorts the allocation of capital.
Multinational !rms have the ability to shift capital from one country to another
in their search for maximum after-tax pro!ts. By inducing reallocation of capi-
tal, the statutory corporate tax rate is an important instrument in the corporate
tax competition game. This holds even when all capital costs are deductible and
the corporate tax is not directly or indirectly incident on capital.
In this essay, I model tax competition as a simple game over multinational
!rm activity using the statutory corporate tax rate as the policy instrument. The
aim is to derive amodel that allows us to empirically identify the size of strategic
spillovers. I beginwith a two-countrymodel of tax competition for the economic
activity of a single multinational !rm. The two-country model highlights the
main mechanism driving tax competition: tax base spillovers. I then extend
this to a three-country three-!rm model to consider the relative importance of
di"erent neighbours. This extension captures the importance of heterogeneity
in tax competition—not all neighbours are equally important.
This model follows the traditional approach to corporate tax competition.
The traditional approach is based on theworkhorsemodel derived fromZodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). This approach focuses on the inten-
sive margin of the !rm’s investment decision; relying on a continuous rather
than discrete investment decision. As in Hau%er and Schjelderup (2000) and
Devereux et al. (2008) I consider multinational !rms.
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2.1.1 Setup
There are two countries which are similar in all respects. A single multinational
!rm has existing production capacity in both Country A and Country B. The
multinational !rm owns a !xed amount of capital K . Capital, along with an un-
observed !xed location-speci!c factor, is used to produce a homogeneous good
at a price normalised to 1.
In the !rst stage of the game, the governments choose their tax rate, taking
the other country’s tax rate as given. In the second stage, the multinational !rm
chooses its optimal allocation of capital across the two countries—kA and kB. As
is standard practice, I solve the model using backward induction.
2.1.2 Firm
A single multinational !rm has production located in each of two countries:
country A and country B. The !rm makes pro!ts π(kA) in country A and π(kB)
in country B. Capital can be costlessly reallocated across countries. I make stan-
dard assumptions about the nature of the pro!t function: π′(k)> 0, π′′(k)< 0 and
π′′′(k) = 0. Re%ecting the majority of corporate tax systems, I assume that taxa-
tion is on a source basis, with pro!ts derived in country A being taxed in country
A. The tax is an ad valorem tax rate given as τA in country A and τB in country
B. The !rm seeks to maximise the sum of its pro!ts across these two operations
subject to the capital constraint. The !rm’s objective function is:
max
kA ,kB
(1−τA)π(kA)+ (1−τB)π(kB)
s.t. K = kA +kB. (2.1)
Taking !rst derivatives with respect to kA and kB, I combine the !rm’s !rst-order
conditions. The !rm’s optimal allocation of capital across countries A and B is
de!ned by the condition:
(1−τA)π
′(kA)= (1−τB)π
′(kB) (2.2)
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The!rmoptimises global pro!tswhere themarginal after-tax pro!ts are equalised
across jurisdictions. A change in the tax rate of either country induces a change
in the optimal capital allocation. Implicitly di"erentiating kA with respect to τA
and τB, we get:
∂kA
∂τA
=
π′(kA)
(1−τA)π′′(kA)+ (1−τB)π′′(kB)
, (2.3)
∂kA
∂τB
=
−π′(kB)
(1−τA)π′′(kA)+ (1−τB)π′′(kB)
. (2.4)
The denominators of both these implicit derivatives are negative since π′′(k)< 0
by assumption. Further, both π′(kA) and π′(kB) are positive by assumption. This
means that an increase in country A’s tax rate leads to a decrease in capital in
country A. An increase in country B’s tax rate leads to an increase in capital in
country A.
How does this work? An increase in country A’s tax rate leads to a reduction
in the marginal after-tax pro!t in country A. The !rm can now make a greater
marginal after-tax pro!t in country B than in country A. The !rmmoves capital
from country A to country B until there is no additional gain from reallocating
capital from country A to B. Since marginal pro!t is decreasing in capital by
assumption, then reducing capital in country A will increase marginal pro!t in
A, while increasing capital in B will reduce marginal pro!t in B. According to
Equation 2.2, this reallocation will occur until marginal after-tax pro!ts are once
again equalised across the two countries. Themultinational !rm responds in the
opposite manner when country B increases its tax rate, reallocating capital from
country B to country A until the optimality conditions are satis!ed again.
These implicit di"erentials capture the main mechanism driving tax com-
petition. When a change in country B’s tax rate a"ects the multinational !rm’s
choice of capital in country A, this is a base spillover. Base spillovers drive tax
competition.
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2.1.3 Government
The government in country A sets the corporate tax rate of pro!ts to maximise
tax revenue RA . Revenue maximisation is a simplifying assumption made in a
number of precedingworks. This assumption is typically justi!ed by the fact that
corporate tax revenue tends to be a small portion of total tax revenue, therefore
having little in%uence on the overall marginal cost of public funds. The govern-
ment of country A takes the tax rate of country B as given, and also takes the
!rm’s optimality conditions as given. The government knows that a change in
the tax rate induces a reallocation of capital. Country A’s objective is:
max
τA
RA = τAπ(kA) (2.5)
Di"erentiating with respect to τA gives the revenue-maximising condition:
∂RA
∂τA
=π(kA)+τAπ
′(kA)
∂kA
∂τA
= 0 (2.6)
The government faces the standard tax trade-o". An increase in the tax rate
induces a mechanical e"ect, increasing the amount of revenue per dollar of a
!xed tax base. However, increasing the tax rate also induces a behavioural e"ect
through the !rm’s optimal behavioural response to the tax rate change. De!ne
the tax semi-elasticity of capital as e = −(∂kA/∂τA)/kA . The semi-elasticity in-
dicates the percentage change in capital located in Country A in response to a 1
percentage point change in Country A’s own tax rate. This is akin to the elasticity
used in empirical work to measure the responsiveness of foreign direct invest-
ment to tax rates. The !rst-order condition of the government can be rearranged
to describe the revenue-maximising tax rate as:
τ∗A =
π(kA)
π′(kA)ekA
(2.7)
Note that the greater the responsiveness of capital to tax rates (e), the lower the
optimal tax rate will be. More importantly, this can be considered to be govern-
ment A’s best response function to τB since the !rm’s optimal choice of kA is an
implicit function of τB.
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2.1.4 Strategic Spillovers
Country A’s best response to a change in countryB’s tax rate is de!ned as a strate-
gic spillover. Strategic spillovers can be formalised by linearising the govern-
ment’s best response function around a symmetric equilibrium where τA = τB.
A strategic spillover is de!ned as the total derivative,
dτ∗
A
dτB
=−
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
/∂2RA
∂τ2
A
. (2.8)
Proposition 2.1. Strategic Complements. Tax rates in Country A and Coun-
try B are strategic complements. Country A’s best response to a tax increase in
Country B is to increase its tax rate such that
dτ∗
A
dτB
> 0 (2.9)
Proof.
The second derivative of the revenue function is
∂2RA
∂τ2
A
=π′(kA)
[
τA
∂2kA
∂τ2
A
+2
∂kA
∂τA
]
+τAπ
′′(kA)
(
∂kA
∂τA
)2
. (2.10)
The term outside the parentheses is negative given that π′′(kA)< 0. The second
term inside the square brackets is negative given that ∂kA/∂τA < 0. Using the
assumption π′′′(k) = 0, I obtain an expression for the second implicit derivative
of kA with respect to τA:
∂2kA
∂τ2
A
=
π′′(kA)
∂kA
∂τA
[
(1−τA)π
′′(kA)+ (1−τB)π
′′(kB)
]
+π′(kA)π
′′(kA)
((1−τA)π′′(kA)+ (1−τB)π′′(kB))
2
(2.11)
Replacing ∂kA/∂τA with Equation 2.3 then gives
∂2kA
∂τ2
A
=
2π′(kA)π
′′(kA)
[(1−τA)π′′(kA)+ (1−τB)π′′(kB)]
2
(2.12)
which is negative. The overall second derivative of the revenue function with
respect to the home tax rate is therefore negative. From Equation 2.8, this im-
plies that the sign of the total strategic spillover will take the same sign as the
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cross-partial derivative of the government’s objective function with respect to
τB. This cross-partial derivative is given by:
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
=
∂kA
∂τB
[
π′(kA)+τAπ
′′(kA)
∂kA
∂τA
]
+τAπ
′(kA)
∂2kA
∂τB∂τA
(2.13)
The !rst term in this expression is positive. The second term in this expression
needs to be signed. Di"erentiating the implicit derivative of kA with respect to
τA again by τB gives:
∂2kA
∂τB∂τA
=
π′(kA)π
′′(kB)−π
′(kB)π
′′(kA)
((1−τA)π′′(kA)+ (1−τB)π′′(kB))
2
. (2.14)
Beginning at a symmetric equilibriumwhere τA = τB, and where (1−τA)π′(kA)=
(1−τB)π
′(kB), then π′(kA)=π′(kB). By symmetry of the countries themselves, we
assume that π′′(kA) = π′′(kB). This means that the above expression is equal to
zero. For simplicity, we can then rewrite the cross-partial derivative as:
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
=
∂kA
∂τB
[
π′(kA)+τAπ
′′(kA)
∂kA
∂τA
]
, (2.15)
which is unambiguously positive. Therefore, given an increase in the corporate
tax rate in country B, country A’s best response is to increase its own corporate
tax rate.
How does this work? The e"ect of an increase in τB is to reduce the marginal
after-tax pro!tability of the !rm in that country, leading the multinational !rm
to reallocate capital from country B to country A. This rebalancing means that
country A now has a larger tax base and will maximise revenue at a higher tax
rate. The usual testable prediction that emerges from a standard model of tax
competition is that tax rates are strategic complements in the competition for
mobile capital.
Notice that two main mechanisms form the basis of the theory of tax com-
petition. Firstly, multinational !rms respond to higher corporate tax rates by re-
ducing economic activity in higher tax countries and reallocating capital across
borders. Secondly, governments respond to changes in their tax bases due to
capital movement (base spillovers) by changing their optimal tax rate. Combin-
ing these two mechanisms provides us with a theory of international corporate
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tax competition.
2.1.5 Three Countries
I now extend the model from a two-country one-!rmmodel to a three-country
model. There are three countries A, B, and C. Each country competes for the
mobile capital of a single multinational !rm. The !rm’s optimal allocation of
capital now depends on the tax rates in each of these three countries. However,
the bilateral reaction functions depend only on partial derivatives (holding all
else constant), and therefore remain the same.
I take the approach of Davies and Voget (2008), which is to identify the rela-
tive responsiveness of country A to countries B and C. That is, why does country
A respond more to a tax cut in country B compared to a similar tax rate change
in country C? I express the reaction functions dτA/dτB and dτA/dτC as a ratio,
and consider what determines country A’s relative responsiveness to countries
B and C.
Proposition 2.2. Relative Responses. The size of the response of country A to
country B relative to the size of the response of country A to country C is an
increasing function of the size of base spillovers from country B to country A
and a decreasing function of the size of base spillovers from C to country A.
Proof. The ratio of country A’s strategic best responses to countries B and C
is:
dτA
dτB
/
dτA
dτC
=
−
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
/∂2RA
∂τ2
A
−
∂2RA
∂τC∂τA
/∂2RA
∂τ2
A
=
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
∂2RA
∂τC∂τA
. (2.16)
Substituting in for Equation 2.15, I get:
dτA
dτB
/
dτA
dτC
=
∂kA
∂τB
[
π′(kA)+τAπ
′′(kA)
∂kA
∂τA
]
∂kA
∂τC
[
π′(kA)+τAπ′′(kA)
∂kA
∂τA
]
=
∂kA
∂τB
/
∂kA
∂τC
. (2.17)
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The derivatives ∂kA/∂τB and ∂kA/∂τC measure the size of base spillovers result-
ing from country B and country C’s tax rate changes, respectively. This says that
country A’s relative response to countries B and C depends on relative size of
base spillovers. If strategic spillovers depend on the size of base spillovers, we
can simply state that strategic spillovers are larger between two countries if base
spillovers are larger between those two countries. Corporate tax competition
therefore predicts that countries should respond more to countries that gener-
ate larger base spillovers. Base spillovers therefore de!ne the structure of tax
competition.
2.1.6 Three Firms
I now extend the model to a three-country, three-!rmmodel. Each country has
a home multinational, denoted by the lower case of the country name: a,b, c.
Each multinational has production capacity in each of the three countries, and
each has the same pro!t function π(k). I do not consider competition in the
goods market or strategic price setting. The only feature di"erentiating these
multinational !rms is the origin of their capital: each multinational !rm raises
its capital at home, but can deploy it in whichever country it wishes. Denote kaA
as the amount of capital originating in country A that is employed in production
in country A. The government of country A’s revenue function is therefore:
RA = τA [π(kaA)+π(kbA)+π(kcA)] . (2.18)
This says that the government has taxing rights over the pro!t of all three multi-
national !rms that are generated within its jurisdiction. It does not assume taxing
rights over the home multinational’s foreign pro!ts. This is the source princi-
ple of international taxation. The government’s new !rst-order condition for
revenue maximisation is:
∂RA
∂τA
=π(kaA)+π(kbA)+π(kcA)+τA
[
π′(kaA)
∂kaA
∂τA
+π′(kbA)
∂kbA
∂τA
+π′(kcA)
∂kcA
∂τA
]
(2.19)
Proposition 2.3. Base Spillovers. The best response of country A to country B
is increasing quadratically in three types of base spillover in response to a tax
increase in country B:
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1. the out%ow of capital from country A,
2. the in%ow of capital to country A from country B, and
3. the in%ow of capital to country A from country C.
These base spillovers are de!ned by the set of partial derivatives:
{∂kaA
∂τB
,
∂kbA
∂τB
,
∂kcA
∂τB
}
. (2.20)
Proof.
The cross partial derivative, which signs the reaction function, can then be
updated to:
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
=π′(kaA)
∂kaA
∂τB
+π′(kbA)
∂kbA
∂τB
+π′(kcA)
∂kcA
∂τB
+τA
[
π′′(kaA)
∂kaA
∂τA
∂kaA
∂τB
+π′′(kbA)
∂kbA
∂τA
∂kbA
∂τB
+π′′(kcA)
∂kcA
∂τA
∂kcA
∂τB
]
(2.21)
Each of these partial derivatives can be interpreted as an observable %ow of capital
from one country to the other. For example, ∂kcA represents the out%ow of
capital from country C to country A. Beginning from a symmetric equilibrium
where τA = τB = τC , then
∂kaA
∂τA
=−
∂kaA
∂τB
. (2.22)
If capital %ows are symmetric in equilibrium, then we can rewrite the cross-
partial derivative of the revenue function as:
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
=π′(kaA)
∂kaA
∂τB
+π′(kbA)
∂kbA
∂τB
+π′(kcA)
∂kcA
∂τB
+τA
[
π′′(kaA)
(
∂kaA
∂τB
)2
+π′′(kbA)
(
∂kbA
∂τB
)2
+π′′(kcA)
(
∂kcA
∂τB
)2]
(2.23)
Further simplifying using the assumption of symmetry of multinational !rms
so that π′(kaA) = π′(kbA) = π′(kcA) = π′(kA) and π′′(kaA) = π′′(kbA) = π′′(kcA) =
π′′(kA), then
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
=π′(kA)
[
∂kaA
∂τB
+
∂kbA
∂τB
+
∂kcA
∂τB
]
−
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τAπ
′′(kA)
[(
∂kaA
∂τB
)2
+
(
∂kbA
∂τB
)2
+
(
∂kcA
∂τB
)2]
(2.24)
The response of country A to a tax change in countryB is expressed as a quadratic
function of three capital %ows. Similarly, the relative responsiveness of country
A to countries B and C is also an increasing function of these three capital %ows.
This can be shown by dividing
dτA
dτB
/
dτA
dτC
=
∂2RA
∂τB∂τA
/
∂2RA
∂τC∂τA
. (2.25)
What determines this ratio? This ratio would depend on {∂kaA/∂τC , ∂kbA/∂τC ,
∂kcA/∂τC}, and on {∂kaA/∂τC , ∂kbA/∂τC , ∂kcA/∂τC}. This implies that it is the rel-
ative ratio of these base spillovers from country B to A, and from C to A that
determine the relative optimal response of country A to countries B and C.
A tax change in country B has three e"ects on country A’s tax base: total
out%ows, in%ows from B, and third market in%ows from country C. Similarly, a
tax change in country C has three e"ects on country A’s tax base: total out%ows,
in%ows from C, and third market in%ows from country B. The relative size of
these %ows determines the relative size of a country’s best responses to its neigh-
bours. By extending the model to three multinational !rms, we can identify the
speci!c capital %ows that matter for tax competition. And these speci!c capital
%ows match the bilateral cross-border capital data that is available.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
2.2.1 Identi!cation
The standard approach to estimating the magnitude of strategic spillovers is the
spatial econometric approach. This approach expresses the tax rate in country
A as a linear function of the tax rates in countries B and C:
τA = ρBτB+ρCτC +ε (2.26)
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As we increase the number of countries who might be neighbour to Country
A, this estimation method becomes impractical due to over-parameterisation.
Consider a full set of countries indexed i, j,k ∈ 1, . . . ,n. The solution is to linearly
combine the tax rates of all neighbours into a spatial lag:
τi = ρ
n∑
j 6=i
wi jτ j+ε. (2.27)
This is the spatial autoregressive process. Identi!cation of a spatial autoregres-
sive process comes from the chosen spatial structure—the weight matrix W .
This requires imposing spatial structure on themodel. For each pair of countries
i and j, the strength of the relationship between the two of them is measured by
a weight wi j. The closer the weight matrix comes to approximating the true un-
derlying spatial structure, the stronger and more convincing identi!cation will
be.
The theoretical model tells us that the relative weight placed on countries
j’s and k’s tax rate changes depend on the expected e"ects their respective tax
rate changes will have on country i’s tax base. Denote k ji as capital originating
in country j but located in country i. Theory suggests that the correct weight
placed on country j depends on the full set of partial derivatives:
{∂kii
∂τ j
,
∂k ji
∂τ j
,
∂kki
∂τ j
}
(2.28)
Tax competition is rationalised by the presence of a base spillover. Therefore the
intensity of tax competition is identi!ed by the intensity of the base spillover. If
there is no base spillover between two countries, then there is no reason for com-
petition to exist between them. For example, Wilson andWildasin (2004) de!ne
tax competition as non-cooperative tax setting where each government’s choices af-
fect the allocation of a mobile tax base among them.
In reality, governments do not have complete information about the full set
of partial derivatives ∂ki j/∂τ j for all i, j = 1, . . . ,n. Becker and Davies (2017) focus
on this incomplete information, modelling the process of governments learning
these elasticities based on previous outcomes (capital allocations) and strategies
(tax rate choices). Even the academic literature is mainly limited to estimating
a single semi-elasticity using data on a number of countries. This literature is
30
reviewed in Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). If a government has an estimate of
a single average semi-elasticity (e¯), then it can approximate the expected e"ect
of a speci!c country’s tax rate change based on the size of existing cross-border
investment between them. Using the de!nition of the semi-elasticity of capital
with respect to the foreign tax rate, then for any pair of countries we get
− e¯ ·ki j =
∂ki j
∂τ j
. (2.29)
So for a constant tax semi-elasticity, the larger the bilateral capital stock between
country i and country j, the larger will be the partial derivative. Where the gov-
ernment does not know the country-speci!c semi-elasticities but has knowledge
of some average semi-elasticity, it can estimate of ∂ki j/∂τ j using the size of the
bilateral stock of investment between these two countries: ki j.
I empirically implement this strategy by calculatingwi j for each pair of coun-
tries using a weighting scheme similar to those used by the United States Federal
Reserve and European Central Bank to produce trade-weighted exchange rates
(see Loretan (2005) andBuldorini et al. (2002) for further details). This weighting
scheme accounts for the three partial derivatives in Equation 2.28 by using cap-
ital in%ows from j to i, capital out%ows from i to j and the competition between
j and i for capital in%ows from a third country k.
The weight that country i places on country j is given by wi j and uses data
on in%ows x ji from j to i, out%ows vi j from i to j, and a measure of their com-
petition for in%ows from a thirdmarket k. The weights for in%ows is given as the
proportion of total in%ows and that come from country j:
wXi j =
x ji∑N
j 6=i
xi j
(2.30)
Similarly, the weight for out%ows is calculated as the proportion of total out%ows
from country i that go to country j:
wVi j =
vi j∑N
j 6=i
vi j
(2.31)
The third market competitiveness weight, wC
i j
, combines the importance of in-
%ows from each third country k to country i’s total in%ows (wX
ik
) and the level of
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market share that country j has in that third market k, given by wV
k j
.
wCi j =
N∑
k 6= j 6=i
wX
ik
·wV
k j
1−wV
ki
(2.32)
These three weights are then combined, weighting them by the relative impor-
tance of out%ows and in%ows to country i:
wi j =
[ ∑N
j 6=i
vi j∑N
j 6=i
x ji+
∑N
j 6=i
vi j
×wVi j
]
+
[ ∑N
j 6=i
x ji∑N
j 6=i
x ji+
∑N
j 6=i
vi j
× (0.5 ·wXi j +0.5 ·w
C
i j)
]
(2.33)
I use the square of all ki j values to approximate the quadratic formderived in the
theoretical model. Many ad hoc weighting schemes in the literature apply the
quadratic form to the inputs (for example Heinemann et al. (2010) andOveresch
and Rincke (2011)). The reason is that it emphasises local clustering—making
near neighbours very important—while not ignoring the possibility of global ef-
fects (Kopczewska et al., 2017). Additionally, using squared values creates a degree
of sparsity in the spatial structure; and sparsity generates clearer identi!cation.
2.2.2 Heckman Two-Step Correction
Tax competition is a dynamic game, with tax changes beingmade in steps rather
than a one-shot jump to equilibrium. To produce an empirically useful model,
we need to think of tax competition as a dynamic game. Corporate tax rates
are not reset each year. This might be perceived as ‘sluggishness’, implying an
autoregressive process (Overesch and Rincke, 2011). Or it might be the result
of a discrete choice decision problem (Heinemann et al., 2010). We observe
tax rates following a jump process, with piece-wise constant trajectories—rather
than drifting slowly over time like othermacroeconomic variables. This suggests
that it is muchmore likely that tax competition should bemodelled as a discrete
choice problem.
In those periods where tax rates did not change, I see two possible expla-
nations. Either the numerous determinants of the optimal corporate tax rate
remained unchanged, or there is some adjustment cost of changing the tax rate
to its optimal value. It seemsmore plausible that there are !xed adjustment costs
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of changing the tax rate. In this case, we can consider the static tax competition
model to be the stage game of a repeated game.
In period t, the government can either play its best response from the tax
competition stage game or leave its tax rate unchanged. The !xed cost of chang-
ing its tax rate is c. The bene!t of changing the tax rate is the additional revenue
the government would receive from playing its best response. The government
would only choose to change its tax rate when the bene!ts of doing so outweigh
the costs.
τtA =


τ∗
A
(τt
B
) if R(τ∗
A
(τt
B
))−R(τt−1
A
)> c
τt−1
A
otherwise
(2.34)
We do not observe the value of c, especially as it might be a perceived or im-
plicit cost rather than a real cost. This cost of changing the tax rate can arise
from various sources: political constraints, the cost of implementing new legis-
lation, or the cost of business uncertainty. The most crucial implication is that
we cannot know whether periods with unchanged tax rates are a best response
to the tax competition stage game. Only in periods where the tax rate is changed
can we be sure that we are observing the government’s best response to the tax
competition stage game.
It is important to view tax competition as a two-stage process. First, I model
the government’s decision to change the tax rate. Second, I consider the best
response to the tax competition game. I do not treat periodswhere no tax change
occurred as being a best response to the tax competition state game. There is a
strong chance that the decision to change the tax rate depends on the value of
the underlying true best response. Small changes in the best response might not
result in a tax rate change if the costs exceed the bene!ts of a small change in the
tax rate.
To model this two-stage process I adopt the Heckman (1976) sample selec-
tion approach. I !rst model the decision to change the tax rate as a function of
the foreign tax rate and a number of controls capturing the dynamics of the po-
litical process. Heinemann et al. (2010) examine the factors that in%uence the
government’s decision to change its tax rate. I use the fraction of seats held by
the government to measure the ease with which the government might be able
to pass new legislation. I also include the Her!ndahl Index Government which
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is measured as the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the govern-
ment. This gives a more detailed measure of the concentration of government
power. I add a categorical variable capturing the economic policy orientation of
the governing party: left, right, or centre. Finally, I add a dummy for if there was
a legislative election in the year and a dummy for if there was an executive elec-
tion in the year. These political variables are all taken from the Inter-American
Development Bank Database of Political Institutions. The estimation includes
country !xed e"ects. From the !rst stage regression, I calculate the Inverse Mills
Ratio (IMR) and include it in the second stage (the main model).
2.2.3 Other Empirical Matters
Controls I include a number of country-speci!c controls that are likely alter-
native determinants of the tax rate. These are mostly in line with the preceding
literature. I include a de jure measure of capital account openness: I use the
Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account openness index to control for the potential
that increasing openness alone drives corporate tax rates down. I also include
a measure of trade openness: imports plus exports as a ratio of GDP. I control
for the personal income tax in case the corporate tax acts as a backstop to the
personal tax, or if tax reforms are undertaken as a full package. I include govern-
ment consumption expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) as a !rst-order
proxy of the demand for public goods. I also include second-order determinants
of the demand for the public good. I use the share of the population under 14
and the share of the population over 65, since these are the portions of the popu-
lation ineligible to work and typicallymost dependent on government spending.
I also include the share of the population living in urban areas. Finally, I add a
variable that captures the share of a country’s total outward foreign direct in-
vestment stock that is located in tax havens. This should separate responses to
pure tax competition from responses to arti!cial pro!t shifting into tax havens.
This !nal variable is the only real deviation from preceding works in the set of
controls.
Simultaneity Bias The spatial econometric literature has had to deal with one
major concern in the spatial autoregressive model: simultaneity bias. If all gov-
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ernments choose their tax rates at the same time, then we are likely to encounter
simultaneity. This implies that the foreign tax rate is endogenous, as it would de-
pend on the home country’s tax rate. Where tax rates are expected to be strategic
complements (moving in the same direction), simultaneity bias—if it exists—
should bias the ordinary least squares estimate upward. There are two accepted
methods of dealing with simultaneity bias in the spatial autoregressive model.
The !rst is the spatial instrumental variable approach used in themajority of the
preceding literature on tax competition. This approach uses the weighted aver-
age of neighbours’ controls to instrument for the endogenous foreign tax rate.
There are serious concerns with this approach. Lyytikäinen (2012) shows that
the spatial instrumental variable approach !nds large strategic spillovers where
a natural experimental approach on the same data shows no evidence of strate-
gic spillovers. In fact, initial estimates using the instrumental variable approach
produce a larger coe*cient than the OLS estimates. This is odd, since the prob-
lem that we are trying to !x is that OLS estimates are biased upward (De Giorgi
et al., 2016). The approach appears to create additional bias rather than elimi-
nating it. Both Elhorst and Fréret (2009) and Fréret and Maguain (2017) report
and discuss these in%ated estimates.
I adopt the second approach to dealing with simultaneity bias, which is esti-
mation via maximum likelihood. It requires careful speci!cation of the spatial
patterns through theory in order to support credible causal interpretation. The
maximum likelihood approach likely provides greater clarity and requires less
caution in interpretation than the spatial instrumental variable approach (Fréret
and Maguain, 2017).
Weight Matrix Endogeneity The possibility exists that the network structure
itself might be endogenous to the tax rate. The tax rate is a determinant of the
foreign direct investment %ows to a country. A number of approaches to solving
the endogeneity problem are discussed in Qu and Lee (2015). Themost intuitive
approach is the instrumental variable approach, which requires either an instru-
mental variable or knowledge of the network formation process. Fortunately,
there is a rich gravity model literature examining the theoretical and empirical
underpinnings of foreign direct investment %ows across borders. I use a grav-
ity model without the tax rate as a predictor. I estimate a simple version of the
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gravity model with foreign direct investment expressed in natural logs. Predic-
tors included are the natural log of gross domestic product, the Chinn-Ito capi-
tal account openness index, the total population size, the urban population size,
government consumption to GDP, the sum of imports and exports as a ratio of
GDP, and dummies for the existence of a signed or in force bilateral trade agree-
ment between the countries. I also include a full set of country-pair !xed e"ects
and year !xed e"ects. I use the predicted values from the gravity model in the
main spatial model to construct the weight matrix.
2.2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use tax rate data for 131 countries to calculate the weighted average foreign tax
rate for each country, using all other countries in the dataset. I obtain data on top
corporate tax rates from a number of sources. The main source is the Oxford
University Centre for Business Taxation’s top corporate tax rate. For countries
where the Centre for Business Taxation does not have tax rate data, I augment it
with data from the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal A"airs Division2. Tax
rates vary from 75 percent in Iran from 1990 to 1992, to 0 percent in Moldova
from 2008 to 2011. Figure 2.1 shows that tax rates have been concentrated in the
range of 20 to 40 percent.
Figure 2.1: Histogram of Tax Rates
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Bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) data are obtained from a combina-
tion of the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) database
2I must express thanks to Ruud De Mooij for providing the data used in Crivelli, De Mooij,
and Keen (2016).
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and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD)
database. The primary source is the OECD’s database, with UNCTAD data used
to !ll the gaps.
TheChinn-Ito index of capital account openness Chinn and Ito (2008) is used
to measure capital account openness. Personal income tax rates are obtained
from a combination of sources including the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Cen-
ter and the OECD. The top personal income tax rate is used. In some cases, top
local tax rates are combined with top federal tax rates to produce an overall top
personal income tax rate. Public consumption is quanti!ed as public expendi-
ture as a percentage of nominal GDP. This data is obtained from theWorld Bank.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population data are also obtained from the
World Bank. The proportion of the population under 14, the proportion of the
population over 65, and the proportion of the population living in urban areas
are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. All polit-
ical variables used in the !rst stage of the two-stage Heckman sample selection
model are obtained from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Database of
Political Indicators.
To capture the e"ect of pro!t shifting activity on tax rates, I employ the stock
of foreign direct investment held by country i in all tax havens as a proxy. This is
measured as a percentage of total outward foreign direct investment from coun-
try i. Corporate pro!t shifting requires setting up a subsidiary in a tax haven
irrespective of the form pro!t shifting takes (Palan et al., 2013). Setting up sub-
sidiaries leaves a trail of investment that is captured in foreign direct investment
statistics. That tax havens attract a level of foreign direct investment vastly dis-
proportionate to their size is a smoking gun. Even excluding three outlier tax
havens with inward foreign direct investment to GDP ratios in excess of 1,000
percent, the average inward foreign direct investment stock of tax havens was
still 129.5% of GDP. In the full data set, the average foreign direct investment held
in tax havens as a percentage of total outward foreign direct investment is 10.8
percent. There are a large number of zero observations, implying either that
we do not observe the bilateral foreign direct investment stocks or there is no
bilateral investment into tax havens. The average, excluding these zero values,
is 15.3 percent. Tax havens are de!ned as in Davies et al. (2017): countries with
abnormally corporate-friendly tax policies that are likely to encourage arti!cial
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location of pro!ts. The primary sample of tax havens is drawn from the OECD’s
original blacklist of 37 countries. I broaden this sample to include a number of
countries that are widely acknowledged to be tax havens, giving a total of 65 tax
havens.3
2.3 Estimates of Strategic Spillovers
I estimate the reaction function for 76 countries where there were 359 corporate
tax rate reforms from 1984 to 2015. This is less than the full dataset of 131 coun-
tries since data for the controls variables are not available for all countries, and
not all countries change their tax rates. However, all available tax rate data are
used in the construction of the weighted average foreign tax rate (the spatial lag).
Themain results of this study are obtained from amaximum likelihood esti-
mation using the proposed foreign direct investment weights instrumented us-
ing the predictions from a foreign direct investment gravity model. The results
of this gravity model are presented in Table 2.6. I demean the main data so that
the model controls for country !xed e"ects. This eliminates between-country
variation anduses onlywithin-country variation, controlling for country-speci!c
time-invariant characteristics. I also include the Inverse Mills Ratio, estimated
from a !rst-stage regression on the decision to change the tax rate using 1,771
observations. The results of this !rst-stage regression are shown in Table 2.7.
The dependent variable is therefore 1(t ∈T), where t denotes the periods where
the tax rate was changed so that τt 6= τt−1. The InverseMills Ratio should account
for possible selection bias in estimating the best responses to the tax competition
game. The main estimated model is therefore:
τit =αi+ρ
n∑
j 6=i
wi jt ·τ jt+βX it+γIMR+εit. (2.35)
for all t ∈ T. The main results of this essay are presented in Table 2.1. These re-
sults are estimated using only periods where the corporate tax rate was changed.
The coe*cient of interest is ρ, which measures the average strategic spillover
from corporate tax competition.
3The list of tax havens is available on request from the author.
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I !rst estimate themodel using only a small set of controls: government con-
sumption, the personal income tax rate, the Chinn-Ito capital account openness
index, and the share of foreign direct investment to tax havens. This estimation
returns a strategic spillover of 0.409. The second model estimated includes the
shares of the population under 14 and over 65, along with the share of the pop-
ulation living in urban areas. These demographic controls improve the !t of the
model and reduce the estimated strategic spillover to 0.242. Adding the sum of
imports and exports as a ratio of GDP further reduces the estimated coe*cient
to 0.227. Finally, estimating the full model, but excluding the Inverse Mills Ratio
increases the estimate only marginally to 0.232.
The preferred estimate of 0.227 is interpreted as a 1 percentage point decrease
in the weighted average foreign tax rate induces a 0.227 percentage point decrease in the
home tax rate. This is substantially smaller than themain estimates of 0.69 uncov-
ered by Devereux et al. (2008) and Overesch and Rincke (2011), and the 0.71 un-
covered by Redoano (2014). These previous estimates are three times larger than
my estimate. This is partially explained by the modelling strategy, and partially
explained by the choice of weight matrix.
Two factors in particular seem to play a strong role in the reduction of cor-
porate tax rates: capital account openness and trade openness. Their impacts
are unsurprising. In fact, a substantial portion of the early literature on tax com-
petition focused on the e"ect of increasing openness on tax rates, discussed in
Devereux and Loretz (2013). Given the optimal corporate tax rate formula in
Equation 2.7, it is intuitive to think that higher levels of mobility lead to lower
optimal corporate tax rates. The results suggest that greater openness has led to
lower corporate tax rates. Increasing foreign direct investment to tax havens also
seems to play a role in tax rate cuts.
I re-estimate these models without instrumenting the foreign direct invest-
ment values with predictions from the gravity model. The estimated strategic
spillovers are given in Table 2.2, and are only slightly di"erent to themain results
in Table 2.1. The model appears robust to concerns of the weight matrix being
endogenous.
39
Table 2.1: Main Estimates of Strategic Spillovers on Corporate Tax Rates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
w ·τJ 0.409
∗∗∗ 0.242∗ 0.227∗ 0.232∗
(0.096) (0.111) (0.106) (0.103)
Gov’t consumption 0.045 0.139 0.112 0.112
(0.092) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094)
Personal tax rate 0.069 0.040 0.106 0.131
(0.369) (0.346) (0.341) (0.338)
Chinn-Ito Index −0.052∗∗∗ −0.037∗ −0.028 −0.033∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
FDI to tax havens −0.089∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.032 −0.027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Population 0-14 0.649∗∗ 0.570∗ 0.655∗∗
(0.238) (0.251) (0.231)
Population 65 and up −0.784∗∗∗ −0.699∗∗ −0.499∗∗
(0.236) (0.230) (0.169)
Urban Population −0.040 −0.007 −0.070
(0.120) (0.122) (0.117)
(Imports+Exports)/GDP −0.055∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014)
Inverse Mills Ratio −0.013∗∗ −0.013 −0.010
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
R2 0.315 0.416 0.433 0.431
Observations 359 359 359 359
Statistical signi!cance is given by ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All models are estimated using maximum likelihood. The depen-
dent variable is the statutory tax rate τi .
Country Sample Are these di"erent results a function of using a broader sam-
ple of countries? Earlier studies such as Devereux et al. (2008), Overesch and
Rincke (2011) and Redoano (2014) focused on developed countries—OECD or
European countries. More recent studies such as Crivelli et al. (2016) examine
a broad range of countries (173) including developed and developing countries.
Their results suggest that base spillovers are actually larger for developing coun-
tries, implying that their optimal response to tax competition should be larger
than those of developed countries. More importantly, their results seem to back
this up. Using OECD countries as in Devereux et al. (2008), Crivelli et al. (2016)
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Table 2.2: Estimates of Strategic Spillovers without Instrumented FDI Weights
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
w ·τJ 0.433
∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.255∗∗
(0.085) (0.098) (0.094) (0.092)
R2 0.331 0.423 0.438 0.435
Observations 359 359 359 359
Statistical signi!cance is given by ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All models are estimated using maximum likelihood. The depen-
dent variable is the statutory tax rate τi .
!nd no signi!cant evidence of strategic spillovers. However, they !nd strategic
spillovers of 0.5 for non-OECD countries. For low- and middle-income coun-
tries, their estimate of strategic spillovers is even larger at 0.7. The results of
Crivelli et al. (2016) suggest that by including low- andmiddle-income countries,
the estimate of strategic in this essay should actually be higher than if I focused
solely on developed or high-income countries. This strongly suggests that in-
cluding developing countries in this essay should not bias the estimates in this
essay downward. Table 2.A shows the World Bank income classi!cations of the
countries in my sample.
Two-Stage Process The decision to model tax competition as a two-stage pro-
cess also results in lower estimates of strategic spillovers. I re-estimate the main
model without using the Heckman two-stage process. All observations avail-
able are included in the regression, giving 1,356 observations rather than the 359
used in Table 2.1. Table 2.3 shows the results of this exercise. The main estimate
increases from 0.227 to 0.379. This suggests that including all observations as
best responses in%ates estimates of strategic spillovers. The likely reason for this
in%ation is that treating all observations as best responses wouldmean that it ap-
pears small changes in the foreign tax rate in a single year induce large changes
in the home tax rate. The truth, however, is that small changes in the foreign
tax rate over a series of years will accumulate into large foreign tax changes that
force a large response by the home country.
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Table 2.3: Using All Observations as Best Responses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
w ·τJ 0.523
∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
R2 0.346 0.393 0.427 0.430
Observations 1356 1356 1356 1345
Statistical signi!cance is given by ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All models are estimated usingmaximum likelihood. Models 1 to 3
use the same controls as Models 1 to 3 in Table 2.1. In Model 4 I add the controls used
in the !rst stage regression in the Heckman sample selection model.
2.3.1 Comparisons
Previous works have used weighting schemes that aim to loosely approximate
the true nature of interaction between countries. These can be broken into two
types: aggregate weights and bilateral weights. Aggregate weighting schemes as-
sume that all countries have approximately the same importance to all other
countries. An aggregate weighting scheme constructs a leave-out-one weighted
average in calculating the foreign average tax rate, where the country left out is
the home country. Therefore variation in the foreign tax rate across countries
depends on the importance of the home country in the weighting scheme. Ex-
amples are the uniform weight (or unweighted average), gross domestic product
(GDP) weights, total foreign direct investment weights (Devereux et al., 2008),
and population size (Exbrayat, 2017). Bilateral weights acknowledge the hetero-
geneity of importance across neighbours. For example, Canada might be more
important to the United States than China is, but China is more important to In-
dia than Canada is. Themain form of bilateral weights used are distance weights
(Overesch and Rincke, 2011; Redoano, 2014). Other bilateral weights used in-
clude market potential weights (Davies and Voget, 2011), and trade integration
(Exbrayat, 2017). A further survey of the literature can be found in Leibrecht
and Hochgatterer (2012).
Does the foreign direct investment weight matrix actually provide a substan-
tial improvement over previous weighting schemes not derived from theory?
Is there some means of testing whether any of the weighting schemes provide
convincing empirical identi!cation? Identi!cation depends on the variation in
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the exogenous variable—the weighted average foreign tax rate. While we can-
not manipulate the corporate tax rates of neighbours to provide identi!cation,
we can attempt to observe those neighbour tax rates that matter the most. The
weighted average foreign tax rate—the source of identi!cation—depends heav-
ily on the choice of the weight matrix.
Figure 2.2: Histogram of Weighted Foreign Tax Rates
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Since identi!cation depends on the calculated foreign average tax rates, I plot
the distribution of the foreign average tax rate for a range of weighting schemes.
I use the popular ones: uniformweights, GDPweights, total inward plus outward
foreign direct investment weights (aggregate foreign direct investment), and in-
verse distance. I compare these to the weights I propose: bilateral foreign direct
investment and bilateral foreign direct investment instrumented by the gravity
model. The distributions of these weighted average foreign tax rates are plotted
as histograms in Figure 2.3.1. They show that the aggregate weighting schemes
(uniform, GDP, foreign direct investment) produce very odd distributions of the
weighted average tax rate, concentrated in a speci!c range and truncated very
sharply. More oddly, they exhibit patches in themiddle of the distributionwhere
no observations fall. The distance weights exhibit a more reasonable distribu-
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tion. There is neither severe truncation nor holes in the distribution. However,
from the range of a 25 percent to 48 percent tax rate, the distribution appears al-
most uniform. In contrast, the bilateral foreign direct investment weights both
generate almost normal distributions of the weighted average foreign tax rate.
LeSage and Pace (2014) make clear that small changes in the weight matrix
should not induce substantial changes in the estimated coe*cients. To examine
whether these weight matrices are similar (or not substantially di"erent), they
suggest a simple method. They suggest generating a standard independent nor-
mal n×1 vector u and calculating the correlation Corr(W1u,W2u) to capture the
correlation between two alternative weight matrices W1 and W2. If these two are
highly correlated, the results of themodels should not be economically di"erent.
Table 2.4: Correlations of Alternative Weight Matrices
FDI-IV FDI-Bi FDI Distance GDP Uniform
FDI-IV 1
FDI-Bi 0.908 1
FDI 0.060 0.066 1
Distance 0.073 0.071 0.305 1
GDP -0.026 -0.018 0.003 -0.044 1
Uniform 0.027 0.026 0.369 0.342 -0.007 1
Correlations between weight matrices are computed according to LeSage and
Pace (2014) as the pairwise correlation Corr(W1u,W2u) for each pair of matrices.
Table 2.4 presents the proposed correlation matrix for the various weighting
schemes. As expected, the two bilateral foreign direct investment weight matri-
ces are highly correlated (0.91). Concurring with LeSage and Pace (2014), they
have been also shown to generate very similar estimates of strategic spillovers.
In stark contrast, the bilateral foreign direct investment weights show very low
correlationwith any of the other weighting schemes. Correlationwith the aggre-
gate foreign direct investment weights is 0.060, with distance 0.073, with GDP
-0.026, and with the uniform weight matrix, 0.027. The implication is that there
is almost no correlation between bilateral foreign direct investment weights and
popular ad hoc weights, suggesting that the !nding of economically signi!cant
di"erences in estimates is justi!ed.
Having shown that the variation used to identify tax competition is substan-
tially di"erent when using bilateral foreign direct investment tax rates, I now
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Table 2.5: Estimates Strategic Spillovers Using Alternative Weight Matrices
Uniform GDP FDI Distance
w ·τJ 0.511
∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.124) (0.110) (0.090)
R2 0.461 0.455 0.446 0.461
Obs. 398 398 380 398
Statistical signi!cance is given by ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All models are estimated using maximum likelihood. The models
estimated in the table are the same speci!cation as that estimated in Model 3 of Table
2.1. Models include all controls and are estimated using the Heckman sample selection
method. For eachmodel estimated, the speci!ed weightmatrix is given by the column
name.
re-estimate the main tax competition model using these alternative weighting
schemes. For comparability, I continue to use the Heckman two-stage approach,
treating only tax rate changes as best responses. The results of these estimates
are presented in Table 2.5. They include the full set of available controls as in
Model 3 of Table 2.1.
The estimated strategic spillover is 0.511 for uniform weights, 0.499 for GDP
weights, 0.395 for aggregate foreign direct investment weights, and 0.389 for
distance weights. These estimated coe*cients are between 1.7 to 2.2 times larger
than the corresponding estimated coe*cient of 0.227 for the bilateral foreign di-
rect investment weights. Note that even these estimates are substantially smaller
than the estimates produced in previous works using the same weight matrices.
The main reason for this di"erence is the exclusion of periods where tax rates
did not change. Including periodswhere the tax rate did not change, the uniform
weights generate a coe*cient of 0.653, very close to themain result of 0.69 from
Devereux et al. (2008) (see Table 2.9 in the Appendix).
Themain estimate of 0.69 inDevereux et al. (2008) is based on anunweighted
network structure. Devereux et al. (2008) also include a model that weighs each
country by their total in%ows plus out%ows of foreign direct investment, pro-
ducing a smaller coe*cient of 0.34. However, they reject these estimates on the
grounds of endogeneity. The estimate of 0.69 in Overesch and Rincke (2011) is
based on distance weights. Similarly, Redoano (2014) use distance weights in her
main estimate of 0.71. Redoano (2014) explicitly explains that distance is a proxy
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for the cost of bilateral cross-border investment %ows, which is expected to be
inversely related to cross-border investment %ows. I take amore direct approach
and simply use cross-border %ows as the weights. Crivelli et al. (2016) !nd an es-
timate around 0.47 using an inverse distance weighting matrix for 125 countries,
which is still twice as large as the estimated coe*cient in this essay.
2.3.2 Graphical Evidence
Tax competition presents a simple testable prediction for identi!cation: a country
should respond more to a tax cut by a ‘close’ neighbour compared to a similar tax cut by
a ‘far’ neighbour. Nearness is de!ned by the empirical weight wi j we choose to
represent the relationship between two countries. This simple prediction is the
basis of identi!cation in a spatial model.
To examine this prediction, I separate neighbouring countries into four groups
of ‘nearness’ for each weight matrix. Near neighbours are those neighbours we
expect to induce a higher strategic spillover. Far neighbours are those we expect
to induce a smaller strategic spillover. Quartile 1 (Q1) are far neighbours while
quartile 4 (Q4) are near neighbours. Nearness is calculated based on an average
of wi j over the entire period. I recalculate the weighted average foreign tax rate
within each quartile. As graphical evidence, I plot a scatterplot of the home tax
rate, τi, against the weighted average foreign tax rate for each quartile,
∑
wi j ·τ j.
Note that these are expressed as deviations from the mean for comparability
across countries (as is used in the regression estimates). For visual clarity I bin
the scatter points. I add simple bivariate regression lines for each quartile. Iden-
ti!cation is convincing if the regression lines are steepest for near neighbour and
%attest for far neighbours.
The results for themain bilateral foreign direct investmentweighting scheme
instrumented by the gravity model are presented in Figure 2.3. Identi!cation
in the bilateral foreign direct investment weighting scheme says that a country
should respond more to a tax cut by a country with which it has a strong cross-
border investment relationship, than to tax cut by a country with which it has
little cross-border investment activity. The graphical evidence strongly suggests
that the bilateral foreign direct investment weights achieve the predicted iden-
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Figure 2.3: Binned Scatterplot by Quartile for Foreign Direct Investment-
Instrumental Variable Weights
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The chart plots the weighted average tax rate against the home tax rate. All data are expressed
in deviations from the country-speci!c mean. Only periods where the tax rate was changed
are included. Binned values are the average home tax rate for a range of the weighted average
foreign tax rate. Regression lines are a separate bivariate regression for each quartile.
ti!cation. The steepest slope is quartile 4—the nearest neighbours. The %attest
slope is quartile 1—farthest neighbours. In fact, all four quartiles show increas-
ing strategic spillovers as nearness increases. Under the theoretically-implied bi-
lateral foreign direct investment weight matrix, we !nd that countries respond
more to tax rate changes in near neighbours than in far neighbours.
Is this identi!cation unique to the bilateral foreign direct investment weights?
To consider this question, I conduct the same exercise for the alternative weight
matrices. The results are shown in Figure 2.4. Tellingly, we cannot conduct
this exercise for the uniform weights used in Devereux et al. (2008) since these
weights assume that all countries are equally near/far.
For distance weights, the scatterplot suggests that countries respond most
intensely to their farthest neighbours. This displays the potential confusion in
using distance alone as a measure of cross-border investment. Competition for
multinational !rms depends in a complexmanner on distance, depending heav-
ily on the type of foreign direct investment being considered—horizontal, ver-
tical, or export-platform. It is di*cult to argue that distance is a clear predictor
of the size of base spillovers.
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Figure 2.4: Binned Scatterplot by Quartile Alternative Weights
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The chart plots the weighted average tax rate against the home tax rate. All data are expressed
in deviations from the country-speci!c mean. Only periods where the tax rate was changed are
included. Regression lines are a separate bivariate regression for each quartile. Binned values
are the average home tax rate for a range of the weighted average foreign tax rate. Each chart
represents a di"erent weighting scheme.
For the aggregate weights—GDP and aggregate foreign direct investment—
there is no clear identi!cation. The slopes across quartiles are very similar for
both weights. GDPweights show an incorrect ordering, but at least identi!es that
the slope is steeper for the biggest (nearest) neighbours than smallest (farthest)
neighbours. The slope for aggregate foreign direct investment weights are al-
most all equal, but captures the fact that countries respond somewhat more to
big (near) neighbours.
I also include the un-instrumented bilateral foreigndirect investmentweights
for comparison. Identi!cation is almost as clear as in the instrumented version:
countries respond most intensely to their nearest neighbours, and less intensely
to their farthest neighbours. The only di"erence is in the farthest neighbours—
the slope of the reaction functions for quartiles 1 and 2 are almost equal. Coun-
tries are shown to respond with the same intensity to their farthest half of neigh-
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bours.
This exercise shows that the bilateral foreign direct investment weighting
scheme instrumented by the gravity model generates convincing identi!cation.
Countries respond more to tax rate changes by their near neighbours than tax
rate changes in their far neighbours. The alternative weighting schemes consid-
ered do not provide convincing identi!cation.
2.4 Under-Provision of the Public Good
What di"erence does it make if the strategic spillover between countries on cor-
porate tax rates is 0.69 or 0.23? Considering that the coe*cient is reasonably
expected to run from 0 to 1, it makes an economically signi!cant di"erence. Tax
competition is predicted to result in the under-provision of public goods, but
themagnitude of under-provision depends on how large strategic spillovers are.
Di"erent works have tried to quantify the under-provision of the public good
that results from tax competition in di"erent ways. Wildasin (1989) estimates
the magnitude of the ine*ciency attributable to tax competition. Parry (2003)
tries to answer the question of welfare costs of tax competition by parameter-
ising a generalised version of the Wildasin (1989) model, based on assumptions
about how governments set optimal tax rates in the absence of tax competition
and about how governments respond to !scal externalities. Benassy-Quere et al.
(2007) consider the case where public goods are inputs into the !rm’s production
process and positively impact on marginal productivity. While lower tax rates
cause an in%ow of capital, it also demands lower public input provision andmit-
igates the potential for in%ow. The intuitive result is that the under- or even
over-provision of the public good depends on the relative size of two elasticities:
the elasticity of capital with respect to the tax rate, and the elasticity of capital
with respect to the public input. They !nd that capital still %ows out even when
an increase in the tax rate is combinedwith an increase in public inputs, meaning
that we remain in the under-provision interval of the potential tax competition
outcomes. Sørensen (2000, 2001) simulates the e"ects of tax coordination using
a computational general equilibrium approach for the European Union. Men-
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doza and Tesar (2005) suggest that due to the large distortions of the capital tax,
competition leading to a race to the bottom actually entails large welfare gains,
and therefore the gains from coordination are small. The only real e*ciency
losses that might arise are those from the misallocation of capital when consid-
ering asymmetric countries with di"erent production possibilities.
I use a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to compare the potential pub-
lic good under-provision from tax competition implied by various estimates of
strategic spillovers. Public good under-provision can bemeasured as the tax rev-
enue lost as a result of lower equilibrium tax rates due to tax competition. The
revenue lost can be measured as the counterfactual tax rate multiplied by the
counterfactual tax base minus actual corporate tax revenue. Strategic spillovers
can be used to estimate the counterfactual tax rates that would exist if there
were no changes in the foreign tax rate. For these simple calculations, I make
the assumption that the global tax base is !xed. This is not an entirely realis-
tic assumption since we know that the higher tax rate would induce behavioural
responses that would lower the tax base. However, it provides an upper bound
on lost tax revenue and allows me to highlight the di"erences in the levels of
under-provision implied by various estimates.
Using data for 2012, I calculate the counterfactual tax rate for each country
in the dataset as if there were no tax competition. I set the coe*cient on the
weighted average foreign tax rate to zero and compare the original !tted values
of the model to the counterfactual tax rate with no strategic spillovers. I use the
preferred estimate of 0.227 for the bilateral foreign direct investment weights,
and the results from the corresponding speci!cations for the alternative weight-
ing schemes.
I measure the under-provision of the public good in terms of the implied
percentage of revenue lost due to tax competition. Figure 2.5 shows the result
of this back-of-the-envelope calculation. The estimate of strategic spillovers us-
ing GDP weights implies a 13.78 percent reduction in public good provision due
to tax competition. Uniform weights imply a 12.35 percent reduction in public
good provision. Distance weights imply a 10.95 percent reduction in public good
provision. Aggregate foreign direct investment weights imply a 10.54 percent re-
duction in public good provision. The simple bilateral foreign direct investment
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Figure 2.5: Public Good Underprovision Due to Tax Competition
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weights imply a much smaller 4.63 percent reduction in public good provision.
The preferred instrumented bilateral foreign direct investment weights imply a
small 3.7 percent reduction in public good provision.
The di"erence between the public good under-provision implied by the al-
ternative weight matrices and the bilateral foreign direct investment weight ma-
trices is economically substantial. The strategic spillovers I estimate in this essay
suggest that the losses from tax competition are modest compared to the losses
implied by previous estimates. The losses implied by previous estimates rang-
ing from 0.6 to 0.7 would be even larger than those presented above. Estimates
in the range of 0.6 to 0.7 have been used to inform analyses such as the IMF
(2014) spillover analysis. In analysing the spillover e"ects from the United States
corporate tax rate cut from35 to 21 percent, Beer et al. (2018) suggest that a strate-
gic spillover estimate of 0.6 would triple the estimated loss in tax revenue from
base spillovers in neighbouring countries. The results of this essay suggest that
tax competition generates far more muted under-provision of the public good
than previous estimates suggest. Magnitudes matter, and this exercise highlights
the importance of clearly identi!ed estimates of tax competition for informing
the policy debate on the race to the bottom.
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2.5 Conclusion
Corporate tax competition is expected to lead to an under-provision of the pub-
lic good. At the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game, tax rates are
below the social optimum. But how far below that social optimum? And how
much under-provision of the public good does it imply?
This essay seeks to answer those questions. I estimate themagnitude of strate-
gic spillovers on corporate tax rates between governments. I extend the standard
model of tax competition to a three-country model with three multinational
!rms. This model implies that the size of a government’s response to a neigh-
bour’s tax cut depends on the size of the base spillover implied by that tax cut.
I use the stock of foreign direct investment between two countries to measure
that bilateral base spillover. I convert these bilateral foreign direct investment
ties into a weight matrix using the approach typically applied to trade-weighted
exchange rates. Using this weight matrix derived from the theory of tax compe-
tition, I estimate a spatial autoregressive model of tax competition.
The results of this estimation suggest that a 1 percentage point reduction in
the weighted average foreign tax rate leads to a 0.23 percentage point tax cut by
the home country in response. This estimate of strategic spillovers is substan-
tially smaller than previous estimates using ad hoc weighting schemes. The con-
sensus existing estimate suggests the home country would respond by 0.6 to 0.7
percentage points. I show that these ad hocweights do not appropriately identify
the structure of tax competition. In fact, only the theoretically-implied bilateral
foreign direct investment weights manage to satisfy a simple test of identi!ca-
tion: that countries should respond more to a tax cut by near neighbours than
to a similar tax cut by far neighbours.
I use a back-of-the-envelope calculation tomeasure the di"erence in the pub-
lic good under-provision implied by the various weighting schemes. The ad hoc
weights—uniform, GDP, aggregate foreign direct investment, and distance—all
suggest public good under-provision between 10 and 14 percent of annual rev-
enue. The bilateral foreign direct investment weights suggest that the level of
public good under-provision is approximately 4 percent of revenue. This study
!nds that strategic spillovers on corporate tax rates between national govern-
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ments exist, but themagnitude of these spillovers is a third of the size of existing
estimates. The implication is that tax competition appears to result in onlymod-
est under-provision of the public good.
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2.A Appendix
Table 2.6: Gravity Model for FDI Instruments
ln(GDPi) 0.751∗∗∗
(0.082)
ln(GDP j) −0.360∗∗∗
(0.089)
Chinn-Ito Opennessi 0.345∗∗∗
(0.070)
Chinn-Ito Openness j 0.561∗∗∗
(0.079)
Urban Populationi 0.780
(0.568)
Urban Population j −1.205∗
(0.626)
Population Growthi −0.067∗∗
(0.027)
Population Growth j −0.040
(0.026)
Government Consumptioni −0.761∗
(0.457)
Government Consumption j −1.507∗∗∗
(0.434)
(Imports+Exports)/GDPi 1.071∗∗∗
(0.086)
(Imports+Exports)/GDP j 1.411∗∗∗
(0.097)
Bilateral Investment Treat In Force 0.285∗∗∗
(0.076)
Bilateral Investment Treat Signed −0.175∗∗
(0.079)
Observations 56,195
R2 0.935
Notes: Country i is the capital-receiving country. Coun-
try j is the capital-sending country. Model includes
country-pair and year !xed e"ects. Standard errors
in parentheses. Statistical signi!cance is given by ***
p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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Table 2.7: Estimation of Probability of Changing Tax Rate
w ·τJ −0.077
(0.654)
Majority −0.392∗∗
(0.186)
Legislative Election −0.131∗
(0.071)
Executive Election 0.003
(0.107)
Her!ndahl Index Government −0.546∗∗∗
(0.147)
Exec. Left/Right/Centre −0.037
(0.036)
Observations 1,772
Log Likelihood −1,208.134
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,428.268
Notes: Estimated as probitmodel. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. Statistical signi!-
cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05,
and * p< 0.1.
Table 2.8: Number of Countries inMainRegression byWorldBank IncomeClas-
si!cation in 1990 (rows) and 2014 (columns)
Low Lower Middle Upper Middle High NA Sum
Low 4 10 1 1 0 16
Lower Middle 1 4 13 3 0 21
Upper Middle 0 0 4 5 0 9
High 0 0 0 18 0 18
NA 0 3 3 6 0 12
Sum 5 17 21 33 0 76
‘NA’ is where theWorld Bank did not have an income classi!cation for the coun-
try. Rows represent the classi!cation in 1990 and 2014 represents the classi!ca-
tion in 2014.
Table 2.9: All Observations as Best Responses for Alternative Weight Matrices
Uniform GDP FDI Distance
w ·τJ 0.653
∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.035)
R2 0.447 0.434 0.424 0.458
Obs. 1620 1620 1508 1620
Statistical signi!cance is given by ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All models are estimated using maximum likelihood. The models
estimated in the table are the same speci!cation as that estimated in Model 3 of Table
2.3. Models include all controls without using the Heckman sample selection method.
For each model estimated, the speci!ed weight matrix is given by the column name.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Corporate Tax Base
Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
Tax reforms do not occur in a vacuum. A single country’s tax reform can have
a large impact on neighbouring countries. Corporate income tax reforms gen-
erate international externalities because of the highly mobile nature of multi-
national !rms. International externalities resulting from corporate tax rate re-
forms are de!ned as corporate tax base spillovers: the e"ect of a change in one
country’s tax rate on another country’s tax base. In 2011 the International Mon-
etary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
United Nations, and the World Bank presented a joint report to the G-20 De-
velopment Working Group that recommended G-20 countries should “under-
take ‘spill over’ analyses of the impact of any signi!cant changes in our own tax
systems on those of developing countries" (IMF et al., 2011). Spillover analysis
is required because the actions of countries designed to improve the competi-
tiveness of their own tax system have the impact of reducing the ability of its
neighbours to raise corporate tax revenue. And corporate tax base spillovers are
the fundamental force underlying corporate tax competition.
Intuition tells us that corporate tax base spillovers are substitutionary: a de-
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crease in a country’s corporate tax rate will steal pro!ts away from its neighbour.
This intuition stemsmainly from the theory of the horizontalmultinational !rm
and from multinational !rms’ arti!cial pro!t shifting behaviour. And empirical
evidence con!rms this to be true on average across many countries (Heckemeyer
and Overesch, 2017; Beer et al., 2018). However, there are other theories that
predict various other behavioural responses of the multinational !rm. The ver-
tical multinational !rm and multinational !rms which rely on cheaper internal
!nancing may generate complementary spillovers instead. These are not com-
peting theories. They describe di"erent organisational structures and strategies
of the multinational !rm. And multinational !rms are complex creatures, such
that many of these behavioural responses might even happen within the same
!rm. Corporate tax base spillovers, therefore, may not always be purely substi-
tutionary.
In this essay, I estimate corporate tax base spillovers disaggregated at the
country level and the country-pair level. I !rst estimate the average spillover
impact that tax reforms in each of 17 European Union countries had on their Eu-
ropean neighbours. I then estimate the corporate tax base spillover from each
country i to each other European country j individually. This gives a matrix of
425 country-pair corporate tax base semi-elasticities for the period 2007 to 2016.
I !nd that there is signi!cant heterogeneity in the estimates; spillovers vary in
magnitude, direction, and signi!cance. Spillovers appear to fall on a continuum
between complementary and substitutionary.
Conceptually, to estimate the spillover from country A’s tax rate change to
country B’s tax base, I use multinational !rms with a*liates in both country A
andB. I compare the pro!ts of its a*liate in countryB to domestic !rms in coun-
try B and multinational !rms which operate in country B but not in country A.
This gives two control groups, and results remain robust to excluding domes-
tic !rms. I implement this strategy using a generalised di"erence-in-di"erences
methodology combinedwith coarsened exactmatching onwithin-industry !rm
size. Importantly, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine of pro!ts to capture the full
response of !rms—including both positive pro!ts and negative pro!ts (losses). I
use data on !rms in 26 European countries from 2007 to 2016 from the Bureau
van Dijk’s Amadeus database.
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I estimate average country-speci!c spillovers in a number of di"erent forms
to attempt to elicit patterns from the data. I estimate tax base spillovers for hori-
zontal multinational !rms and for vertical multinational !rms. I also control for
changes in the tax base. I include measures of real factors of production to see
whether arti!cial pro!t shifting drives tax base spillovers. The results seem to
suggest that horizontal multinationals generate more substitutionary spillovers
than vertical multinationals, and that arti!cial pro!t shifting might make up a
substantial portion of corporate tax base spillovers.
To understand the heterogeneity of spillovers, I take advantage of the sub-
stantial variation in estimated country-pair semi-elasticities. I regress the country-
pair semi-elasticities on country-pair characteristics. These characteristics are
derived from the body of theory on multinational !rms and tax competition.
Horizontal multinational !rms are predicted to arise when trade costs are higher
and when countries havemore similar endowments. I !nd that themore similar
two countries’ purchasing power is, the more likely spillovers are to be substitu-
tionary between them. Vertical multinational !rms are predicted to arise when
factor endowments are very di"erent. Surprisingly, using labour cost di"eren-
tial as a proxy, I !nd that the larger the wage di"erential, the more substitu-
tionary the spillover. I !nd that country size and public inputs seem to provide
a location-speci!c rent that mitigates the substitutionary spillover e"ects of a
corporate tax rate change. These !ndings provide a !rst practical step towards
understanding how corporate tax base spillovers work. The importance of this
work arises when we need to make policy predictions about the spillover e"ects
of corporate tax rate reforms. This work provides us with the foundational tools
to be able to predict spillovers more accurately at a country-by-country level.
And we can base these predictions on empirically relevant economic mecha-
nisms.
The recent United States’ Tax Cut and Jobs Act has sparked a debate on the
spillover e"ects of their tax reform. Beer et al. (2018) is a key work examining the
spillover e"ects of the United States tax rate cut from three sides: the arti!cial
spillover e"ects, the real spillover e"ects, and the policy spillover e"ects. Draw-
ing on previous average spillover estimates, they de!ne heterogeneity among
countries based on the relative importance of the United States market to each
country. They use the number of multinational !rm links in the Orbis dataset,
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and as a robustness check, the bilateral foreign direct investment %ows between
countries. Beer et al. (2018) predict that the United States’ corporate tax rate cut
of 14 percentage points (from 35 percent to 21 percent) will likely reduce other
countries’ tax revenue frommultinational !rms by 1.6 to 4.5 percent on average.
Boumans et al. (2019) conduct surveys of German !rms. Only a few !rms
in the survey derive at least 5 percent of their revenue from the United States
(approximately 13). Of !rms deriving more than 5 percent of their revenue in
the United Stats, only 18 percent expect a change in the tax burden in the short
run, and that rises to only 25 percent in the long run. Only 14 percent of them
intend to increase investment in the United States, while 6 percent intend to re-
duce investment in the United States. And 26 percent of those !rms who plan to
increase investment in the United States will counterbalance that with a reduc-
tion in investment in Germany. Two things from their research are striking, and
providemotivation for this research. First, only a small portion of German !rms
surveyed intend to change their investment activity. Three percent of all !rms
intend to change investment activity in the United States and only 1.8 percent
intend to change investment activity in Germany. Second, there exists quite a
bit of heterogeneity in responses to the tax reform.
This essay is related to a wide range of papers that measure various forms of
spillover e"ects. A large number of papers measure the impact of a home coun-
try tax change on the in%ow of capital (Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011). Becker et al.
(2012) !nd that an increase in the tax rate not only reduces the level of foreign
investment, but also the reported pro!tability of !rms locating there. Without
further assumptions, these estimates do not tell us exactly how other countries’
corporate tax base (pro!ts) are impacted. In general, there are two types of tax
base spillover e"ects that the literature has focused on: location of real invest-
ment, and arti!cial pro!t shifting (Beer et al., 2018). Using !rm-level data, Becker
and Riedel (2012) and Davies et al. (2016) examine the e"ect of tax changes on
!rm cross-border investment. Becker andRiedel (2012) !nd complementarity in
cross-border investment at the !rm level, but substitutionary e"ects when con-
sidering arti!cial pro!t shifting. Following the conceptual frameworks of Hines
Jr and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008), a number of works mea-
sure arti!cial pro!t spillovers as a function of tax di"erentials between a*liates.
This work is reviewed byHeckemeyer andOveresch (2017) and Beer et al. (2018).
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Methodologically, this essay is similar to Gri*th et al. (2014), who also estimate
cross tax elasticities in Europe. Their cross tax elasticities are for location of own-
ership of intellectual property rather than for pro!ts. This paper is also linked
to the broader theme of base spillovers conducted at the aggregate level. Works
such as Crivelli et al. (2016) and IMF (2014) estimate the size of average aggregate
revenue spillovers.
I make two key contributions to the literature. First, I present the !rst evi-
dence ondisaggregated corporate tax spillovers by estimating cross-tax or spillover
semi-elasticities of pro!t for European countries. This evidence suggests that av-
erage spillover e"ects mask substantial heterogeneity in country-pair spillovers.
Second, I provide the !rst meaningful understanding of how these spillover
semi-elasticities are determined. This is a step towards a structural understand-
ing of the heterogeneity of corporate tax base spillovers. These are signi!cant
contributions that can help us to make better policy predictions in the future.
In the following section I outline a number of theories that detail the poten-
tial responses a multinational !rm might have to a corporate tax rate change.
I describe the data used in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 I estimate the average
spillover for each country’s tax rate reforms, and extend this to disaggregated
country-pair spillovers in Section 3.5. Using the country-pair semi-elasticities
in a meta-analytical style, I provide new evidence for why corporate tax base
spillovers may be heterogeneous across countries in Section 3.6.
3.2 Potential Spillovers
A multinational !rm is a business that conducts productive economic activity
in more than one country. The multinational !rm is the ‘organizational form
that de!nes foreign direct investment’ (Kogut, 2001). Multinational !rms tend
to be complex creatures. As a result, a multinational !rm might have a range of
optimal responses to a tax change. These responses might result in competing
e"ects thatmay lead to an ambiguous overall response. Therefore, for any single
multinational !rm the spillover response may be either substitutionary or com-
plementary. A substitutionary response says that an increase in the tax rate in one
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country leads the multinational !rm to generate more pro!ts in another coun-
try. A complementary response suggests that a tax increase in any countrywould
lead it to reduce pro!ts in other countries. The result is that it may be useful to
think of spillover responses as operating on a continuum from purely substitu-
tionary to purely complementary, depending on which e"ect dominates. Desai
et al. (2005) notes that substitutionary behaviour and complementary behaviour
are likely to be operational for di"erent !rms at di"erent times.
In the following section, I examine various theories that make predictions
about the spillover responses ofmultinational !rms to corporate tax rate changes.
Note that each model depends on a somewhat di"erent organisational form for
themultinational !rm. The organisation of themultinational !rm heavily in%u-
ences how it responds to corporate tax rate changes. This, by nomeans, serves as
an exhaustive list of the potential responses of multinational !rms to corporate
tax rate changes.
3.2.1 The Horizontal Multinational
The !rst formalmodel of the horizontalmultinational !rm is found inMarkusen
(1984). Horizontal multinational !rms replicate productive activity across coun-
tries to avoid trade barriers or transport costs from servicing a foreign market
(Brainard, 1993). The !rm either produces everything in the home country to
satisfy demand in both the home and foreign country, or it sets up production in
both countries. Setting up production in a foreign country carries an additional
!xed cost. Horizontal multinational !rms are therefore market-oriented—they
are concerned with serving the foreign market pro!tably.
Consider a !rm with productive capacity in two countries f (k1) and f (k2),
where k is capital and countries are indexed by 1 and 2. The !rm’s production
functions carry the standard assumption that f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0. The !rm
has limited capital available K , which it allocates between k1 and k2. The !rm
seeks to maximise its global pro!ts by solving the problem:
max
k1,k2
Π= (1−τ1)( f (k1)− rk1)+ (1−τ2)( f (k2)− rk2)
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s.t. k1+k2 =K . (3.1)
This gives the optimality condition:
(1−τ1)( f
′(k1)− r)= (1−τ2)( f
′(k2)− r). (3.2)
Using the implicit function theorem, we can examine the e"ect of a change in
the tax rate in country 2 on the equilibrium allocation of pro!ts in country 1.
This gives:
∂k1
∂τ2
=
−( f ′(k2)− r)
(1−τ1) f ′′(k1)+ (1−τ2) f ′′(k2)
> 0. (3.3)
The term ∂k1/∂τ2 is positive. An increase in the corporate tax rate in one country
will lead horizontal multinational !rms to increase pro!ts in a*liate countries.
That is, for horizontal multinationals, their response to tax reform is substitu-
tionary. An increase in country 2’s tax rate leads the multinational !rm to sub-
stitute activity away from country 2 and into country 1. This is the standard type
of result that underpins the theory of tax competition (Keen and Konrad, 2014).
It is this type of !rm behaviour that is expected to lead to a race to the bottom
in corporate tax rates as governments compete for multinational !rm activity.
Notice, however, that if a !rm’s capital stock K is large, it can bid themarginal
product all the way down to f ′(k)= r in both countries, so that λ= 0. That is, the
marginal increase in global pro!t resulting from an extra unit of capital stock
is zero. This has a severe impact on the expected substitutionary spillover: the
e"ect ∂k1/∂τ2 would go to zero. This means that the more cash-rich !rms are,
the less likely their capital responses are to be substitutionary in this traditional
manner. This discussion resembles the new view versus old view discussion of
the neoclassical theory of the !rm (Chetty and Saez, 2010; Becker and Fuest,
2011).
Becker and Riedel (2012) !nd substantial evidence that multinational !rms’
real spillover responses are complementary. Their theoretical model alters the
standard horizontal multinational model in a manner that generates comple-
mentarity. Speci!cally, they include a common input across both a*liates that
increases the productivity of capital. This good is ‘common’ in the sense that it is
non-rival so that its use in country 1 does not prohibit its use in country 2. This
can be thought of as the !rm-speci!c advantage of Dunning (1988).
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3.2.2 The Vertical Multinational
Vertical multinational !rms take advantage of a country’s comparative advan-
tage. Vertical multinational !rms split their supply chain across countries to take
advantage of di"erences in factor prices, factor endowments, and technology
across countries (Helpman, 1984). Most multinational !rms carry some vertical
element. For example, horizontal multinationals do not duplicate all activities,
but frequently rely on the home a*liate for headquarter services. Thismakes the
theory of the vertical multinational at least partly relevant for almost all multi-
national !rms.
Note that many perceive vertical multinationals as substitutionary because
they tend to outsource production from one country to another. However, in
this essay I am concerned with the intensive margin—once multinational plants
have already been set up. Once vertical plants have been set up, economic output
in one country is used as an input to production in another country. This means
that pro!ts generated in these two countries should bemutually interdependent.
Consider amultinational !rm that produces an intermediate good x2 in coun-
try 2. This intermediate good is needed for production of !nal output in country
1. Due to the existence of some !xed factor of production in both countries, the
!rm generates positive pro!ts in both countries. The !nal output production
function in country 1 is f (x2), with f ′(x2) > 0 and f ′′(x2) < 0. The intermedi-
ate input in country 2 is most e*ciently produced at cost c(x2) with c′(x2) > 0
and c′′(x2) > 0. The intermediate input is sold at an arm’s length price w from
the multinational a*liate in country 2 to the a*liate in country 1. The multi-
national !rm takes this price as !xed. I make this assumption so as to exclude
transfer pricing concerns from the analysis. I focus on tax base spillovers gen-
erated by movement of real factors in this simple model. The price of the !nal
output is normalised to 1.
The !rm is taxed on pro!ts it generates in both countries. In country 1 it is
taxed at the rate τ1, and in country 2 it is taxed at the rate τ2. The !rm’s global
pro!t function therefore takes the form:
Π= (1−τ1)( f (x2)−wx2)+ (1−τ2)(wx2− c(x2)). (3.4)
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Themultinational !rm’s aim is to maximise global pro!ts, choosing the amount
of x2 it wishes to produce and use. The !rm’s !rst-order condition for maximis-
ing global pro!t is:
∂Π
∂x2
: (1−τ1)( f
′(x2)−w)+ (1−τ2)(w− c
′(x2))= 0. (3.5)
We are interested in how a change in the corporate tax rate in country 2 a"ects
pro!ts generated in country 1. Before-tax pro!ts in country 1 are de!ned as:
π1(x2)= ( f (x2(τ1))−wx2(τ1)). (3.6)
Taking the derivative of this equation with respect to τ2, I get:
∂π1(x2)
∂τ2
=
∂x2
∂τ2
(
∂ f (x2)
∂x2
−w
)
. (3.7)
Ifmarginal before-tax pro!ts in country 1 are positive, then the sign of ∂π1(x2)/∂τ2
depends on the sign of ∂x2/∂t2. This can be signed using the implicit function
theorem for the !rst-order condition of the !rm:
∂x2
∂τ2
=
w− c′(x)
(1−τ1) f ′′(x2)− (1−τ2)c′′(x2)
. (3.8)
By the assumptions that f ′′(x2) < 0 and c′′(x2) > 0, if marginal pro!t in country
2 is positive, then ∂x2/∂τ2 is negative. This says that an increase in the tax rate
in country 2 reduces the production of the intermediate good x2. This implies
that the !rm reduces pro!t in country 1 in response to a tax increase in country
2 if the !rm is vertically fragmented such that x2 is needed for production in
country 1 to take place.
This represents an extremeversion of the idea that imported inputs are needed
formultinational production. This is themost intuitive way to think of vertically
integrated or ‘fragmented’ multinationals. Boehm et al. (2019) !nd strong evi-
dence that the relationship between imported and domestic inputs is close to the
Leontief technology. More speci!cally, they !nd that the short-run elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported inputs is close to zero. I capture
this simply by assuming that the intermediate input produced in country 2, x2,
is the single input the !rm chooses in country 1.
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Becker and Riedel (2012) empirically identify complementarity, !nding that
a 10 percent increase in the corporate tax rate in one country leads European
multinational !rms to reduce the capital stock by 5.6 percent in a*liate coun-
tries. Desai et al. (2005, 2009) !nd that outward foreign direct investment com-
plements domestic American economic activity rather than substituting forAmer-
ican economic activity. Complementarity coincides with the likelihood that the
multinational !rm’s level of global production is not !xed, but rather responds
to pro!t opportunities. Substitution would hold when a multinational’s global
production level is !xed due to resource limits, capacity constraints, or market
competition. It is intuitive to think that if investment %ows into a country after a
tax cut, then it is necessarily substituting away from investment somewhere else.
But this does necessarily not hold for a vertical multinational !rm.
3.2.3 Pro!t Shifting
Arti!cial pro!t shifting is one of the more popular explanations for corporate
tax base spillovers that a"ect both horizontal and vertical multinational !rms.
Arti!cial pro!t shifting represents a key reason why we intuitively tend to think
of corporate tax base spillovers as being substitutionary. Arti!cial pro!t shifting
is the use of some tax devices to move the location of pro!ts from a high tax
jurisdiction to a low tax jurisdiction on paper, withoutmoving the actual location
of economic activity. The aim is to minimise tax liability without disrupting the
real allocation of production. As Becker and Riedel (2012) discover, even if the
real investment behaviour of !rms is complementary, pro!ts may still respond
in a substitutionary manner due to the strong e"ects of pro!t shifting.
Empirical evidence is mounting that pro!t shifting is quite large. For exam-
ple, Tørsløv et al. (2018) estimate that 40 percent ofmultinational !rmpro!ts are
shifted to tax havens each year. Similarly, Janský and Palanský (2019) estimate
that around 1 percent of the gross domestic product of the 79 countries in their
sample is shifted to tax havens each year. This adds up to around 37 percent of
multinational !rm pro!ts, similar to Tørsløv et al. (2018). Crivelli et al. (2016)
highlight that this loss is particularly high for developing countries, who are es-
timated to lose around 1.7 percent of gross domestic product to pro!t shifting.
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Consider a multinational !rm who generates pro!ts in country 1. The !rm’s
actual pro!ts are !xed but it can shift pro!ts across borders. Actual pro!ts gen-
erated in country 1 are denoted π1, while pro!ts arti!cially shifted from country
1 to country 2 are denoted q2. There is a cost attached to shifting pro!ts from
country 1 to country 2, denoted c(q2). Assume a cost of pro!t shifting function
that is positive and increasing at an increasing rate in the level of pro!ts shifted
so that c(q2)> 0, c′(q2)> 0 and c′′(q2)> 0. This is standard in the literature on the
notion that the more pro!ts shifted, the more likely a !rm is to be caught and
!ned (Devereux et al., 2008). The !rm’s pro!t function is:
Π= (1−τ1)(π1− q2)− c(q2)+ (1−τ2)(q2) (3.9)
The !rm’s optimal choice of q2 is determined by the condition:
τ1−τ2 = c
′(q2). (3.10)
I am interested in the e"ect that an increase in country 1’s tax rate would have
on the amount of pro!ts shifted. This is given by the implicit partial derivative
∂q2
∂τ1
=
1
c′′(q2)
> 0. (3.11)
An increase in the tax rate in country 1 will increase arti!cialmultinational pro!ts
booked in lower-tax countries. This re%ects a pure substitutionary e"ect as a !rm
seeks to minimise its tax liability. An increase in the tax in country 1 increases
the pro!ts shifted to country 2. Conversely, an increase in country 2’s tax rate
should lead to less pro!ts being shifted into country 2. Much of the literature on
corporate tax spillovers has focused on arti!cial spillovers. Since Huizinga and
Laeven (2008) various works have measured the impact of tax rate di"erentials
on arti!cial spillovers across countries.
3.2.4 Internal Capital
Hubbard (1998) proposes a very simple idea. When taxes are lowered, !rms have
more after-tax pro!ts. These after-tax pro!ts can then be reinvested into the
!rm. Extending this idea to a multinational !rm, this means these pro!ts can
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be reinvested in any country the multinational operates in. That is, lower taxes
in one country can increase the multinational a*liate’s retained earnings, and
therefore increase the internal capital of the entire multinational !rm group.
Where the multinational chooses to invest then depends on which a*liate has
the highest marginal return on capital.
But why would a multinational !rm prefer to use internal capital when it can
borrowon the external capitalmarket? Hubbard (1998) suggests that this happens
because external capital ismore costly. External investors do not have perfect in-
formation about the multinational !rm’s behaviour or prospects, and choose to
add an additional monitoring cost to the cost of external borrowing. This ad-
ditional cost makes external !nancing more expensive relative to the internal
opportunity cost of capital. Increasing the cost of capital would lead the multi-
national !rm to optimally choose to underinvest. This means that some output
is left on the table. When the !rm’s tax bill is reduced, the !rm receives greater
after-tax pro!ts, all else being equal. If it has investable projects available, then
the !rm now has greater retained earnings which it can invest at a lower cost—
the opportunity cost of capital. Internal funds mitigate the distortion induced
by the additional monitoring cost that comes with external capital.
Consider a !rm with two sources of capital: internal capital E and external
capital D. It can either invest internal capital at the world safe interest rate rE or
invest in the !rm. To borrow on the external market, it has to pay a premium
above the safe interest rate rD = rE+δ. The !rm’s weighted average cost of capital
is rE[E/(E+D)]+rD[D/(E+D)]. Assume the !rm has some !xed amount of inter-
nal capital available to it E, accumulated as retained pro!ts. As before the !rm’s
production function is simply f (k) where k is the sum of internal and external
capital: k=E+D. The !rm chooses capital k=D+E to maximise pro!ts:
max
D,E
π= f (k)−
(
rE
E
E+D
+ rD
D
E+D
)
(E+D)
s.t. E ≤E. (3.12)
The !rm’s !rst-order conditions are:
f ′(k)− rD = 0; (3.13)
f ′(k)− rE =λ. (3.14)
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An increase in one country’s tax rate will reduce pro!ts in a*liate countries if
multinational !rms rely on internal capital. The !rm chooses external capital
up to the point where the marginal product of capital is equal to the rate of re-
turn on capital. Notice that we can rewrite rD = rE +δ, such that the !rst-order
condition becomes f ′(k)− rE = δ. This gives us λ = δ, where λ is the value of
relaxing the constraint: ∂π/∂E. Since a reduction in the tax rate in any country
where the multinational !rm has an a*liate will increase its retained earnings
(internal capital E), then this is the relevant derivative. This implies that the ef-
fect of an increase in internal capital is to increase pro!ts by δ. The implication
of this simple model of internal capital is that a reduction in tax rates in any
country can lead the multinational !rm to potentially increase pro!ts in a*liate
countries. Egger et al. (2014) provide a full theoretical and empirical discussion
of the in%uence of corporate taxes on the multinational !rm’s internal capital
market.
3.3 Data
I use data from Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database on companies operating
in 26 European countries from 2007 to 2016. Amadeus provides administrative
!nancial accounts from business registers collected by local Chambers of Com-
merce across Europe. For most European countries, it is a requirement for !rms
of all sizes to !le balance sheet information. However, the data does not pro-
vide complete coverage. The Amadeus database also contains !rm ownership
information.
The properties of this data are well-known and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015)
discuss how to produce a representative sample. I clean the data as suggested
by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015). I keep only data which re%ects accounts over a
12-month period. If the !nancial account closes on or before June 1, it is counted
as the previous !nancial year. Otherwise it is counted as the current !nancial
year. This is not a major problem as most !nancial accounts close at the end
of the year. All companies with Bureau van Dijk identi!cation numbers that do
not accurately re%ect the country that the data says they are from are dropped.
All values are expressed in euros converting using Eurostat’s average annual ex-
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change rate data. Where any negative value is observed for total assets, the entire
company is dropped. Where there are year-!rm duplicates, I keep only themost
recent observation since this is likely due to a change in the accounting period. I
do not use data fromMalta and Cyprus since there are not enough observations.
Note that there is no data for Denmark prior to 2012, but I keep Denmark in the
study.
Multinational a*liates are identi!ed as corporations with an ultimate owner
who is also the ultimate owner of a*liates located in other countries. In this es-
say I de!ne ownership as a shareholder owning 51 percent or more of the !rm’s
equity. This is the clearest case where we can identify the International Financial
Reporting Standards’ de!nition of control needed for consolidation of !nancial
statements: that the shareholder has the power to direct the !rm’s activities af-
fecting its return, that the shareholder is exposed to variable returns from the
!rm, and that the shareholder has the ability to use that power to a"ect the !rm’s
returns. While this may occur with minority shareholders, I have chosen the
conservative de!nition of ownership, since this is the only case I can be sure that
control exists. Data from Bureau van Dijk has the substantial bene!t of captur-
ing cross-border ownership structures, which is the main reason for using it in
this study. In the raw data there are 924,168 multinational a*liates owned by
European parents and 823,818 a*liates owned by non-European parents.
Using the Nomenclature des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté
Européenne (NACE)Revision 2 Section classi!cation, I keep only !rms operating
in the non-!nancial business economy. This includes sectors of industry, con-
struction and distributive trades and services. More speci!cally, Eurostat con-
siders the non-!nancial business economy to be captured by NACE Revision 2
Sections B to J and L to N, and also including Group S95. Within each industry
within each country, I split the !rm into quartiles based on their average total
real assets over the period. Each !rm then has a speci!c country-industry-size
group to which it belongs. Figure 3.1 plots the distribution ofmultinational !rms
and domestic !rms across the various industries. Industry here is de!ned by the
!rm’s NACE Section classi!cation.
I use data on tax rates drawn from a variety of sources. This includes the Ox-
ford University Centre for Business Taxation’s database, the International Mon-
70
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Industry for Domestic and Multinational Firms
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etary Fund’s database1, Ernst and Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides,
KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey, the European Commission’s Taxes in Eu-
rope Database, and the University of Michigan’s World Tax Database. There are
17 European countries which conducted corporate tax rate reforms from 2007
to 2016. This gives me 41 tax reforms, the full list of which is detailed in Table
3.A.
The mean return on assets for multinational !rms is 5.26 percent, while the
mean return on assets for domestic !rms is slightly lower at 4.51 percent. This
conforms to the traditional expectation that multinational !rms are more prof-
itable. Thedistribution of returns on assets are very similar across the two groups.
From the perspective of size, however, the distributions of real assets are some-
what di"erent. Multinational !rms tend to be larger than domestic !rms. The
average of real assets held by a multinational a*liate is e114 million while the
average for domestic !rms is e10 million. The medians are also quite di"erent.
Themedian formultinational !rms ise9.8million while themedian for domes-
tic !rms is e3 million. Figure 3.2 plots the di"erence in the distribution of the
log of real total assets for multinational versus domestic !rms.
1So kindly provided by Ruud de Mooij from their paper "Base Erosion, Pro!t Shifting and
Developing Countries" (Crivelli et al., 2016).
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Firm Size for Domestic and Multinational Firms
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3.4 Estimating Country-Speci!c Tax Base Spillovers
This section presents themain results of this chapter. I examine the heterogene-
ity of corporate tax base spillovers using a generalised di"erence-in-di"erences
strategy. I extend the analysis to horizontal spillovers and arti!cial spillovers. In
all the following analysis, the variable of interest is pro!t or loss before taxes.
Pro!t before tax most closely approximates the taxable income of the !rm and
is the base that matters to governments.
The parameter of interest is the semi-elasticity of pro!ts in country j with
respect to the tax rate in country i. To transform the data in amanner that allows
us to estimate the semi-elasticity while still keeping zero-valued and negative-
valued observations, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine of pro!ts. The inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation, de!ned by the arcsinh notation, is given by the
formula:
arcsinh(π j)= ln
(
π j+
√
π2
j
+1
)
. (3.15)
It is used in practice by Bahar and Rapoport (2018) for migration, trade, and
foreign direct investment data, Clemens and Tiongson (2017) for income data,
and by McKenzie (2017) for !rm pro!ts. Bellemare and Wichman (2019) show
that we can convert the inverse hyperbolic sine to traditional semi-elasticities
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using the formula:
∂π j
∂τi
1
π j
= eˆ i j ·cosh(arcsinh(π j)) ·
1
π j
= eˆ i j ·
√
π2
j
+1
π j
, (3.16)
where eˆ i j is the coe*cient from a regression of arcsinh(π j) on τi. For large
enough values of π j, the estimated coe*cient eˆ i j will be almost equivalent to
the semi-elasticity. For example, if π j = 100, then the second term in the !nal
expression
√
(π2
j
+1)/π j = 1.00005. Even at this low value of pro!ts, the adjust-
ment ismarginal and becomes insigni!cant for the averages of π j I use to recover
the semi-elasticity.
Economists frequently estimate semi-elasticities by transforming pro!ts us-
ing the natural logarithm. But the natural log of negative numbers is unde-
!ned, meaning that this strategy only keeps observations where !rms are prof-
itable. Using natural logs limits the relevance of the estimated semi-elasticity
since !rms frequently make losses. Losses can even be part of the !rm’s opti-
mal response to corporate tax changes (Johannesen et al., 2016; Koethenbuerger
et al., 2019). Using the inverse hyperbolic sine increases the number of observa-
tions available by 30 percent. It eliminates selection bias that would be induced
by focusing only on the responses of pro!table !rms. Importantly, the inverse
hyperbolic sine captures part of the !rm’s spillover response that is typically ig-
nored in these studies—!rm losses.
Figure 3.3 plots the density distribution of log pro!ts and of arcsinh pro!ts.
For positive values the distributions are very similar in shape. The arcsinh trans-
formed positive distribution is just shifted slightly to the right compared to the
log distribution. Figure 3.3 shows that !rms make losses for a substantial pro-
portion of observations. The distribution of losses is similar to the distribution
of pro!ts. These losses are included in the arcsinh transformation but ignored
by the natural logarithmic transformation.
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Figure 3.3: Comparing the Distributions of Pro!ts Under log and arcsinh Trans-
formations
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The distribution of log transformed pro!ts are shown in blue, while the distribution of inverse
hyperbolic sine transformed pro!ts are shown in pink. Note that the log distribution does not
include values below zero.
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
A multinational !rm’s pro!ts in country j are a function of the tax rates in all
countries in which it operates. For each !rm operating in country j, a dummy
D i captures whether it has an a*liate operating in country i. For domestic !rms,
this dummy is equal to zero for all i ∈ N. Only !rms with an a*liate in country
i are a"ected by country i’s tax rate change.
To identify the e"ect of a tax change in country i on pro!ts in country j, we
compare the country j pro!ts of !rms with an a*liate in country i against !rms
without an a*liate in country i. Two types of !rm act as controls: country j
domestic !rms and multinational !rms with an a*liate in country j but not in
country i. Using these control units, we can form a counterfactual: what would
the multinational a*liate’s pro!ts be in country j if the tax rate in country i did
not change.
Implementing this strategy means expressing each !rm’s pro!ts in country j
as a function of all countries’ tax rates. Each tax rate is interacted with a dummy
D i that captures whether the !rm has an a*liate in country. I estimate a gener-
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alised di"erence-in-di"erences model using the two-way !xed e"ects strategy:
arcsinh(πm jt)=αm+γkt+
N∑
i=1
e i ·Dmit ·τit+
N∑
i=1
θi j ·∆Dmit+εmt, (3.17)
where m indexes the !rm, j is the country being a"ected by the spillover, i is
the country whose tax rate reform we are investigating, and k is a grouping vari-
able. Firm !xed e"ects are included as αm and group-speci!c time e"ects are
included as γkt. The !rst summation captures the interaction of the dummies
and tax rates for all other countries. The coe*cients e i are the semi-elasticities
we are interested in estimating. Note that Dm jt = 0, meaning we do not esti-
mate own-country tax e"ects. The second summation captures the change in
D i so as to eliminate variation in the previous summation that arises from the
change in a*liate location. This means we focus only on variation that comes
from changes in the tax rate τi.
I consider di"erent grouping levels to include as disaggregated time !xed ef-
fects. Goodman-Bacon (2018) shows that with disaggregated time !xed e"ects
the estimated semi-elasticity will be a weighted average of the two-way !xed ef-
fects estimates for each grouping. Naturally, the weight each group receives in
calculating the average depends on the number of !rms in each group and the
within-group variance. The baseline grouping is at the country j level. This
grouping means that we estimate the spillover e"ect on country j by compar-
ing all !rms operating in country j but not in country i to all !rms operating in
country j and i. I consider more narrow comparisons: within industry de!ned
by the NACE Section classi!cation; within industry de!ned by the NACE Sec-
tion 4-Digit; and within size deciles within industry, where size is de!ned by the
average of real total assets.
Firms are assigned asset size deciles within their NACE Section within each
country. The cut-o" for each decile is created using the distribution of multi-
national !rm assets within that NACE Section and country. Both multinational
and domestic !rms are assigned a size decile based on these cut-o" points. This
means that domestic !rms whose assets fall outside the range of multinational
assets within their country-industry grouping are dropped. These do not serve
as appropriate controls.
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The aim is to create balance on covariates across multinational and domes-
tic !rms so that the empirical distribution of covariates is similar across these
two groups. Examining the distributions of industry and size, we observe some
di"erence between the two groups. In particular, multinational !rms tend to be
larger than domestic !rms. I use a simple covariate balancing method based on
the already-de!ned country-industry-size bins. I apply exact matching to these
bins to produce weights that re%ect the coarsened exact matching weights pro-
posed by Iacus et al. (2011). All multinational !rms receive a weight wmt = 1,
while a domestic !rm in grouping k receives a weight:
wmkt =
Wkt(0)
Wkt(1)
×
W(1)
W(0)
(3.18)
where Wkt(0) is the number of domestic !rms in the grouping at time t, and
Wkt(1) is the number of multinational !rms in the grouping at time t. The term
W(0) is the sum of all domestic !rm observations in the data, while W(1) is the
sumof all multinational !rm observations. All unmatched !rms receive a weight
of zero. Matching provides a non-parametric way of controlling for any con-
founding in%uence of covariates. Coarsened exactmatching is an intuitivemethod
that gives full control over the level of remaining covariate imbalance. These
weights are applied to the observations in the following regressions.
3.4.2 Main Results
Estimating Equation 3.17 gives us an average corporate tax base spillover for
each individual country that reformed their tax rate during the period 2007 to
2016. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 3.1. Each regression
in this table uses a di"erent level of disaggregated time e"ects: country, country-
industry (NACE Section or NACE 4-Digit Class), or country-industry-size (using
NACE Sections).
Since these are semi-elasticities, they are interpreted as ‘a one percentage
point decrease in France’s tax rate reduces the pro!t of multinational !rms in
other European countries by 1.7 percent on average’. I also remind the reader
that the country listed is the country changing its tax rate, so that the coe*cient
measures the e"ect on all other European countries.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of Average Corporate Tax Spillovers by Tax Reforming
Country
Country NACE Section NACE 4-Digit Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Denmark 1.419∗∗∗ 1.518∗∗∗ 1.652∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.284) (0.284) (0.295)
Estonia 0.111 0.535 0.690 1.111
(0.900) (0.904) (0.916) (0.943)
Finland −0.002 0.344 0.092 0.325
(0.478) (0.487) (0.477) (0.499)
France 1.664∗∗∗ 1.684∗∗∗ 1.692∗∗∗ 1.715∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.280) (0.282) (0.283)
Germany −0.608 −0.696∗ −0.604 −0.754∗
(0.395) (0.397) (0.398) (0.409)
Greece −0.136 −0.454 −0.327 −0.591
(0.502) (0.503) (0.508) (0.519)
Hungary 3.262∗∗∗ 3.445∗∗∗ 3.014∗∗∗ 3.637∗∗∗
(0.676) (0.677) (0.681) (0.694)
Italy 1.861∗∗∗ 1.616∗∗∗ 1.544∗∗∗ 1.503∗∗∗
(0.422) (0.422) (0.425) (0.428)
Lithuania −0.575 −0.134 −0.044 −0.061
(0.826) (0.828) (0.849) (0.880)
Luxembourg −1.063∗∗∗ −1.184∗∗∗ −1.235∗∗∗ −1.186∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.258) (0.261) (0.259)
Netherlands 0.958∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.304) (0.299) (0.292) (0.290)
Portugal 2.200∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗ 2.123∗∗∗ 2.210∗∗∗
(0.456) (0.457) (0.460) (0.466)
Slovakia 1.460∗∗∗ 1.519∗∗∗ 1.592∗∗∗ 1.539∗∗∗
(0.446) (0.446) (0.448) (0.452)
Slovenia 2.747∗∗∗ 1.780∗∗∗ 1.503∗∗ 1.832∗∗∗
(0.685) (0.689) (0.694) (0.698)
Spain 0.864∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗ 0.708∗∗ 0.714∗∗
(0.334) (0.333) (0.335) (0.338)
Sweden 1.563∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗ 1.139∗∗ 1.145∗∗
(0.511) (0.511) (0.511) (0.516)
United Kingdom −0.974∗∗ −1.289∗∗∗ −1.108∗∗∗ −1.439∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.388) (0.389) (0.396)
Observations 9,503,645 9,503,645 9,503,645 9,503,645
R2 0.508 0.512 0.520 0.521
Notes: All models include !rm !xed e"ects. Model (1) includes country-
year !xed e"ects. Model (2) includes country-NACE Section-year
!xed e"ects. Model (3) includes country-NACE 4 Digit-year !xed
e"ects, and Model (4) includes country-NACE Section-size-year
!xed e"ects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at the !rm level. Statistical signi!cance is given by ***
p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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Notice that these estimated semi-elasticities are quite consistent acrossmodel
speci!cations, and do not change signs. Table 3.1 shows that a corporate tax rate
cut in most European nations reduces pro!ts in neighbouring European coun-
tries. That is, on average, most corporate tax base spillovers are substitutionary.
Substitutionary e"ects are statistically signi!cant forDenmark, France, Hungary,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. These
semi-elasticities range in magnitude from 0.7 for Spain to 3.6 for Hungary.
Not all semi-elasticities are positive and signi!cant, however. I am unable to
precisely estimate a signi!cant spillover elasticity for Estonia, Finland, or Lithua-
nia. I estimate three negative elasticities: for Germany, Luxembourg and the
United Kingdom. For Germany, the e"ect is weakly statistically signi!cant. For
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom there is a much clearer suggestion that
these semi-elasticities are negative. On the face of it, these estimates imply that
these two countries have generated complementary corporate tax base spillover
e"ects over the past decade.
With respect to magnitude, these estimates fall in the region of what might
be expected based on preceding literature. Becker and Riedel (2012) report an
investment spillover semi-elasticity of -0.6, suggesting that an increase in the
multinational parent country’s tax ratewould reduce real investment in the spillover
country. In the pro!t shifting literature, the meta-analysis of Beer et al. (2018)
suggests that a tax rate that is one percentage point lower than other countries
will increase arti!cially shifted pro!ts by 1.5 percent. Heckemeyer and Overesch
(2017) !nd a smaller consensus estimate of 0.8. Further de Mooij and Ederveen
(2008) report an average responsiveness of inward foreign direct investment to
a change in the home tax rate of 2.4 percent. Their estimate is not necessarily a
spillover e"ect, but gives us an idea of whether the magnitudes of spillover ef-
fects estimated here make sense. The spillovers I estimate here are total pro!t
spillovers that include both real and arti!cial pro!ts. Note that I do not capture
the extensive margin response.
3.4.3 Controlling for Tax Base Changes
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) point out that the de!nition of the tax base af-
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fects the elasticity of personal taxable income. The tax elasticity can therefore
be thought of as a policy choice based on the de!nition of the tax base. This
point is even more poignant in the case of the corporate income tax, where the
e"ectivemarginal tax rate, based on a combination of tax rate and tax base rules,
is perceived as being important for some marginal investment decisions (Dev-
ereux and Gri*th, 2003). For us, this might confound the analysis since Kawano
and Slemrod (2016) highlights that the de!nition of the tax base changes fre-
quently in the corporate income tax context. There are three main types of tax
base changes that we might consider to be very important to the estimation of
elasticities.
The !rst type of tax base change is the shift from worldwide to territorial
tax systems or vice versa. A worldwide tax system imposes corporate tax on the
foreign pro!ts of home-based multinational !rms, while a territorial tax system
imposes tax only on the pro!ts of all !rms generated within the country. Only
the United Kingdommade the shift from a worldwide to a territorial tax system
during the period under investigation. In 2009, the United Kingdom govern-
ment abolished the home taxation of pro!ts made abroad. This means that if
pro!ts are booked in low-tax countries, they would no longer be taxed again at
the United Kingdom rate. Langenmayr and Liu (2019) show that this switch in
regime incentivisedUK-basedmultinationals to increase pro!ts in low-tax coun-
tries compared to non-UK-basedmultinational !rms. I add a dummy that is zero
for !rms who do not have an a*liate in the United Kingdom, and only takes the
value 1 formultinational !rms who have an a*liate in the United Kingdom from
2009 onwards.
The second tax base change is transfer pricing regulations that dictate how
!rms are to de!ne prices on cross-country intra-!rm transactions. The aim of
such regulations is to limit the !rm’s ability and incentive to arti!cially shift prof-
its through transfer mispricing. Transfer pricing regulations will commonly in-
clude guidance on how arm’s length prices should be determined, what penalties
can be applied if prices are determined to be improperly set, and how a govern-
ment might determine the probability of transfer mispricing. Most recently Liu
and De Mooij (2018) examine the unilateral adoption of transfer pricing regula-
tions and how it may a"ect the multinational !rm’s investment decision. Three
countries in the sample introduced transfer pricing regulations over the period:
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Finland (2008), Greece (2008), and Luxembourg (2011). For Luxembourg, these
transfer price regulations coincided with a change in their corporate tax rates. I
add dummy variables that take the value one for multinational !rms with a*li-
ates in those countries after the transfer pricing regulation was introduced, and
are zero otherwise.
The third type of tax base change is the standard tax allowances for invest-
ment. Devereux and Gri*th (1998) de!ne the net present value of tax allowances
per unit of investment, separately for straight-line and declining-balance meth-
ods of depreciation. This tax base term is expected to alter the !rm’s real invest-
ment decision. Works such as Gruber and Rauh (2007) consider themarginal ef-
fective tax rate elasticity of earnings before interest and tax for the United States,
where the marginal e"ective tax rate considers both tax rate and tax base policy
changes. To calculate the net present value of tax allowances per unit of invest-
ment (α), I !rst identify whether the country uses a straight-line or declining
balance method of depreciation. For each method, Devereux and Gri*th (1998)
de!ne the formulas:
αSL =
δˆτ(1+ρ)
ρ
[
1−
1
(1+ρ)T
]
(3.19)
αDB =
δˆτ(1+ρ)
ρ+ δˆ
, (3.20)
where δˆ is the rate at which capital can be o"set against tax, T is the allowed
length of depreciation in years, and ρ is the nominal discount rate. The value
of α is calculated for each of three types of asset: industrial buildings, plant and
machinery and intangibles (patents). These are then weighted by the percentage
of these assets in total !xed assets and the weighted sum of these three are taken
to give an overall value of α. To ensure that variation in α stems only frompolicy
changes, I set all non-tax base parameters to be equal for all countries for all
time periods. The interest rate ρ is given by the European Union average of
the convergence criterion bond yield. The weights for assets is taken from the
average weights across all !rms in the Amadeus dataset from 2007 to 2016. And
the tax rate is the average tax rate across all countries in the dataset for the period
2007 to 2016.
Only six countries change their tax allowances over the period 2007 to 2016:
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. There
is some concern that tax rate changes coincide with tax base changes for all of
these countries except the Netherlands. For most of these countries, there are
periods where the tax rate changes but the tax base does not change, allowing
identi!cation of the tax rate e"ect. For Italy and Germany, however, there is
only one tax rate change in the period under consideration and it coincides with
a tax base change. This makes the results less convincing for these two countries.
The results of adding these tax base reforms progressively are shown in Ta-
ble 3.2. I !rst add the territorial dummy for the United Kingdom, then dummies
for the introduction of transfer pricing regulations, and !nally I add investment
allowances. I continue to include all countries in the reported results, includ-
ing those that did not undergo signi!cant corporate tax base reform during the
period. The reason is that each multinational a*liate’s pro!ts are a function of
a large number of variables all at once, such that controlling for one additional
e"ect might imply changes in the estimated e"ect of another country’s tax rate
change. This is the complexity cost of the estimation strategy.
Controlling for Germany’s changes to their tax allowances gives a positive,
but insigni!cant estimate. Similarly with Italy, the estimated coe*cient changes
sign. Identi!cation is unclear with these two countries given that the tax base
change confounds the tax rate reform. For the United Kingdom, controlling
for tax base changes does not alter the negative sign, but it makes the estimate
less precise. Interestingly, Greece’s average spillover e"ect appears to become
larger in magnitude and more negative when considering tax base reforms. For
Netherlands, controlling for changes in the investment allowance causes the es-
timate to spike, but be insigni!cantly estimated. Spillovers from Spain are esti-
mated as being negative and signi!cant once I control for investment allowances.
For countries such as Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Finland, the tax base controls
seem to make little di"erence. And while I do not include tax base reforms for
Sweden, there appears to bemitigation of themagnitude of the average spillover
I estimate for their tax rate reform.
Controlling for potentially important tax base changes appears to make a
substantial di"erence to some countries, while not having a large e"ect for oth-
ers. Tax base changes are potentially complex and might alter the overall tax
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Table 3.2: Estimating Spillover E"ects Controlling for Tax Base Changes
Territorial Tax Sys. Transfer Pricing Reg. Investment Allowances
(1) (2) (3)
Denmark 1.499∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.796∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.298) (0.317)
Estonia 1.043 0.896 1.001
(0.944) (0.946) (0.946)
Finland 0.253 0.323 0.552
(0.500) (0.632) (0.646)
France 1.676∗∗∗ 1.693∗∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.284) (0.286)
Germany −0.641 −0.439 0.446
(0.411) (0.416) (1.075)
Greece −0.584 −1.502∗∗ −1.935∗∗
(0.519) (0.623) (0.943)
Hungary 3.420∗∗∗ 3.389∗∗∗ 3.544∗∗∗
(0.700) (0.699) (0.702)
Italy 1.504∗∗∗ 1.611∗∗∗ −0.729
(0.428) (0.431) (1.090)
Lithuania −0.132 −0.168 −0.100
(0.881) (0.881) (0.881)
Luxembourg −1.227∗∗∗ −0.888∗∗ −0.933∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.349) (0.350)
Netherlands 0.711∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 9.179
(0.291) (0.291) (6.361)
Portugal 2.122∗∗∗ 2.160∗∗∗ 2.245∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.468) (0.470)
Slovakia 1.404∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗
(0.457) (0.457) (0.460)
Slovenia 1.770∗∗ 1.798∗∗∗ 1.814∗∗∗
(0.697) (0.697) (0.700)
Spain 0.716∗∗ 0.709∗∗ −2.822∗∗
(0.338) (0.338) (1.102)
Sweden 1.158∗∗ 1.011∗ 0.812
(0.516) (0.519) (0.522)
United Kingdom −1.537∗∗∗ −1.591∗∗∗ −1.325
(0.411) (0.416) (3.135)
Observations 9,503,645 9,503,645 9,503,645
R2 0.521 0.521 0.521
Notes: The !rst model includes a dummy for the change in the tax sys-
tem in the United Kingdom. The secondmodel includes dummies
for changes in transfer pricing regulations in Finland, Greece, and
Luxembourg The third model includes the investment allowance
for Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. All models include !rm !xed e"ects and country-
industry-size year e"ects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the !rm level. Statistical signi!-
cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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burden of the !rm in a manner not captured by the main change in the head-
line corporate tax rate. Spillover e"ects become evenmore heterogeneous when
considering the potential implications of tax base changes.
3.4.4 Horizontal and Vertical Multinational Firms
The theoretical models predict substantially di"erent behaviour between hor-
izontal and vertical multinational !rms. Our simple models predict that hori-
zontal multinational !rms should exhibit substitutionary behaviour, while verti-
cal multinational !rms are expected to exhibit more complementary behaviour.
However, multinational !rms are far more complex than these simpli!ed dis-
tinctions, and their behaviour may not be so easy to classify. In fact, being able
to identify a multinational a*liate as being a horizontal or vertical a*liate is,
in itself, a di*cult task. Making the comparison between vertical and horizon-
tal multinationals is an important aspect of dissecting the corporate tax base
spillover.
I take a simple approach. Horizontal multinational !rms are those which
replicate an economic activity across countries. Therefore, two a*liates of the
same multinational group are considered to be in a horizontal multinational
group if they also conduct similar economic activity. The level of similarity of
their economic activity can be identi!ed from their NACE classi!cation. This
suggests that vertical multinational !rms would be the complement. I identify
vertical multinational groups as two a*liates of the same multinational group
which conduct di"erent economic activity. Again, I identify di"erence in eco-
nomic activity based on whether their NACE classi!cations are di"erent.
To operationalise this de!nition, I use the a*liate dummy variable. If a !rm
has an a*liate operating in the same economic activity (a horizontal a*liate) in
country i, then the dummy DH
mi
= 1. If a !rm does not have a horizontal a*liate
in country i, but has an a*liate in country i which does not operate in the same
economic activity, then I de!ne them as having a vertical a*liate in country i.
For a vertical a*liate, then the dummy DV
mi
= 1. This e"ectively disaggregates
the main results into tax base spillover driven by vertical and horizontal a*li-
ates. This is not a clean separation, but is a useful approximation to the already
83
blurred conceptual distinction between horizontal and vertical multinationals.
Operating in the same economic activity is de!ned at three levels: the NACE
Section level (letter code), the NACE Division level (2-digit code), and the NACE
Class level (4-digit code). This makes the grouping for horizontal multinationals
progressivelymore narrow, while making the grouping for vertical multination-
als progressively broader. The model estimated is the same as the main average
country spillover model given in Equation 3.17, but splitting elasticities into hor-
izontal base spillovers and vertical base spillovers:
arcsinh(πm jt)=αm+γkt+
N∑
i=1
eHi D
H
mitτit+
N∑
i=1
eVi D
V
mitτit+
N∑
i=1
θi j∆Dmit+εmt. (3.21)
The results are presented in Table 3.3. For almost all countries where there
are statistically signi!cant e"ects, horizontal base spillovers are more positive
than vertical base spillovers. For example, consider Italy, where the horizontal
base spillover e"ect is positive and statistically signi!cant across all speci!cations,
but the vertical base spillover is statistically not di"erent from zero. Even in
the cases where the semi-elasticity is negative—Germany, Luxembourg, and the
United Kingdom—the horizontal base spillover is more positive than the verti-
cal base spillover. Finland represents the exception, with a vertical base spillover
that is more positive than the horizontal base spillover, although the results are
not consistent. For most countries, the semi-elasticities do not change substan-
tially as the de!nition of horizontal and verticalmultinational changes. This sug-
gests that the horizontal versus vertical di"erentiation I use is su*ciently clear
to approximate potentially di"erent behavioural patterns.
To some extent these results validate the theoretical prediction that horizon-
tal base spillovers would be more substitutionary while vertical base spillovers
would be more complementary. Here, we begin to observe an important con-
cept: that tax base spillovers operate on a negative to positive continuum. Dif-
ferent forces pull them in either direction and we can observe some di"erences
along that continuum. Butwe are dealingwith organisationally andbehaviourally
complex multinational !rms that conduct a wide range of activity and exhibit
behaviours that can be captured and explained by various theories of the multi-
national !rm.
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Table 3.3: Corporate Tax Spillovers for Horizontal and Vertical Multinationals
Section (letter) Division (2-digit) Class (4-digit)
Horizontal Vertical Horizontal Vertical Horizontal Vertical
Denmark 2.371∗∗∗ 0.330 2.456∗∗∗ 0.571∗ 2.005∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.371) (0.392) (0.341) (0.475) (0.301)
Estonia 1.057 1.019 0.795 1.089 −0.067 1.152
(1.294) (1.172) (1.389) (1.100) (1.855) (0.993)
Finland 0.416 1.026 −0.225 1.254∗∗ 0.150 0.916∗
(0.627) (0.626) (0.691) (0.580) (0.881) (0.530)
France 1.579∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.376) (0.376) (0.344) (0.441) (0.321)
Germany −0.387 −0.889∗ −0.020 −1.087∗∗ 0.125 −0.941∗∗
(0.497) (0.496) (0.547) (0.464) (0.672) (0.434)
Greece 0.383 −1.284∗∗ −0.238 −0.650 −0.262 −0.478
(0.669) (0.647) (0.741) (0.622) (0.953) (0.556)
Hungary 4.221∗∗∗ 2.573∗∗∗ 4.151∗∗∗ 2.873∗∗∗ 4.716∗∗∗ 2.853∗∗∗
(0.905) (0.793) (1.049) (0.743) (1.418) (0.690)
Italy 1.678∗∗∗ 0.184 1.288∗∗ 0.536 1.650∗∗ 0.422
(0.512) (0.480) (0.557) (0.453) (0.678) (0.429)
Lithuania 0.950 −0.883 1.349 −0.794 1.805 −0.376
(1.134) (1.231) (1.230) (1.111) (1.560) (0.973)
Luxembourg −0.675 −1.404∗∗∗ −0.446 −1.365∗∗∗ −0.333 −1.226∗∗∗
(0.426) (0.263) (0.480) (0.252) (0.810) (0.240)
Netherlands 0.326 0.821∗∗∗ 0.458 0.711∗∗ 0.109 0.708∗∗
(0.380) (0.317) (0.431) (0.293) (0.558) (0.276)
Portugal 3.118∗∗∗ 0.907 2.973∗∗∗ 1.453∗∗∗ 3.385∗∗∗ 1.711∗∗∗
(0.589) (0.603) (0.652) (0.557) (0.842) (0.498)
Slovakia 1.368∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗ 1.668∗∗ 1.398∗∗∗ 2.875∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗
(0.592) (0.575) (0.668) (0.514) (0.839) (0.475)
Slovenia 1.606∗ 1.583∗ 2.806∗∗∗ 1.083 4.163∗∗∗ 1.000
(0.946) (0.897) (1.078) (0.799) (1.417) (0.718)
Spain 0.554 0.040 0.449 0.187 0.579 0.145
(0.413) (0.403) (0.455) (0.375) (0.566) (0.348)
Sweden 1.588∗∗ 1.024 1.586∗∗ 1.174 1.531∗ 1.137∗
(0.660) (0.836) (0.729) (0.753) (0.894) (0.678)
United Kingdom −1.351∗∗ −2.843∗∗∗ −1.691∗∗∗ −2.616∗∗∗ −1.502∗∗ −2.540∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.690) (0.575) (0.622) (0.681) (0.579)
Observations 9,503,645 9,503,645 9,503,645 9,503,645 9,503,645 9,503,645
R2 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521
Notes: All models include !rm !xed e"ects and country-industry-size-year !xed ef-
fects. Horizontal multinational a*liates are those operating within the same
economic activity. Vertical multinational a*liates are those which do not oper-
ate within the same economic activity. Economic activity is de!ned either by
NACE Section (letter), NACE Division (2-digit), or NACE Class (4-digit). Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the !rm level. Sta-
tistical signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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3.4.5 Controlling for Real Factors
Public perception of substitutionary corporate tax base spillovers is heavily driven
by the idea of multinational !rms engaging in arti!cial pro!t shifting. The key
concern with pro!t shifting, as spelt out by the OECD and G20’s Base Erosion
and Pro!t Shifting project, is the failure to align taxable pro!ts with the location
where economic activity took place or where value was created. This suggests
that arti!cial pro!t shifting occurs where !rms shift pro!ts to lower tax jurisdic-
tions without actually shifting productive economic activity.
If arti!cial pro!t shifting spillovers occur when pro!ts do not align with real
activity, then we can identify pro!t shifting spillovers as those that do not re-
sult from changes in real factors of production. This is the approach used by
Huizinga and Laeven (2008). However, since I use a di"erence-in-di"erences
approach to estimating spillovers, this analysis does not su"er from the concern
that some !rmsmay appear to bemore pro!table simply because they are more
productive. Since I am concerned only with changes in pro!tability controlling
for changes in real factors, then the only concern here might be that some !rms
experience heterogeneous temporal shocks based on their !rm type. I do not
measure total pro!t shifting. Instead I measure pro!t shifting spillovers that re-
sult from corporate tax rate reform.
I add controls for the two main factors of production: capital and labour.
The aim is to eliminate variation in pro!ts that are due to a real expansion of
output. Conceptually the remaining variation should be due to arti!cial changes
in pro!ts. While the previous literature has used the notion of controlling for real
factors of production as a means of identifying pro!t shifting, there are some
reasons why this might not be a perfect method. In particular, !rms can alter
real output without necessarily increasing or decreasing capital or labour. Many
!rms have spare capacity. For example, in Europe’s industry capacity utilization
rate averaged 80.5 percent from 1980 to 2019.
To control for capital and labour, I use data on the a*liate’s total assets and
the cost of employees respectively. Additionally, I also use !xed assets and the
number of employees as secondary variables. These are the variables used in
Huizinga and Laeven (2008). The results of controlling for these real factors of
86
production are presented in Table 3.4. Since data on wages and employees are
not available for a large number of !rms in the Amadeus database, the number
of observations is substantially reduced. To make an appropriate comparison
between the main estimates and the models controlling for real factors, I re-
estimate themainmodel on the reduced sample of !rms for which there are data
on assets, wages, and employees. This is presented in column 1 of the table. The
second and third models use di"erent de!nitions for capital and labour, while
the fourth includes both de!nitions for capital and both de!nitions for labour.
The !fth column also includes controls for the tax base reforms identi!ed pre-
viously.
The most striking !nding is that controlling for real factors of production
does not substantially reduce the estimated elasticities. This is striking but not
surprising. The results of Becker and Riedel (2012) suggest that !rms’ real eco-
nomic activity might actually be complementary on average rather than sub-
stitutionary. But estimating the response of total pro!ts, they !nd substantial
substitutionary e"ects that are likely due to arti!cial pro!t shifting. Further, they
!nd—as I do—that the pro!t shifting e"ect is quantitatively dominant and there-
fore economically important for understanding corporate tax base spillovers.
Themain exceptions areGermany and theUnitedKingdom, countries where
tax base reforms occurred. Controlling for tax base reforms in Germany causes
the coe*cient to switch from negative to substantially positive. This suggests
that Germany’s tax rate cutmay have had substitutionary pro!t shifting spillover
e"ects on its neighbours once accounting for tax base reform. For the United
Kingdom, the coe*cient becomes even more negative. The negative sign re-
mains for Luxembourg as well. In the long run, countries that act as tax havens
or as tax-friendly jurisdictions may actually bene!t their neighbours. This is not
entirely counter-intuitive. Since we are examining the change in these countries’
tax rate rather than the decision to set up an a*liate in a tax-friendly jurisdiction,
it is likely that most of the substitutionary e"ects may have already occurred—
much as with vertical multinationals. This is not unheard of in the economic
literature; for example, Rose and Spiegel (2007) !nd that !nancial tax havens
have a bene!cial impact on neighbouring countries’ !nancial sectors.
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Table 3.4: Corporate Tax Base Spillovers Controlling for Real Factors of Produc-
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Denmark 2.222∗∗∗ 2.235∗∗∗ 2.142∗∗∗ 1.796∗∗∗ 1.730∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.388) (0.388) (0.357) (0.419)
Estonia 0.749 0.542 0.613 0.299 0.390
(1.605) (1.604) (1.605) (1.566) (1.607)
Finland 0.427 0.340 0.393 0.620 −0.402
(0.773) (0.772) (0.773) (0.745) (1.410)
France 1.718∗∗∗ 1.523∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 1.479∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.387) (0.388) (0.367) (0.389)
Germany −1.378∗∗ −1.661∗∗ −1.456∗∗ −1.412∗∗ 6.905∗
(0.670) (0.668) (0.669) (0.626) (3.595)
Greece 0.250 0.342 0.248 0.480 −1.070
(0.674) (0.674) (0.674) (0.649) (1.212)
Hungary 2.998∗∗∗ 2.895∗∗∗ 2.932∗∗∗ 2.359∗∗∗ 2.611∗∗∗
(0.920) (0.916) (0.920) (0.885) (0.923)
Italy 2.068∗∗∗ 1.427∗ 1.929∗∗∗ 1.235∗ 0.675
(0.744) (0.742) (0.744) (0.709) (3.381)
Lithuania 2.068∗ 1.906∗ 1.960∗ 1.559 1.641
(1.134) (1.131) (1.133) (1.094) (1.128)
Luxembourg −1.693∗∗∗ −1.558∗∗∗ −1.686∗∗∗ −1.577∗∗∗ −1.283∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.342) (0.343) (0.332) (0.468)
Netherlands 0.691∗ 0.703∗ 0.654∗ 0.741∗∗ 9.142
(0.382) (0.380) (0.381) (0.367) (8.138)
Portugal 2.401∗∗∗ 2.177∗∗∗ 2.275∗∗∗ 2.020∗∗∗ 1.917∗∗∗
(0.629) (0.628) (0.628) (0.600) (0.630)
Slovakia 2.399∗∗∗ 2.343∗∗∗ 2.279∗∗∗ 1.979∗∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗
(0.716) (0.713) (0.714) (0.693) (0.716)
Slovenia 0.629 0.299 0.536 0.642 0.445
(0.954) (0.948) (0.952) (0.919) (0.948)
Spain 0.227 −0.105 0.147 0.363 −1.714
(0.483) (0.482) (0.483) (0.458) (1.382)
Sweden 0.829 0.074 0.687 0.411 0.326
(0.859) (0.853) (0.859) (0.816) (0.860)
United Kingdom −2.668∗∗∗ −3.286∗∗∗ −2.696∗∗∗ −2.619∗∗∗ −6.969∗
(0.576) (0.575) (0.575) (0.522) (3.615)
log assets 2.082∗∗∗ 2.826∗∗∗ 2.912∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.023) (0.058)
log !xed assets −0.019 −0.008 0.017
(0.042) (0.018) (0.045)
log wages −0.201∗∗∗ −0.837∗∗∗ −0.881∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.010) (0.026)
log employees 0.770∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.060
(0.048) (0.021) (0.056)
Tax base Yes
Observations 4,382,779 4,382,779 4,382,779 4,382,779 4,382,779
R2 0.536 0.539 0.537 0.512 0.541
Notes: All models include !rm !xed e"ects and country-industry-size
year e"ects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at the !rm level. Statistical signi!cance is given by
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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3.4.6 Robustness
I consider a number of robustness checks. The results of these estimations are
included in the Appendix.
First, I re-estimate the model without re-weighting the sample for covariate
balance between domestic and multinational !rms. This means that each 2×2
di"erence-in-di"erences estimate within the model is weighted based on how
many observations are in each group and the within-group variance of the lo-
cation dummy. The results of this robustness check are shown in Table 3.9. The
results are qualitatively the same, and change only slightly quantitatively.
Second, I re-estimate the model excluding domestic !rms altogether. This
means that the control group consists entirely of multinational !rms. How does
this work? It relies on sparsity in a*liate networks to identify the spillover e"ects
of tax reforms. Consider a pair of countries i and j, when country i changes its
tax rate. The control group is made up of multinational !rms which have an
a*liate in country j, but not in country i. This should eliminate any remaining
selection bias that arises due to inherent di"erences between domestic !rms and
multinational !rms, possibly due to permanent productivity di"erences. The
results of this robustness check are shown in Table 3.10. Once again the results
are qualitatively the same, and change somewhat quantitatively.
Third, I re-estimate the main model using the natural log of pro!ts rather
than the inverse hyperbolic sine. This means that I include only pro!table !rm-
year observations. This shrinks the data set from 9.5 million observations to 7.3
million observations, indicating the importance of including unpro!table !rm-
year observations. Interestingly, the model !ts much better, increasing the R2
from 0.521 in the arcsinh pro!ts model to 0.819 in the log pro!ts model. Most
striking is the vastly reduced magnitude of the spillover estimates. This is ex-
pected since we only account for changes from one pro!table year to another
pro!table year. These changes in pro!ts will therefore be much smaller. The re-
sults are qualitatively di"erent in some cases. Greece shows substantially com-
plementary spillover e"ects when not accounting for !rm losses. The United
Kingdom is now estimated to generate substitutionary, rather than complemen-
tary e"ects. Denmark and Germany are estimated to generate no spillover ef-
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fects, while there is a signi!cant and positive spillover semi-elasticity for Finland.
The qualitative di"erence in these results highlights the unmistakable impor-
tance of including !rm losses in estimating the spillover e"ects of tax reforms.
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 3.11.
Fourth, I include only !rms that operate in the manufacturing sector. This
restriction relies on the empirical evidence presented by Hanson et al. (2001)
and Namini and Pennings (2009) that a*liates operating in the manufacturing
sector are most likely to be vertical multinational a*liates, while a*liates op-
erating in other sectors are most likely to be horizontal multinational a*liates.
Hanson et al. (2001) suggest that multinational !rms seem to face the decision
of whether to set up production-oriented a*liates or distribution-oriented a*l-
iates. Evidence on spillovers in the manufacturing sector is presented in Table
3.12.
Finally, I re-estimate the main model, splitting the data into !ve quantiles
based on the size of total assets. This checks to see whether there is substantial
heterogeneity in spillovers across the size distribution of !rms. The results of
this estimation are presented in Table 3.13. For Spain and the United Kingdom
there appear to be systematic variation in spillovers across the size distribution.
For Italy, the smallest quantile displays substantially substitutionary behaviour,
while no other quantiles have statistically signi!cant e"ects. There seems to be
no general systematic variation in spillover e"ects by !rm size.
3.4.7 Comparing Semi-Elasticities
I summarise these result in graphical form for easy comparison. For each type
of tax base spillover—total, horizontal, vertical, and arti!cial—I plot the semi-
elasticities implied from themainmodel, converted using Bellemare andWich-
man (2019). Note that there is basically no change in the semi-elasticities using
this conversion. For the total spillover, I plot the semi-elasticities from the main
model with country-NACE Section-size time e"ects. For the horizontal and ver-
tical base spillovers, I use the narrowest de!nition of a horizontal multinational,
the NACE Class. For arti!cial spillovers, I use the model including all four vari-
ables as controls for capital and labour.
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Figure 3.4: Box Plot of Country-Speci!c Spillovers
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Figure 3.4 shows a clear comparison of the semi-elasticities across models.
Elasticities are pretty consistent within countries, as those with complementary
spillover e"ects displaying general complementarity across all speci!cations and
vice versa for substitutionary spillovers. For some countries such as Spain, there
is very little variation in the estimated elasticities. The variation is greater for
other countries such as Slovenia, Lithuania andHungary. But even these present
a relatively consistent picture. Importantly, notice that the majority of countries
generate substitutionary corporate tax base spillovers to their neighbours on av-
erage. While this is consistentwith the evidence that corporate tax base spillovers
are substitutionary, we can already notice that a word of caution is required due
to the substantial heterogeneity across countries.
This chart highlights the emerging notion that spillover elasticities operate
along a continuum. One can mentally draw a diagonal trend line through the
chart. There is no discrete distinction between countries which generate com-
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plementary elasticities and countries which generate substitutionary elasticities.
No one theoretical model of spillovers is correct; each one likely carries a mea-
sure of validity in determining the eventual corporate tax base spillover that a
country’s tax rate reform generates.
3.5 Country-Pair Spillovers
I now explore the heterogeneity of country-pair spillovers. The previous esti-
mates give an average of the e"ect a country’s tax spillovers has on all its Euro-
pean neighbours. An average e"ect might mask the fact that some country-pair
spillovers are complementary while others are substitutionary. What e"ect does
a country i’s tax rate change have on a speci!c neighbour j? And is the e"ect
homogeneous across neighbours?
To estimate the spillover e"ect between a pair of countries, I extend Equation
3.17 bymultiplying each of 17 country-i tax rate terms by a full set of 26 country-
j dummies, Dm j. That is, I e"ectively estimate the e"ect of each country i’s tax
rate change separately for each country j. The regression I estimate to recover
country-pair spillover semi-elasticities is:
arcsinh(πm jt)=αm+γ jkt+
N∑
j 6=i
N∑
i=1
e i j ·Dmit ·Dm jt ·τit+
N∑
i=1
θi j ·∆Dmit+εmt. (3.22)
This results in amatrix of semi-elasticities e i j with j ∈ N rows and i ∈ N columns,
where each entry is a spillover from country i’s tax rate reform to country j’s tax
base. I do not consider the e"ect of the corporate tax reform on the country’s
own tax base so the diagonal entries are missing.
I use the !nalmodel inTable 3.1, with country-industry-size year !xed e"ects.
This gives us 425 country-pair spillover semi-elasticities. Each semi-elasticity
represents the e"ect a country i’s corporate tax rate reform had on a speci!c
neighbouring country j. The results of these estimates are presented in matrix
form. The columns are the country which changes its tax rate (the originating
or reform country) and the rows are the countries which are a"ected by the tax
rate change (the spillover or a"ected country). The full results are presented in
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Table 3.5. For simplicity, I present a summary of these results in two graphs.
Figure 3.5: Box Plot of Country-Pair Spillover Semi-Elasticities
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Each dot represents a country-pair semi-elasticity originating from the country on the y-axis.
The centre line of the box is the median, and the outside lines measure the 25th and 75th per-
centiles. The notch in the box is the 95% con!dence interval for the median.
Figure 3.5 presents a box andwhisker plot of the country-pair semi-elasticities
generated by each country’s corporate tax rate reform. The estimated semi-
elasticities are plotted as dots. The centre vertical line of each box represents the
median estimate. The box spans from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.
The notch in the box (where the diagonal part meets the horizontal part) mea-
sures approximately a 95 percent con!dence interval for comparing medians
across boxes.
It is relevant to remind the reader that these country-pair semi-elasticities are
estimated from the same data and speci!cation asModel 4 in Table 3.1. The only
di"erence is the inclusion of dummy variables that are interacted with the tax
rates so as to disaggregate the e"ect into a country-pair spillover rather than ag-
gregating to an average spillover. The heterogeneity of these estimates is there-
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fore striking. Average country-speci!c semi-elasticities in Table 3.1 ranged from
-1.4 to +3.6. In contrast, country-pair semi-elasticities range from -14.8 to +18.5.
This is a central !nding of this essay: not all neighbouring countries are af-
fected in the same way when a country changes its tax rate. While the aver-
age e"ect from a tax change may be substitutionary, it is misleading to assume
that all countries are a"ected by spillovers in the same way. Only for Denmark
does it appear that the tax reform resulted in unambiguously substitutionary
spillovers for all country-pairs—no other country has this unambiguous e"ect.
Instead, spillovers operate on a continuum. Spillovers across country-pairs likely
fall somewhere on that continuumbetween complementary and substitutionary
depending on the characteristics of the two countries and their relationship.
Figure 3.6: The Distribution of Country-Pair Spillovers
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The histogram represents the distribution of only signi!cant semi-elasticities, while the density
distribution represents the distribution of all semi-elasticities.
Not all of these semi-elasticities can be de!ned as being statistically signi!-
cantly di"erent from zero. Of 425 semi-elasticities, we can identify 95 as being
statistically signi!cant at the 10 percent level. Many are found to be statistically
insigni!cant. In Figure 3.6, I plot a histogram of those semi-elasticities which are
statistically signi!cant at the 10 percent level based on standard errors clustered
at the !rm level to adjust for within-cluster correlation resulting from tempo-
ral autocorrelation. The overlaid shaded density distribution shows the distri-
bution of all estimated semi-elasticities, including those that are insigni!cant.
There are much more statistically signi!cant substitutionary semi-elasticities
relative to complementary semi-elasticities. Sixty-nine of 95 statistically sig-
ni!cant semi-elasticities are positive (substitutionary), meaning that 73 percent
95
statistically signi!cant semi-elasticities are positive. Of the semi-elasticities clus-
tered in the range -1 to 1, only 26 are statistically signi!cantly di"erent from zero.
In contrast, 196 of the semi-elasticities in this range cannot be reasonably distin-
guished from zero. And even if they were precisely estimated, the magnitude of
these elasticities is economically insigni!cant.
Figure 3.7: A Network of Statistically Signi!cant Country-Pair Spillovers
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Statistical signi!cance is measure by a p-value < 0.1. Each node of the network represents a
country. Each directed edge or arrow represent a spillover e"ect from the tax reform country to
the a"ected country. The size of the arrow captures the absolute size of the estimated spillover
semi-elasticity. The size of the node captures the strength or importance of the country in the
network based on the number of connections and the size of those connections.
Given the striking nature of the !nding that we cannot convincingly estimate
signi!cant spillover e"ects formany country-pairs, I plot a network of all statisti-
cally signi!cant spillover semi-elasticities in Figure 3.7. Each node (circle) repre-
sents a country in the data set. Directed arrows represent the country reforming
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its tax rate (from) and the country being a"ected by the tax base spillover (to). The
width of the arrow represents the absolutemagnitude of the spillover e"ect. The
size of each node then re%ects the weighted vertex in-degree or strength of each
node. Strength (si) simply measures the weighted number of arrows pointing
towards a country:
si =
∑
i 6= j
ai j e i j, (3.23)
where ai j takes the value of 1 if there is a signi!cant tax base spillover from coun-
try i to j, and e i j is the relevant country-pair elasticity. The size of a node then
captures howmuch corporate tax base spillovers a"ected that country’s tax base.
The !rst thing to note is that the network is shown to be sparse given the low
ratio of signi!cant elasticities. The ratio of signi!cant elasticities suggests that
only 2 out of every 10 neighbouring countries are highly likely to be signi!cantly
a"ected by a country’s corporate tax rate reform. This says that concerns about
widespread tax base spillovers might be unjusti!ed. Spillover e"ects are likely to
be localised to a few important neighbours.
The second thing of interest is that those countries most likely to be a"ected
by corporate tax spillovers are the smaller European states: Romania, Poland,
and the Czech Republic have the largest weighted in-degree (strength) in the net-
work. The next tier of countries on the in-degree ranking, however, are France,
Italy, and Spain—three of the largest economies in Europe. This suggests that it
is not only small countries who are a"ected by corporate tax base spillovers.
Finally, notice that some countries are relatively well insulated. Belgium,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Sweden have experienced lit-
tle base spillover e"ects due to corporate tax reforms in Europe over the past
decade.2 This suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity too in which coun-
tries are likely to be a"ected by corporate tax base spillovers, evenwithin Europe.
There are a few important implications to be drawn from this new evidence
on country-pair tax base spillovers. First, many neighbouring countries do not
appear to be signi!cantly impacted by spillover e"ects. Second, the majority
of these spillover e"ects are substitutionary but I uncover some economically
2I exclude Denmark because its low in-degree is likely due to the fact that it does not have
data available before 2012.
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signi!cant complementary spillover e"ects. Third, it is clear that country-pair
spillover e"ects vary substantially in magnitude.
3.6 UnderstandingWhy Spillovers Vary
What features of these countries or the relationships between these countries
cause spillovers to vary so substantially across country-pairs? In this section, I use
the cross-sectional variation in country-pair spillover semi-elasticities estimated
in the previous section to explore whether I can uncover any structural patterns
in themagnitude and direction of spillovers. I explore a simple regression of the
form:
e i j =βi X i+β j X j+βi j X i j +εi j. (3.24)
The matrix X i captures features of the tax reform originating country (i). The
matrix X j captures features of the a"ected or spillover country ( j). The matrix
X i j is most important, describing the relationship between the two countries
(i j). The form of this regression is similar to a cross-sectional gravity model,
but the type of analysis resembles a meta-analysis which might use a range of
coe*cients from various studies across countries to explain the heterogeneity
of results. For example, using regression on elasticities, Havranek et al. (2015)
!nd that cross-country heterogeneity in inter-temporal substitution elasticities
is mostly explained by income and asset market participation.
This is an empirical approximation of a structural understanding of spillovers.
The aim of this approach is to try to understand what frictions, incentives, or
characteristics generate heterogeneity in observed country pair elasticities. Ide-
ally, researchers want to be able to identify the structural spillover elasticity. The
reason is that structural elasticities are functions of the primitives of our stylised
economic models. Having structural elasticities based on primitives allows us
to make clear out-of-sample predictions and to create useful counterfactuals
Chetty (2009).
But even with new approaches using administrative data such as bunching, a
wide range of optimisation frictions make it di*cult for us to truly observe the
underlying structural elasticities that govern economic behaviour. This makes
98
it di*cult to move from estimates to policy (Kleven, 2016). A small estimated
elasticity could be either the result of a large structural elasticity and large ad-
justment costs or a small structural elasticity and small adjustment costs (Chetty,
2012). And this observational equivalence is compounded by the fact that multi-
plemodelsmight apply to amultinational !rm. Eachmodel describes a di"erent
set of behaviours displayed by complex multinational !rms.
The aim of this estimation then, is to identify the key features that cause ob-
served elasticities to deviate from a single homogeneous elasticity as we might
derive in a simple theoretical framework. Much of the theoretical literature on
spillovers is found as the intermediate step in deriving models of tax competi-
tion: an originating country changes its tax rate, leading to a base spillover, which
induces a strategic response by the spillover country. One particular feature the
tax competition literature has found to be important in driving heterogeneity in
spillovers is asymmetry across countries (Bucovetsky, 1991; Hau%er andWooton,
1999; Peralta and van Ypersele, 2005; Stöwhase, 2005; Johannesen, 2010).
What Asymmetries are Important? Themost important asymmetry in the tax
competition literature is economic size (Bucovetsky, 1991; Hau%er and Wooton,
1999). Wilson (1991) for example !nds that a small country might be an impor-
tant bene!ciary of spillovers if the di"erence between countries is large. But it
is not always clear how size might a"ect the intensive margin since !rms them-
selves may sort across jurisdictions (Hau%er and Stähler, 2013). The bene!ts of
agglomeration—which is likely correlated with size—also in%uence the sensitiv-
ity of capital to tax rate changes (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004).
However, we have noted that arti!cial pro!t shifting spillovers are likely of
substantial importance. Stöwhase (2005) !nds that introducing pro!t shifting
into amodel alters the sensitivity of countries. Low-tax countries experience re-
duced sensitivity of their tax base to tax rate changes, while high-tax countries
experience increased sensitivity. But Johannesen (2010) proposes that the exis-
tence of tax havens also reduces non-haven countries’ competition for arti!cial
pro!ts since tax havens have e"ectively already ‘won’ that game.
Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) emphasise the importance of public capital in
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determining the responsiveness of real capital %ows to tax rate changes. That is,
!rms might be willing to accept higher tax rates when public capital provision
is high. This can reduce !rms’ sensitivity to tax rate changes in that country, or
even in neighbouring countries. The importance of public capital is also high-
lighted inWilson (1987), Hindriks et al. (2008), Dhillon et al. (2007), Zissimos and
Wooders (2008). While each of these models is set in a di"erent context, they all
highlight the importance of public capital in attracting real capital %ows.
Certainly, the main asymmetry identi!ed in the theoretical and empirical
analysis deserves attention—the di"erentiation between vertical and horizontal
multinationals. At the country level, both vertical and horizontal multinationals
will operate across all countries. Therefore at this aggregated level, asymme-
try will arise if there are key characteristics of the country-pair relationship that
make it more likely that there will be horizontal or vertical multinationals oper-
ating between these two countries.
Data on Asymmetries In order to identify the asymmetries outlined above, I
require some empirical proxies.
As a measure of the incentive to engage in horizontal activity, I use two vari-
ables: distance and the di"erence in log purchasing power. Horizontal multina-
tional !rms are more likely to exist when trade barriers or trade costs are high.
Within the EuropeanUnion there are no such trade barriers, but the cost of trade
is likely increasing in distance. Distance acts as a proxy for trade costs. Markusen
and Venables (2000) shows that horizontal multinational !rms are more likely
to exist when countries are more similar in endowments. I use the di"erence
between two countries’ purchasing power to measure their similarity. This is
intuitive: horizontal multinationals are trying to access new markets. They will
likely attempt to access markets that are as similar to theirs as possible. I express
the di"erence in log purchasing power as an absolute di"erence, since it is only
the size of the di"erential that matters and not the direction. Purchasing power
is expressed as a per capita measure. Data on distance is obtained from the Cen-
tre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) and data on
purchasing power is obtained from Eurostat.
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Typically vertical multinationals span countries that are dissimilar in factor
endowment. Helpman (1984) !nds that the share of multinational intra-!rm
trade should increase with the factor endowment di"erential. The most impor-
tant factor driving intra-!rm trade is the cost of labour. I measure the incentive
to become a vertical multinational across two countries by the di"erence in log
wages between the two countries. Wages are measured as the compensation of
employees plus taxes minus subsidies in the business economy (NACE Section
B to N), measured in euros. This data is obtained from Eurostat. As with pur-
chasing power, I express the di"erence in log wages as an absolute di"erence as
it is only the size of the di"erential that matters.
For the country size di"erential, I use the natural log of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) as a measure of size. Data on GDP are obtained from Eurostat. As
a measure of the di"erence in public capital, I use data on public capital to
GDP from the InternationalMonetary Fund (2017) Investment and Capital Stock
Dataset.
I include a dummy for whether the originating country (the tax reform coun-
try) is a tax haven and a dummy for if the spillover country (the a"ected coun-
try) is a tax haven. Tax havens are de!ned as the !ve countries on the European
Parliament (2019) list which are in my dataset: Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Lux-
embourg, and The Netherlands. I include the di"erence in corporate tax rates
to investigate whether there is any substantial non-linearity in the elasticity.
Asymmetries are expressed as di"erences in the form xi j = xi − x j, except
for wages and purchasing power. This means these di"erences as interpreted
as becoming more positive when the originating country’s xi is larger than the
spillover country’s x j. The absolute di"erences used for wages and purchasing
power are expressed as xi j = |xi− x j|. This implies that these di"erences capture
any positive or negative asymmetries between two countries. All variables are
expressed as averages over the period 2007 to 2016.
Results I consider all elasticities in the regressions inTable 3.6. However, noting
that some elasticities are precisely estimated while others are not, it is prudent
to give more weight to those that are more precisely estimated. The models in
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Table 3.6 give increasing weight to more statistically signi!cant semi-elasticities.
This is done by weighting observations based on the t-statistic of the estimated
country-pair semi-elasticity. I consider unweighted estimates, estimatesweighted
by the absolute value of the t-statistic, estimates weighted by the square of the
absolute value of the t-statistic, and estimates weighted by the cube of the abso-
lute value of the t-statistic. I scale all data to be between zero and one using the
simple formula: xi j/(max{xi j}−min{xi j}).
Table 3.6: Meta-Regression on Country-Pair Semi-Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Is tax haven (origin) 0.414∗ 0.553∗ 0.408 0.137
(0.247) (0.308) (0.335) (0.344)
Is tax haven (spillover) 0.129 0.343 0.806∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.306) (0.359) (0.391)
Di" in log wage 0.569∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.387) (0.392) (0.366)
Di" in log purchasing power −1.187∗∗∗ −1.872∗∗∗ −2.238∗∗∗ −2.340∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.422) (0.451) (0.448)
Di" in log GDP −0.233 −0.388 −0.644∗ −0.904∗∗
(0.245) (0.334) (0.377) (0.393)
Di" in corporate tax rates 0.328 0.518 0.756∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.361) (0.376) (0.361)
Di" in public capital to GDP −0.108 −0.107 −0.278 −0.539∗∗
(0.252) (0.291) (0.277) (0.241)
Distance −0.179 −0.208 −0.148 −0.118
(0.218) (0.268) (0.283) (0.274)
Constant 1.918∗∗∗ 3.021∗∗∗ 3.448∗∗∗ 3.717∗∗∗
(0.569) (0.694) (0.720) (0.690)
Weights None Abs(T-Stat) Abs(T-Stat)2 Abs(T-Stat)3
Observations 425 425 425 425
R2 0.035 0.049 0.070 0.135
Notes: The dependent variable in this model is the set of semi-
elasticities estimated in Table 3.5. These models di"er in
the weight given to each observation. Model (1) includes
no weights. Model (2) weights observations by the absolute
value of the t-statistic. Model (3) weights observations by
the square of the absolute value of the t-statistic. Model (4)
weights observations by the cube of the absolute value of
the t-statistic. Statistical signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01,
** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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Taking substitutionary spillovers as the default behaviour, we can explain
negative coe*cients in two ways. A variable can either be indicative of increas-
ing complementarity or reducing substitutionary e"ects. Guidance as to how to
interpret a coe*cient depends on the discipline provided by economic theory.
The !rst thing to note is that the direction of these estimates is consistent
across estimates. While the size of coe*cients changes, the interpretation does
not change for any of the signi!cant coe*cients. This suggests that the e"ects
are relatively stable across all country pairs.
The second point of interest is that there is a negative, signi!cant and large
coe*cient for the absolute di"erential in purchasing power. This says that the
more di"erent two countries are in economic size, themore likely spillovers will
be complementary rather than substitutionary. In contrast, the closer countries
are in size, the more substitutionary the spillovers will be. This aligns perfectly
with theory. Countries that are more similar in size are expected to increase
the incentive to create horizontal multinational !rms. And horizontal multina-
tional !rms are predicted to have more substitutionary spillovers. Therefore,
we can expect countries that are closer in size to generate more substitutionary
spillovers.
The third point is that there is a positive, signi!cant, and large coe*cient for
the absolute di"erential in log wages. This suggests that as the absolute di"er-
ence between two countries’ wage costs increase, spillovers become more sub-
stitutionary. This runs counter to the theoretical prediction that countries with
greater wage di"erentials should incentivise vertical multinational !rms, where
verticalmultinational !rms are expected to generatemore complementary spillovers.
Because of the surprising nature of this result, I plot a binned scatter plot of
the relationship between the absolute log of the wage di"erential and the semi-
elasticity. Figure 3.8 shows, in the left panel, the binned relationship having par-
tialled out the e"ects of the other control variables. In the right panel, I show
the results without partialling out these e"ects. Notice that without controlling
for other variables, the relationship in the data is negative. However, when con-
trolling for other covariates, the partialled e"ect of the absolute di"erence in the
log of wages is positive. This is a surprising result. Similar results hold for al-
ternative de!nitions of wages such as total wages and salaries, and limiting it to
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wages in the manufacturing sector. Countries with the lowest average wages are
Bulgaria, Romania, and Lithuania, while the countries with the highest average
wages are Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden. The largest absolute wage di"eren-
tials are therefore between these two groups of countries.
Figure 3.8: Binned Scatter Plot of the Relationship Between Wage Di"erentials
and Semi-Elasticities
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This is a binned scatter plot of wages with a line of best !t plotted for the bins. The plot on the
left partials out the e"ects of other control variables using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem.
That is, the y-axis is the residual of the semi-elasticity controlling for all other variables, and the
x-axis is the residual of the di"erential in log wages controlling for all other variables. The plot
on the right does not partial out the e"ects of other control variables, and therefore plots the raw
data.
The results suggest that the greater the level of public capital in the tax re-
forming country, the less substitutionary the e"ect is expected to be. When a
high-public capital country changes its tax rate, it does not generate large sub-
stitutionary spillovers to low-public capital countries. This lines up with the ex-
isting evidence which suggests that the own-tax elasticity of foreign direct in-
vestment is substantially declining in the level of public capital. Benassy-Quere
et al. (2007) !nd that the own-tax elasticity is insigni!cant for high public capital
countries, while the opposite holds for low-public capital countries. Their sug-
gestion is that tax decisions have less importance for foreign direct investment
in high public capital countries. A similar result is uncovered in Bellak et al.
(2009), whose central !nding is that the own-tax elasticity of foreign direct in-
vestment shrinks in magnitude as the level of public infrastructure increases. In
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fact, they even suggest that the negative own-tax elasticity becomes insigni!cant
for the highest levels of public infrastructure. The proposed rationale for this
!nding is that high levels of public capital generate substantial location-speci!c
rents which can be taxed without generating substantial distortionary responses
by multinational !rms.
The larger the originating country is relative to the spillover country, the less
substitutionary the elasticity. This e"ect is not, however, consistently signi!cant
across all models. It suggests that the e"ect of economic size works similarly
to the e"ect of public capital. It is possible that economic size is capturing the
e"ects of agglomeration rents. Agglomeration rents are also location-speci!c
rents that reduce the responsiveness of the multinational !rm to corporate tax
changes. It is similarly possible that, with greater economic size comes greater
market access. A horizontal multinational that is set up to serve a foreignmarket
is unlikely to substantially alter its real allocation of output if it needs to be close
to the market it is serving or if exporting is costly.
The results also suggest that as the corporate tax rate in the originating (tax
reforming) country is larger relative to the spillover (a"ected) country, the more
substitutionary is the corporate tax base spillover. That is, whenhigher-tax coun-
tries cut their tax rates, they are likely to generate substantial negative tax base
e"ects on lower-tax countries. In contrast, tax reformby a lower tax country gen-
erates a more complementary or less substitutionary spillover e"ect on higher-
tax neighbours.
Finally, the tax haven dummies are each statistically signi!cant in two of
the models. In the !rst two models, which place less weight on the statistically
signi!cant semi-elasticities, the results suggest that spillovers originating from
a tax haven are more substitutionary. In the !nal two models, which place a
greater weight on statistically signi!cant semi-elasticities, the results suggest that
spillover to a tax haven aremore substitutionary. Both results con!rm the notion
that spillovers to and from tax havens are likely to be quite substitutionary. This
is the main e"ect predicted by the theoretical models of pro!t shifting.
The bene!t of analysing the heterogeneity of corporate tax base spillovers is
in being able to use these results to predict spillovers in the future. This new evi-
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dence allows us tomake richer policy predictions rather than needing to assume
that all countries are a"ected evenly. I provide a deeper understanding of what
leads to substantial heterogeneity in country-pair corporate tax base spillovers.
3.7 Conclusion
In this essay I estimate corporate tax base spillovers across Europe. First, I esti-
mate the spillover e"ect of 17 countries’ tax rate reforms, averaged across all Eu-
ropean neighbours. Second, I estimate country-pair spillovers, examining how
each country’s reforms a"ected each neighbouring country. For each set of es-
timates I examine the deeper causes of these spillover e"ects. The aim of this
essay is to help us to understand corporate tax base spillovers.
I use data on European !rms from the Amadeus database. I specify an ap-
proach that uses multinational !rms as the transmission mechanism for corpo-
rate tax base spillovers while using domestic !rms as the counterfactual. With
this approach, I !nd that corporate tax base responses inEurope are—on average—
substitutionary in total. However, there is substantial variation, and some spillovers
are complementary.
I !nd that, on average, horizontal spillovers aremore likely to be substitution-
ary than vertical spillovers, but the di"erence is not great. I !nd that controlling
for real factors of production does not substantially reduce the size of the esti-
mated elasticity, likely implying that much of the total spillover e"ect is due to
arti!cial pro!t shifting.
These average e"ects mask even deeper heterogeneity in country-pair elas-
ticities. Most importantly I !nd that we cannot identify signi!cant spillover ef-
fects for a large number of country-pairs. This suggests there is sparsity in the
corporate tax base spillover network, as a small number of countries are likely
substantially a"ected by a single country’s tax rate change. The natural implica-
tion for future policy predictions is that all countries are not a"ected evenly by
spillovers from a corporate tax rate reform. Further, as these spillovers are ex-
pected to drive tax competition, it may mitigate our concern about ‘retaliatory’
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tax rate cuts.
Finally, I am able to use the variation in country-pair elasticities to try to un-
cover richer facts about how spillover e"ects are determined. In particular, I !nd
that countries that have similar levels of purchasing power generatemore substi-
tutionary e"ects. Features such as high levels of public capital and country size
mitigate the substitutionary spillover e"ects of tax rate reforms, likely due to the
location-speci!c rents they generate. As one might expect, tax havens generate
substantially substitutionary spillovers, likely due to arti!cial pro!t shifting. Sur-
prisingly, I !nd that countries with larger wage di"erentials appear to generate
more substitutionary spillovers.
One key takeaway from this essay is that corporate tax base spillovers oper-
ate on a continuum from complementary to substitutionary. There is no clear
divide. Multiple theories give varying predictions of howmultinational !rms’ re-
sponses might generate corporate tax base spillovers. They all likely hold some
measure of importance in determining the !nal e"ect on a country’s tax base.
Therefore the aggregate country-pair spillover is, itself, some weighted average
of the various behavioural responses of the multinational !rm.
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.7: Number of Firms in Each Country by Domestic versus Multinational
Country Total Domestic Multinational
Austria 8206 4517 3689
Belgium 47501 39343 8158
Bulgaria 12047 10949 1098
Czechia 23254 18208 5046
Germany 64805 50658 14147
Denmark 24477 19706 4771
Estonia 5153 3826 1327
Spain 137932 125083 12849
Finland 15714 12797 2917
France 148478 121670 26808
United Kingdom 79979 53226 26753
Greece 11570 10674 896
Croatia 7988 6845 1143
Hungary 16468 14741 1727
Ireland 8034 4739 3295
Italy 218436 203053 15383
Lithuania 3633 2906 727
Luxembourg 6055 3421 2634
Latvia 4056 3268 788
Netherlands 10933 6624 4309
Poland 39206 32226 6980
Portugal 31710 27584 4126
Romania 20106 16575 3531
Sweden 45643 35593 10050
Slovenia 6235 5180 1055
Slovakia 12298 9972 2326
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Table 3.8: Corporate Tax Rate Reforms in Europe from 2007 to 2016
Country Year Previous Tax Rate New Tax Rate
Germany 2008 26.38 15.82
Denmark 2014 25.00 24.50
Denmark 2015 24.50 22.00
Estonia 2008 22.00 21.00
Estonia 2015 21.00 20.00
Spain 2008 32.50 30.00
Spain 2015 30.00 28.00
Spain 2016 28.00 25.00
Finland 2012 26.00 24.50
Finland 2014 24.50 20.00
France 2012 34.43 36.10
France 2014 36.10 38.00
United Kingdom 2009 30.00 28.00
United Kingdom 2011 28.00 26.00
United Kingdom 2012 26.00 24.00
United Kingdom 2013 24.00 23.00
United Kingdom 2014 23.00 21.00
United Kingdom 2015 21.00 20.00
Greece 2010 25.00 24.00
Greece 2011 24.00 20.00
Greece 2013 20.00 26.00
Greece 2015 26.00 29.00
Hungary 2010 16.00 19.00
Italy 2008 33.00 27.50
Lithuania 2009 15.00 20.00
Lithuania 2010 20.00 15.00
Luxembourg 2009 29.63 28.59
Luxembourg 2011 28.59 28.80
Luxembourg 2013 28.80 29.22
Netherlands 2011 25.50 25.00
Portugal 2011 25.00 27.50
Portugal 2012 27.50 30.00
Sweden 2009 28.00 26.30
Sweden 2013 26.30 22.00
Slovenia 2008 23.00 22.00
Slovenia 2009 22.00 21.00
Slovenia 2010 21.00 20.00
Slovenia 2012 20.00 18.00
Slovenia 2013 18.00 17.00
Slovakia 2013 19.00 23.00
Slovakia 2014 23.00 22.00
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Table 3.9: Unweighted Estimates of Average Corporate Tax Spillovers
Country NACE Section NACE 4-Digit Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Denmark 1.094∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗ 1.711∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.254) (0.254) (0.259)
Estonia −0.219 0.081 0.147 0.325
(0.887) (0.886) (0.885) (0.890)
Finland 0.114 0.440 0.345 0.489
(0.446) (0.446) (0.447) (0.449)
France 1.328∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗ 1.327∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.269) (0.269) (0.270)
Germany 0.143 0.167 0.127 −0.217
(0.373) (0.373) (0.373) (0.378)
Greece −0.186 −0.440 −0.373 −0.053
(0.492) (0.493) (0.493) (0.497)
Hungary 2.947∗∗∗ 2.777∗∗∗ 2.489∗∗∗ 3.094∗∗∗
(0.660) (0.657) (0.657) (0.661)
Italy 2.318∗∗∗ 2.076∗∗∗ 1.967∗∗∗ 1.972∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.411) (0.411) (0.412)
Lithuania −0.522 −0.160 −0.063 0.003
(0.772) (0.771) (0.773) (0.776)
Luxembourg −0.972∗∗∗ −1.096∗∗∗ −1.175∗∗∗ −1.007∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250)
Netherlands 0.826∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗ 0.622∗∗ 0.689∗∗
(0.276) (0.275) (0.275) (0.276)
Portugal 2.570∗∗∗ 2.143∗∗∗ 2.097∗∗∗ 2.790∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.437) (0.437) (0.440)
Slovakia 1.004∗∗ 0.871∗∗ 0.926∗∗ 1.439∗∗∗
(0.436) (0.435) (0.434) (0.438)
Slovenia 2.897∗∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗
(0.669) (0.668) (0.669) (0.671)
Spain 1.215∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.319) (0.319) (0.321)
Sweden 1.646∗∗∗ 1.263∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗ 1.134∗∗
(0.485) (0.484) (0.484) (0.486)
United Kingdom −0.687∗ −0.530 −0.444 −1.192∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.353) (0.352) (0.354)
Observations 9,646,299 9,646,299 9,646,299 9,646,299
R2 0.473 0.476 0.479 0.480
Notes: All models include !rm !xed e"ects. Model (1) includes country-
year !xed e"ects. Model (2) includes country-NACE Section-year
!xed e"ects. Model (3) includes country-NACE 4 Digit-year !xed
e"ects, and Model (4) includes country-NACE Section-size-year
!xed e"ects. Observations are unweighted. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the !rm level. Statis-
tical signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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Table 3.10: Country-Speci!c Spillovers Excluding Domestic Firms
Country NACE Section NACE 4-Digit Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Denmark 0.711∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.284) (0.287) (0.291)
Estonia −0.436 −0.123 0.044 0.231
(0.906) (0.909) (0.913) (0.921)
Finland −0.019 0.308 0.286 0.269
(0.463) (0.466) (0.470) (0.473)
France 0.739∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.280) (0.280) (0.283)
Germany −0.526 −0.456 −0.507 −0.442
(0.404) (0.403) (0.407) (0.412)
Greece 0.282 0.082 0.079 0.010
(0.501) (0.503) (0.509) (0.513)
Hungary 1.491∗∗ 1.625∗∗ 1.543∗∗ 1.751∗∗
(0.671) (0.670) (0.675) (0.682)
Italy 0.383 0.177 0.039 0.113
(0.428) (0.427) (0.430) (0.434)
Lithuania −0.362 −0.057 0.270 0.256
(0.786) (0.788) (0.803) (0.805)
Luxembourg −0.976∗∗∗ −0.996∗∗∗ −0.853∗∗∗ −0.953∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.254) (0.258) (0.258)
Netherlands 0.893∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.280) (0.283) (0.285)
Portugal 0.463 0.447 0.426 0.498
(0.455) (0.457) (0.461) (0.465)
Slovakia −0.211 0.105 0.229 0.193
(0.455) (0.456) (0.461) (0.466)
Slovenia 2.623∗∗∗ 2.091∗∗∗ 2.112∗∗∗ 1.992∗∗∗
(0.685) (0.687) (0.694) (0.700)
Spain 1.170∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.337) (0.339) (0.341)
Sweden 1.669∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.509) (0.516) (0.518)
United Kingdom 0.231 0.001 0.158 −0.072
(0.372) (0.372) (0.374) (0.377)
Observations 1,324,428 1,324,428 1,324,428 1,324,428
R2 0.505 0.509 0.517 0.521
Notes: This table re-estimates the main results for country-speci!c
spillovers excluding domestic !rms. This means that only multi-
national !rms with no a*liate in country i serve as the con-
trol units used to create counterfactual outcomes. No reweight-
ing is done. All models include !rm !xed e"ects. Model (1) in-
cludes country-year !xed e"ects. Model (2) includes country-
NACE Section-year !xed e"ects. Model (3) includes country-
NACE 4 Digit-year !xed e"ects, and Model (4) includes country-
NACESection-size-year !xed e"ects. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Standard errors are clustered at the !rm level. Statistical
signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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Table 3.11: Country-Speci!c Spillovers Using Natural Log of Pro!ts
Country NACE Section NACE 4-Digit Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Denmark −0.009 −0.024 −0.021 0.013
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040)
Estonia 0.098 0.180 0.210∗ 0.145
(0.118) (0.119) (0.121) (0.122)
Finland 0.194∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
France 0.169∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Germany 0.079 0.065 0.070 0.080
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055)
Greece −0.206∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Hungary 0.281∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.094)
Italy 0.416∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Lithuania 0.020 0.044 −0.000 0.095
(0.110) (0.111) (0.113) (0.116)
Luxembourg −0.060∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Netherlands 0.088∗∗ 0.055 0.043 0.044
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Portugal 0.176∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Slovakia 0.128∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
Slovenia 0.455∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089)
Spain 0.287∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
Sweden 0.382∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
United Kingdom 0.219∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Observations 7,306,857 7,306,857 7,306,857 7,306,857
R2 0.813 0.815 0.819 0.819
Notes: This table uses the natural log of pro!ts as the dependent variable.
This reduces the number of observations available. All models in-
clude !rm !xed e"ects and year e"ects interacted with country,
country-industry, or country-industry-size. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the !rm level. Statis-
tical signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
112
Table 3.12: Corporate Tax Spillovers for Manufacturing Multinationals
Section (letter) Division (2-digit) Class (4-digit)
(1) (2) (3)
Denmark −0.950 −0.610 −0.793
(0.874) (0.863) (0.885)
Estonia 1.473 2.912 1.393
(2.823) (2.913) (2.874)
Finland 0.095 0.343 −0.025
(1.587) (1.381) (1.639)
France 2.461∗∗∗ 1.829∗∗ 2.436∗∗∗
(0.803) (0.819) (0.817)
Germany −0.586 −0.228 −0.693
(1.053) (1.053) (1.070)
Greece −0.126 0.999 −0.009
(2.204) (2.273) (2.293)
Hungary 5.280∗∗∗ 4.698∗∗ 4.888∗∗
(1.968) (1.961) (1.958)
Italy 2.047∗ 1.858 1.984∗
(1.129) (1.162) (1.151)
Lithuania −5.343 −4.354 −6.047∗
(3.255) (3.355) (3.352)
Luxembourg −1.824 −1.032 −1.784
(1.492) (1.501) (1.524)
Netherlands −0.461 −0.476 −0.297
(0.847) (0.817) (0.820)
Portugal 9.122∗∗∗ 7.613∗∗∗ 9.153∗∗∗
(1.752) (1.781) (1.803)
Slovakia 3.824∗∗∗ 4.146∗∗∗ 3.799∗∗
(1.462) (1.489) (1.475)
Slovenia −3.849 −5.180 −4.184
(3.651) (3.718) (3.711)
Spain −1.012 −0.365 −1.040
(0.958) (0.971) (0.979)
Sweden −1.692 −2.028 −1.205
(1.723) (1.675) (1.688)
United Kingdom −2.097∗∗ −1.593 −2.120∗∗
(1.040) (1.049) (1.072)
Observations 1,819,604 1,819,604 1,819,604
R2 0.468 0.495 0.477
Notes: All models include !rm !xed e"ects. Model (1) in-
cludes country-year !xed e"ects. Model (2) includes
country-NACE 4 Digit-year !xed e"ects, and Model
(3) includes country-size-year !xed e"ects. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the !rm level. Manufacturing !rms are those
operating in Section C of the NACE Classi!cation.
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the !rm level. Statistical signi!cance is
given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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Table 3.13: Estimates by Firm Size
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Denmark 1.880∗∗∗ 2.419∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗ 1.211∗∗ 1.526∗∗
(0.629) (0.578) (0.575) (0.568) (0.610)
Estonia −0.967 −0.370 1.100 −0.002 1.182
(2.521) (2.097) (1.959) (1.979) (1.698)
Finland 1.107 −0.190 −0.340 1.188 0.222
(1.081) (1.036) (0.987) (0.956) (0.977)
France 1.134∗ 2.606∗∗∗ 1.046∗ 1.402∗∗ 1.757∗∗
(0.581) (0.572) (0.585) (0.611) (0.693)
Germany −0.129 −1.903∗∗ −0.475 0.048 −0.708
(0.871) (0.806) (0.823) (0.852) (0.935)
Greece −2.115∗ 2.401∗ 0.780 −1.502 −0.775
(1.281) (1.228) (1.099) (1.036) (0.995)
Hungary 3.603∗∗ 2.439 0.503 4.979∗∗∗ 3.834∗∗∗
(1.647) (1.584) (1.507) (1.369) (1.356)
Italy 4.007∗∗∗ 1.336 1.108 0.093 0.859
(1.005) (0.903) (0.886) (0.901) (0.978)
Lithuania −2.452 −0.704 0.811 2.110 −0.239
(2.178) (1.807) (1.847) (1.717) (1.623)
Luxembourg −1.535∗∗ −2.383∗∗∗ −0.988∗ −0.410 −0.813
(0.624) (0.566) (0.545) (0.544) (0.518)
Netherlands 0.112 0.567 0.997∗ 0.551 1.257∗∗
(0.711) (0.634) (0.601) (0.587) (0.592)
Portugal 1.283 3.776∗∗∗ 2.117∗∗ 2.441∗∗ 1.011
(1.100) (0.999) (0.981) (0.962) (0.958)
Slovakia 1.631 0.405 2.102∗∗ 0.944 1.740∗
(1.141) (1.010) (0.977) (0.937) (0.896)
Slovenia 1.355 0.433 2.922∗ −0.650 3.658∗∗∗
(1.795) (1.636) (1.604) (1.465) (1.268)
Spain 2.711∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗ 0.424 0.031 0.095
(0.737) (0.704) (0.677) (0.714) (0.797)
Sweden 1.016 1.081 1.404 2.681∗∗ 0.253
(1.197) (1.057) (1.091) (1.047) (1.091)
United Kingdom 0.584 −0.341 −0.783 −2.171∗∗∗ −3.043∗∗∗
(0.791) (0.733) (0.770) (0.821) (0.918)
Observations 4,510,081 2,252,751 1,377,322 854,232 509,259
R2 0.469 0.500 0.514 0.522 0.517
Notes: This table splits the !rms into !ve quantiles based on total asset
size. Themodel is estimated separately to see if there is substantial
heterogeneity of spillover across size groups. All models include
!rm!xed e"ects and country-industry-year !xed e"ects. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the !rm
level. Statistical signi!cance is given by *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
and * p< 0.1.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Bene!t-Based Corporate
Income Tax
4.1 Introduction
The view that ‘corporations must pay their fair share’ dominates public opinion.
In 2017, Americans’ biggest complaint about the federal tax system was the feel-
ing that some corporations do not pay their fair share of tax. Sixty-two percent
of respondents said they were bothered ‘a lot’ by corporations who did not pay
their fair share (Pew Research Center, 2017a). In 2018, only 26 percent of Ameri-
cans believed that corporations paid their fair share of tax. Sixty-two percent felt
that corporations paid too little tax (Gallup, 2018). Fifty-nine percent of Ameri-
cans felt that corporations made too much pro!t (Pew Research Center, 2017b).
Even the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and the G20’s combined Base Erosion and Pro!t Shifting Project justi!es its ex-
istence on the grounds that multinational !rms “avoid paying their fair share”
through arti!cial pro!t shifting (OECD, 2019).
But what is anyone’s fair share of tax? For example, Datt (2014) says the Aus-
tralian Taxation O*ce’s call for corporations to pay a ‘fair share of tax’ is not an
objective calculation of tax liability. Is there any way for us to convert the idea
of a ‘fair share’ into a formal guideline for tax liability? The concern is not that
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a ‘fair share’ is not a good fundamental principle. The concern is that it implies
no formal guideline for the calculation of tax liability.
To be useful, guidelines for the optimal taxation of corporations must be
rooted in a purpose. Weisbach (2015) says:
The basic point is that we cannot know what the optimal pattern of
international capital income taxation should be without understand-
ing the reasons for taxing capital income in the !rst place... To un-
derstand the design of !rm-level taxation, however, we need to know
why we are taxing !rms.
To be able to de!ne the purpose for taxing corporations, we !rst have to ask: ‘why
does the corporate tax exist?’
In academia, the dominant view of the corporate tax is that it serves an ad-
ministrative purpose (for example, see the OECD 2001 and Mirrlees et al. 2011).
The administrative view encompasses three arguments. The !rst is that the cor-
porate income tax exists to prevent individuals from incorporating themselves
to avoid personal taxation. The second is that the corporate income tax exists
to prevent !rms from hoarding pro!ts to avoid dividend taxation. The third is
that it is easier to tax a !rm’s pro!ts rather than to tax individual shareholders.
According to the administrative view, the corporate tax exists to support taxes
on individuals.
I propose an alternative bene!t-based view: !rms should contribute to the pro-
vision of the public input according to the bene!ts they receive from the use of the public
input. The corporate income tax should exist for !rms to contribute to public
input provision. This is an application of the classical principle of bene!t-based
taxation to corporations (Weinzierl, 2018a). I will refer to this simply as bene!t-
based taxation. This bene!t-based view of corporate taxation justi!es and is sup-
ported by the widespread norm that !rms should pay tax where the relevant
economic activity takes place (OECD, 2013; Pogge and Mehta, 2016a). Similarly,
the IMF (2019) suggests that the only widely-accepted principle of inter-nation
equity is that governments should have taxing rights over location-speci!c rents
that arise in their country. Since the public input creates a location-speci!c rent,
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Musgrave andMusgrave (1972) conclude that the bene!t principle automatically
satis!es the notion of inter-nation equity. The bene!t-based view of corporate
taxation is supported by our widely-held norms of corporate taxation.
Imodel the bene!ts of public spending byputting a non-excludable non-rival
productive public good in the !rm’s production function. I refer to this produc-
tive public good as the public input. To identify an optimal bene!t-based corpo-
rate tax rate, I use the Lindahl (1919)method of solving the cost-sharing problem.
I modify the Lindahl (1919) thought experiment to account for the distortionary
nature of the corporate tax by supposing that the government chooses the public
input and the corporate tax separately for each !rm type. I draw heavily from
Weinzierl (2018b), who integrates the Lindahl (1919) thought experiment into
modern tax theory under the case of non-distorting labour income taxation.
I derive a simple optimal bene!t-based corporate tax rate formula:
t∗ =
eG
1+ eT
.
The formula is a function of two estimable elasticities: the elasticity of pro!ts
with respect to the (net of) tax rate (eT ), and the elasticity of pro!ts with respect
to the public input (eG). While the tax elasticity accounts for the distortionary
e"ects of corporate taxation, the public input elasticity captures the bene!ts gen-
erated by the public input. This optimal tax formula integrates the bene!t view
with more popular e*ciency concerns.
I apply the bene!t-based optimal tax formula to the United States. Using
Compustat data, I estimate the necessary elasticities for public corporations,
which tend to be the largest and most visible corporations. The preferred es-
timate of the public input elasticity is 0.653, and of the tax elasticity is 0.427.
These estimates imply the optimal bene!t-based corporate income tax rate is
t∗ = 0.653/(1+0.653×0.427)= 46 percent for United States public corporations.
This exceeds both the new and the old United States corporate tax rates of 21
percent and 35 percent respectively. It suggests that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
of 2017 moves the tax rate in the opposite direction of what an optimal bene!t
based tax on public corporations would suggest. A full range of estimates suggest
that the optimal bene!t-based tax lies in the range of 35 to 59 percent.
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The bene!t principle gives three guidelines for designing the international
corporate tax system. The !rst guideline is that corporate taxation should follow
the source principle so that governments can tax the returns to their own public
inputs. The second guideline is the tax base should be narrowed to economic
rents so as to target returns to the public input. This implies we should distort
other factors of production as little as possible. The third guideline is that pro!t
shifting is unfair. Despite the e*ciency-enhancing nature of pro!t shifting, it
allows !rms to evade their contribution to providing the public input.
This paper does not attempt to impute the bene!t principle as the reasonwhy
the corporate income tax was !rst implemented. Zucman (2014) already points
out that its original purpose when introduced across the world shortly after the
!rst World War was to stop shareholders from hoarding pro!ts within the !rm
and to stop individuals from incorporating themselves. That is, the corporate tax
is originally a backstop to the personal income tax. Instead, I propose that the
corporate income tax’smost fundamental economic use is as a bene!t-based tax.
I also do not propose a full package of policies, but instead a series of principles
that should serve as the normative foundation for detailed policywork on how to
implement the bene!t-based corporate income tax. The bene!t principle serves
as the guiding light for answering di*cult policy questions such as: “how should
digital companies be taxed?” The approach is not the standard approach either,
since it does not focus onmaximising a social welfare function asmodern public
economics demands. The use of the Lindahl (1919) method achieves the desired
solution, but the method used to achieve that solution does not wholly replicate
or describe reality as most economic models seek to do.
In the following section, I present the case for bene!t-based taxation as the
fundamental principle of corporate taxation. In Section 4.3, I formalise these
insights to derive an optimal bene!t-based corporate tax formula. I then apply
thismodel to the case of theUnited States in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, I describe
the policy insights that can be gained from applying the bene!t principle to the
corporate income tax.
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4.2 The Case for Bene!t-Based Corporate Taxation
There is no clear consensus on why the corporate income tax exists. Even in
canonical public economics texts there is a great deal of vagueness on the pur-
pose of the corporate tax. For example, Kaplow (2011) and Myles (1995) !nd it
di*cult to rationalise the tax’s existence. And while Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)
tries to examine the validity of some of the beliefs behind the various justi!ca-
tions of the corporate income tax, none of these authors provide a convincing
explanation.
Bird (1996) collects a number of potential economic justi!cations for the cor-
porate income tax’s existence. He concludes that none of the justi!cations he
uncovers are particularly strong. But the combination of these justi!cations is
enough for him to recommend that the corporate tax should exist. He separates
these justi!cations into three categories. First, because the corporate tax is desir-
able. Second, because it is necessary to achieve some objectives. Third, because
it is convenient.
Avi-Yonah (2004) advances the view that the corporate income tax is justi!ed
as a means to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of cor-
porate management. He describes power as the ability to in%uence behaviour
or the ability to get what one wants. This power arises as the result of !nancial
power at the disposal of the !rm. Excessive !nancial power likely arises through
excess pro!ts, which are themselves the result of uncompensated factors of pro-
duction. The most obvious use of such !nancial power is in the political sphere
as examined by Mikler (2018), but a !rm’s economic size may give it power in
economic interactions too. Avi-Yonah (2004) therefore suggests that the aim of
the corporate tax is the redistribution of power in society. However, in the limit,
this rationale for the corporate income tax’s existence would imply that society
is better o" even if the tax revenue is thrown into the sea. The corporate power argu-
ment, therefore, provides no fundamental economic purpose for the existence
of the corporate tax.
I propose a fundamental economic purpose for the corporate income tax. I
argue that the corporate income tax should exist as a bene!t-based tax. The case
for bene!t-based taxation is built on two arguments. First, I argue that bene!t-
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based taxation is fair. Second, I argue that bene!t-based taxation is feasible. I
now present logical evidence in support of these arguments.
4.2.1 Bene!ts-Based Taxation as Normatively Fair
Bene!ts-based taxation has root in Adam Smith’s (1776) !rst maxim of taxation:
“The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the gov-
ernment, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is,
in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection
of the state.” This maxim re%ects Smith’s normative perspective on how !rms
should be taxed. Ideally, he says, tax liability should be linked to the revenue a
!rm derives from the state’s public services. This is the foundation of bene!t-
based taxation.
Bene!t-based taxation of corporations leads to a quite natural conclusion:
!rms should pay tax where pro!t-generating production takes place. Graetz (2000)
says:
The services a nation providesmay contribute substantially to the
ability of both residents and foreigners to earn income there. Taxing
that income is one way for the source country to be compensated for
its expenditures on the services it provides. One need not thoroughly
embrace the bene!t theory of taxation—the idea that the expenses
of government should be paid by those who bene!t in proportion
to the bene!ts they receive—which is fraught with di*cult problems
of measurement and allocation, to recognize a country’s legitimate
claim to tax income produced within its borders.
In fact, the legitimacy of a country’s claim to tax income generated within its
borders is a principle on which we are in widespread agreement. The essays
in Pogge and Mehta (2016a) collectively demand that tax liability should arise
where the income-generating economic activity takes place. This principle is
also the fundamental driving force behind the OECD’s Base Erosion and Pro!t
Shifting (BEPS) project. Weinzierl (2018a) reverse-engineers these views, point-
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ing out that this principle is a natural implication of the bene!t principle of tax-
ation. Further, the bene!t principle provides a normative foundation for this
broad notion of inter-nation fairness. Under bene!t taxation, the multinational
!rm pays tax where its income-generating economic activity takes place because
that activity is supported and made possible by the government where that ac-
tivity takes place.
This principle is e"ectively a statement of inter-nation equity. Inter-nation
equity concerns the allocation of national gains and losses in an international
context, aiming to ensure that each country is allocated an equitable share of the
tax revenues that arise from international or cross-border activity of corpora-
tions (OECD, 2014). In practical terms, it discusses who should have the ability
to tax a multinational’s pro!ts—the source, residence, or destination country.
Kaufman (1997) says that ”fairness exists in the international tax system only
when states distribute among themselves the competence to tax in a way that
conforms to prevailing views of justice internationally.”
The notion of inter-nation equity was developed byMusgrave andMusgrave
(1972), and their original conclusion is striking: “Inter-nation equity under the
bene!t principle would be self-implementing.” That is, a bene!t-based corpo-
rate tax would automatically achieve inter-nation equity. According toMusgrave
andMusgrave (1972), the bene!t idea would be an ideal manner to allocate gains
among countries by entitling each country to charge for the cost of public ser-
vices rendered to the !rm. This perspective of inter-nation equity is echoed by
the IMF (2019). The IMF (2019) report says while that there is little agreement
on standards of inter-nation equity, there is one principle of inter-nation equity
on which we broadly agree: that taxing rights of location-speci!c rents should
be allocated to the jurisdiction in which they arise.
From the perspective of within-country equity, bene!t-based corporate tax-
ation complies with the just deserts principle proposed by Mankiw (2010). The
just deserts principle simply says “people should get what they deserve”, imply-
ing no desire for redistribution from rich to poor. What does a !rmdeserve? The
!rm does not ‘deserve’ to receive returns to the public input. Instead, the returns
to the public input should accrue to the public input’s owner: the government.
And even if the government does not want these rents, the !rm still has no legit-
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imate claim that it ‘deserves’ these returns. The corporate income tax is the only
means of fairly allocating their ‘just deserts’ between !rm and government.
Unlike the administrative view of corporate taxation, bene!t-based taxation
does not need to invoke the need for redistribution of income across households.
Instead, bene!t-based taxation justi!es the !rm as the unit of taxation since it is
the !rm that uses the public input to produce, and it is the !rm that receives
the bene!ts of the public input. Because the bene!ts of the public input are
generated at the !rm level, then these bene!ts should be taxed at the !rm level.
Using the !rm as the unit of taxation gives us a clear framework to determine
what a !rm’s ‘fair share’ of tax is.
Support for bene!t-based taxation is widespread. Between 62 and 79 percent
of American survey respondents prefer bene!t-based taxation to conventional
optimal tax logic based on the diminishing marginal social welfare of income
(Weinzierl, 2017). Why is the bene!t principle’s popularity of relevance? Dia-
mond and Saez (2011) provide the answer: optimal tax policy should be socially
acceptable and should not violate widely-held normative views.
The main economic arguments against the corporate tax as a bene!t tax are
positive rather than normative. For example, Weichenrieder (2005) does not
argue that the bene!t principle is invalid, but rather that the existing corporate
tax system is an imperfect way to achieve the aims of the bene!t principle. De
Mooij (2005) makes a similar claim: since there exists a weak relationship be-
tween the taxes paid by a company and the bene!ts the company receives from
public services, then the existing corporate income tax does not comply with the
bene!t principle. These are valid arguments against the existing corporate tax as
a bene!t tax. However, they do not invalidate the central thesis of this essay: the
corporate income tax should be a bene!t-based tax.
Fairness and equity should be a fundamental concern of the corporate in-
come tax. Cui (2016) concludes that “theories that do not take into account dis-
tributional consequences and focus only on e*ciency concerns are unlikely to
be accepted as setting out adequate normative criteria for international taxation.”
And optimal international corporate tax systemmust be based both on the fair-
ness and e*ciency of the proposed tax.
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4.2.2 The Ability to Tax Returns to Public Inputs
The seminal work of Gordon (1986) suggests that a small open economy cannot
impose a tax onmultinational !rms. Gordon (1986) assumes an in!nite elasticity
of capital with respect to tax; even a small corporate income tax would cause all
capital to disappear. The assumption of an in!nite elasticity of capital requires
the absence of location-speci!c rents. Any modern re-statement of Gordon’s
!ndings includes the quali!cation that a small open economy cannot impose a
tax onmultinational !rms if there are no location-speci!c rents (Gri*th et al., 2010).
The obvious implication is that the existence of location-speci!c rents provides
an opportunity for a small open economy to impose a non-zero corporate tax.
Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) then consider optimal corporate taxation in the
presence of location-speci!c rents. Full taxation of location-speci!c rents be-
comes optimal. A tax on location-speci!c rents is not distortionary because the
factors generating location-speci!c rents are immobile. However, if there is an
upper limit on the tax rate on location-speci!c rents, the use of a distortionary
tax on capital income becomes warranted. Similarly, if a government is forced
to tax capital and rents at the same rate, it might be forced to impose a non-
zero tax on capital. In reality, a government might be forced to tax them both at
the same rate because it cannot distinguish between returns to capital and rents
(Auerbach and Devereux, 2018). In the same manner, Keen and Piekkola (1997)
!nd that if pro!ts arising from location-speci!c rents are not taxed, then taxing
returns to capital becomes optimal. In fact, McKeehan and Zodrow (2017) sug-
gest that the main reason corporate income taxes have not simply converged to
zero is the existence of location-speci!c rents. Therefore, location-speci!c rents
give government the ability to impose positive corporate income taxes.
What exactly are these location-speci!c rents that give the government the
ability to impose corporate taxes? First, the concept of Paretian rent, de!ned by
Wessel (1967) is "the excess earnings over the amount necessary to keep the factor in its
present occupation." Pure pro!ts arising from a decreasing returns to scale produc-
tion function suggests that there are some unobservable factors of production at
work. Since it should always be possible to perfectly replicate production by
replicating all rival factors, then decreasing returns to scale in observable factors
must re%ect the scarcity of (or normal returns to) an underlying unlisted factor of
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production. The popular microeconomic theory text by Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
provides a proof for the proposition that any decreasing returns to scale pro-
duction function can be represented by a constant returns to scale production
function with implicit !xed inputs (page 134, Proposition 5.B.2).
If economic rents can be attributed to underlying factors of production, these
factors can then be broadly divided into two categories: !rm-speci!c factors or
location-speci!c factors. That is, the factors generating economic pro!ts must
belong either to the !rm or to the country in which production takes place. The
most common example of an unobserved !rm-speci!c asset is entrepreneurial
inputs. Such !rm-speci!c rents are considered to be highlymobile and subject to
%ight as described byMirrlees et al. (2011). Firm-speci!c assets are a key element
of the theory of the multinational !rm, as described by Dunning (1988) in terms
of specialized and patented technological knowledge, superior managerial skills
or production techniques, or valuable product brands, trademarks, reputations,
and other intangible assets (McKeehan and Zodrow, 2017).
Locations-speci!c rents appear in various forms such as returns to immobile
natural resources, agglomeration rents due to industrial concentration (Baldwin
and Krugman, 2004), country-size rents due to savings on aggregate transporta-
tion costs (Hau%er and Wooton, 1999), or more traditional imperfectly compet-
itive domestic markets. A salient example of location-speci!c assets is natural
resources. TheHandbook of National Accounting (UN and FAO, 2005) describes
economic rents of a natural resource as the value of capital services %ows ren-
dered by a natural resource, or their share in gross operating surplus. Mirrlees
et al. (2011) list a couplemore possible sources of location-speci!c rents: the pres-
ence of workers not re%ected in labour costs, or proximity to large markets not
re%ected in the cost of land. The latter is most easily thought of in the context
of agglomeration rents, a topic that is central to the New Economic Geography
literature. Koh et al. (2013) !nd that, within the context of German municipali-
ties, greater agglomeration e"ects increase a municipality’s tax rate. One might
also think of location-speci!c rents being the result of government regulation.
More importantly, the public input is a key source of location-speci!c rents.
The public input is de!ned as a productive public good that the !rm uses in
its production process. Empirically, the public input is represented as public
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capital generating a %ow of public services. Aschauer (1989) argues that public
inputs are very important to the production process. The need for public goods
and services arise when private agents are unwilling or unable to provide them.
This might happen if private agents cannot charge a user fee for these goods,
neither can they exclude agents fromusing the public good. Itmight also happen
when the provision of a good requires economies of scale so large that only a
government is willing to undertake provision. The body of empirical literature
following Aschauer (1989) !nds economically signi!cant elasticities output with
respect to public capital across a range of countries (Bom and Ligthart, 2014b).
Most importantly, however, is the casewhere location-speci!c rents are the result
of an uncompensated public input. Most easily, one can think of the abundance
of public capital. Recent work by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018) suggests
that to account for economic pro!ts as income to unmeasured capital in the US,
the value of unmeasured capital would need to be approximately 30 percent of
total private capital. It is not surprising then that according to the International
Monetary Fund’s Investment and Capital Stock Dataset (2015), the size of public
capital was 53 percent of private capital in the US from 1970 to 2015.
The public input is an important location-speci!c factor of production. The
location-speci!c rents generated by the public input allows governments the
ability to impose a positive corporate income tax. This ability to tax exists even
in a small open economy where optimal corporate tax rates are traditionally
thought to be zero. A bene!t-based corporate income tax that links a !rm’s tax
liability to its returns generated by the public input is not only fair, but also fea-
sible.
4.3 AModel of Bene!t-Based Corporate Taxation
I apply the Lindahl (1919) approach to classical bene!t-based taxation to the cor-
porate income tax. I extend theLindahl thought experiment laid out inWeinzierl
(2018b) to incorporate a distortionary corporate tax instrument. To do so, I con-
sider a thought experiment where the government chooses each !rm’s optimal
level of public input provision and corporate tax rate individually. This di"ers to
the standard Lindahl thought experiment where !rms would choose their own
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optimal level of public input provision, and no distortionary tax exists.
4.3.1 Setup
There are I !rm types and each !rm type is indexed by i. To simplify the pre-
sentation of the model, I restrict attention to a single country. A !rm of type i
has a pro!t function πi(ki,G) which is a function of private capital (ki) and the
public input (G). Each !rm type is endowed with !nancial capital K i which it can
either invest in production or in an outside option. Investing in production gen-
erates pro!ts through the pro!t function πi(ki,G) while investing in the outside
option o"ers a !xed return of return r.
For simplicity, I assume !rms are price takers and there is no strategic inter-
action. Note that pro!ts described here are not economic pro!ts. Instead, they
are the sum of the returns to equity capital and the returns to the public input.
This de!nition of pro!ts matches the common de!nition of corporate pro!ts in
the real world. I also normalise prices to unity.
The !rm chooses ki to maximises total income Π—the sum of pro!t and
returns from the outside option. Each !rm type i faces an ad valorem tax on its
pro!ts of ti. The !rm takes both the tax rate and the amount of the public input
provided as given. This is the standard approach in tax theory, but it diverges
from the traditional Lindahl thought experiment since !rms do not choose the
level of public input themselves. Firm type i’s problem is:
max
ki
Π= (1− ti)πi(ki,G)+ r(K i−ki). (4.1)
Firm type i’s !rst-order condition of the maximization problem with respect to
ki is given by:
(1− ti)
∂πi(ki,G)
∂ki
− r = 0. (4.2)
Intuitively, Equation 4.2 says that the !rm uses capital in production up to the
point where marginal after-tax pro!t is equal to the !xed return on the outside
option. The outside option is the opportunity cost of investing in productive
economic activity. I use the outside option to include any alternative uses of
!nancial capital or behavioural responses a !rmmight have. This includes shift-
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ing from equity to debt, pro!t shifting, shifting the geographical location of pro-
ductive activity, or even shifting to passive investment classes outside of the !rm.
The !rm can be considered to be either a domestic or a multinational !rmwith-
out altering the setup of the model.
Distorting Corporate Tax The !rm’s !rst-order condition in Equation 4.2 im-
plies that the !rm’s optimal choice of capital—and therefore itsmaximizedpro!ts—
depend on the tax rate. How? Using the !rst-order condition, the implicit dif-
ferential of ki with respect to the net-of-tax rate (1− ti) is
dki
d(1− ti)
=
−∂πi(ki,G)/∂ki
(1− ti)∂2πi(ki,G)/∂k
2
i
6= 0. (4.3)
Consequently, the e"ect of a change in the net of tax rate on pro!ts is also non-
zero, given by:
dπ(ki,G)
d(1− ti)
=
∂πi(ki,G)
∂ki
dki
d(1− ti)
6= 0. (4.4)
A change in the net-of-tax rate invokes a change in the !rm’s optimal value of
ki. Standard restrictions on the pro!t function so that ∂πi(ki,G)/∂ki > 0 and
∂2πi(ki,G)/∂k
2
i
< 0 would imply that increasing the tax rate leads to a decrease
in pro!t. More importantly in this simple setup, I show that the corporate in-
come tax distorts the !rm’s choice of pro!ts.
4.3.2 Optimal Corporate Tax
Lindahl (1919) devised a means for two parties to determine ‘by free agreement’
howmuch of a commongood theywould purchase. Lindahl’s solutionwas based
on the idea that either party would want the group to purchase less of the com-
mon good if they have to cover a larger share of the cost. If each partymust cover
half the cost of the common good but their valuations of the common good are
di"erent, then they will not agree on how much to purchase. Lindahl’s solution
is simple: increase the share of the cost covered by the party with a higher val-
uation of the common good. The high-valuation party now thinks the group
should purchase less of the common good since they bear a greater portion of
the burden. Meanwhile, the low-valuation party now thinks the group should
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purchase more. Lindahl suggests adjusting the share each party contributes un-
til they agree on exactly how much of the common good should be purchased.
While Lindahl’s solution is by nomeans the only proposition for how best to
enforce bene!t-based taxation, it is intuitive. Weinzierl (2018b) integrates Lin-
dahl’s approach into optimal tax theory by making the assumption that an in-
dividual’s income is a function of the public good. I extend the Lindahl (1919)
solution to the optimal corporate income tax.
The existingLindahl (1919)methodunrealistically assumes a non-distortionary
tax instrument. But since Pigou (1947) we recognise that using distortionary tax
instruments generates an additional cost to raising funds for provision of the
public good (Stiglitz and Dasgupta, 1971; Atkinson and Stern, 1974). I use the
term ‘distortion’ in the original sense of Atkinson and Stern (1974) as the excess
burden the corporate income tax on pro!ts generates compared to the alterna-
tive of lump-sum taxation (Browning and Liu, 1998). This distortion is created
by the !rm’s behavioural responses to taxation, which we know to be empirically
relevant (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008; Devereux et al., 2014; Bachas and Soto,
2018; Seegert et al., 2018).
To !nd an implementable and realistic application of the bene!t principle,
I modify the traditional Lindahl approach. I introduce a Modi!ed Lindahl Ap-
proach that adds the distortionary character of the corporate income tax to Lin-
dahl’s solution for provision of a public input.
De!nition 4.1. Modi!ed Lindahl Approach: The Modi!ed Lindahl Approach is a
thought experiment where the government chooses the optimal level of public input provi-
sion g i and the optimal tax on pro!ts ti for each !rm type individually. The government
is constrained by the condition:
tiπi(ki, g i)−τi g i = 0 (4.5)
so that the amount of tax paid by the !rm must be equal to a !xed share τi of the cost of
the provision of the public input g i.
The Lindahl approach uses a !rm-speci!c choice of public input g i rather
than the single aggregate value G that holds in reality. This !rm-speci!c public
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input is a key mechanism in Lindahl’s solution. The original Lindahl (1919) ap-
proach would ask: what if each individual !rm could choose its optimal level of
public input provision? Instead the modi!ed approach asks: what if the govern-
ment chose the optimal level of public input provision for each !rm separately?
The modi!ed thought experiment incorporates the existence of a distortionary
corporate tax. Moving the choice of g i outside the !rmmeans the !rm does not
internalise the link between the tax it pays and public input provision. The !rm
is separately aware that it pays tax and that it uses a public input, but it does not
recognise that higher taxes imply higher public input provision. If a !rm inter-
nalises the e"ect of a higher tax rate on public input provision then the corporate
tax would not be distorting.
Maximising Pro!ts I assume that the government’s aim in setting tax rates and
choosing the public input is tomaximise the value of the !rm’s pro!ts. The !rm’s
domestic pro!ts are derived from domestic production. I use the !rm’s outside
option to describe any alternative use of the !rm’s !nancial capital endowment.
In the broader scheme, this might include activities that the government does
notmind. However, this essay is narrowly focused on the question of the optimal
corporate tax system and abstracts away from other possibly-bene!cial invest-
ment activity. There are two reasons for this. First, the fundamental advice of
the classical bene!t principle is that we must consider each bene!t in isolation.
This is why user fees are considered to be the optimal means for implement-
ing bene!t taxation—it charges the user separately for each usage of the public
input (Gugl and Zodrow, 2015a). Second, for clarity of exposition. The bene!t
principle is analytically coherent when we focus our attention narrowly on the
tax base where bene!ts show up: corporate pro!ts.
This assumption is standard in the literature considering public inputs and
corporate taxation. Hau%er and Schjelderup (1999) speci!callymodel amultina-
tional !rm, but assume that investment in the foreign country (the outside op-
tion) is !xed. This implies that utility maximisation is equivalent to maximising
the net rents derived from public input provision. Gugl and Zodrow (2015a,b)
andMatsumoto and Sugahara (2017) assume that households own a !xed amount
of capital that can either be invested in the !rm or in an outside option which
generates return r. Since the !rm rents capital in their model, including both
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the cost of renting capital (rk) and the returns to renting capital (rk) in the gov-
ernment’s objective function means that these will cancel out. The government
is therefore left maximising only the !rm’s pro!ts. In Appendix 4.A.2, I show the
outcome of maximising over the !rm’s total income.
The Government’s Lindahl Problem For the tax collected from !rm i to be
equal to !rm i’s share of the cost of the public input, the government uses the
!rm-speci!c constraint tiπi(ki, g i)= τi g i. For each !rm, the government chooses
a tax rate and level of public input provision for each individual !rm type that
maximises the !rm’s pro!ts. The Lagrangian for the government’s problem for
!rm type i is:
max
ti ,g i
L = (1− ti)πi(ki, g i)+λ (tiπi(ki, g i)−τi g i) . (4.6)
where k∗
i
is the policy function from the !rm’s maximisation problem. From
the !rst-order conditions of the !rm, we know that k∗
i
is a function of both g i
and ti.
I de!ne the elasticities of pro!t with respect to public inputs and the net-of-
tax rate as:
eGi =
(
dπi(k
∗
i
, g i)
dg i
)(
g i
πi(k
∗
i
, g i)
)
(4.7)
eTi =
(
dπi(k
∗
i
, g i)
d(1− ti)
)(
1− ti
πi(k
∗
i
, g i)
)
(4.8)
Optimal Public InputCondition I derive the !rst-order conditionwith respect
to the public input to characterise optimal public input provision in a settingwith
a productive public input. Full derivations are shown in Appendix 4.A.1. I derive
the condition:
(
eG
i
1− eG
i
)(
1− ti
ti
)
=λ. (4.9)
Increasing the public input directly and indirectly increases the !rm’s pro!ts.
Directly through the pro!t function, and indirectly through the e"ect on the
!rm’s optimal choice of capital. By increasing !rm pro!ts, the public input also
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increases the government’s tax base.
Optimal Corporate Tax Condition I derive the government’s optimal choice
of the net-of-tax rate (1− ti). The !rst-order condition is:
1+ eT
i
1− eT
i
(
ti
1− ti
) =λ. (4.10)
An increase in the net-of-tax rate of !rm type i induces a mechanical and a be-
havioural e"ect. The mechanical e"ect is the reduction in the tax rate the !rm
faces, holding pro!ts constant. The behavioural e"ect is the !rm’s optimal re-
sponse to the change in the tax rate through its !rst-order conditions and cap-
tures the distorting e"ect of the corporate tax. Normally a higher tax rate leads
to lower pro!ts and vice versa.
De!nition 4.2. Lindahl Equilibrium: A Lindahl equilibrium is a policy comprising
a set of personalised tax shares {τi} and public input choice G∗ where the following con-
ditions hold:
g i =G
∗
∀i, (4.11)∑
i∈I
τi = 1 (4.12)
A Lindahl equilibrium is de!ned by the set of tax shares {τ1,τ2, ...,τI} that
leads the government to optimally choose the same level of public input pro-
vision {g i} for all !rms. This level is the optimal level of public input provision
G∗. This equilibrium concept requires that these tax shares must completely
fund the provision of the optimal level of public input provision. Even though
the Lindahl equilibrium concept remains unchanged, it is no longer a !rst-best
equilibrium. It does, however, give us a solution for the set of optimal tax rates.
Optimal Tax Rate Formula How does the government set the optimal tax rate
that achieves Lindahl equilibrium? First I use De!nition 4.2 of Lindahl equi-
librium to replace g i with G∗. Then I combine the government’s !rst-order
conditions for optimal public input provision and for optimal taxation for an
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individual !rm type i:
(
eG
∗
i
1− eG
∗
i
)(
1− ti
ti
)
=
1+ eT
i
1− eT
i
(
ti
1− ti
) . (4.13)
I can now state this essay’s main proposition.
Proposition 4.1. In a Modi!ed Lindahl Equilibrium, the optimal bene!t-based corpo-
rate income tax rate for any !rm type i with a distortionary tax instrument is:
t∗i =
eG
∗
i
1+ eT
i
(4.14)
where eG
∗
i
is the elasticity of pro!ts with respect to the public input and eT
i
is the elasticity
of pro!ts with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
Proof is shown in Appendix 4.A.1. The optimal corporate tax rate is expressed
in terms of two estimable elasticities. A higher public input elasticity of pro!ts
implies a higher corporate tax rate since the !rm derives a greater bene!t. If the
corporate tax rate is not distortionary such that eT
i
= 0, then the optimal corpo-
rate tax rate is t∗
i
= eG
∗
i
. As the !rm’s behavioural response to taxation increases,
then the optimal corporate tax rate falls.
In a standard Lindahl equilibrium, the !rm should pay for the public good
according to the bene!t they receive from the public good. When a !rm is opti-
mising, themarginal bene!t the !rm receives should be equal to theirwillingness
to pay for an extra unit of the public input. The !rm’s total tax payment should
be equal to their total willingness to pay for the optimal level of public inputs.
This optimal tax formula therefore combines the !rm’s willingness to pay for
the good with the !scal externality induced by the behavioural response of the
agent (Hendren, 2016).
The optimal tax formula in Equation 4.14 implies that a !rm type contributes
more to public input provision when it values the public input more. This is
the classical logic of bene!t-based taxation. Firms with a higher behavioural re-
sponse to corporate taxation see their optimal corporate tax rate adjusted down-
ward. Note, however, that there is only an economically signi!cant adjustment
to the optimal corporate tax rate for !rms who receive a high bene!t from the
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Figure 4.1: Optimal Tax Rate for Range of Elasticities
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public input. This is shown in Figure 4.1. Those with a public input elasticity of
0.2 or below see almost no adjustment in their optimal corporate tax rate when
their behavioural responses increase.
Notice that a !rm that has a high level of pro!ts independent of the public
input so that eG = 0 would pay no corporate income tax under this bene!t-based
corporate income tax system. This approach does not account for the ‘ability
to pay’ rationale for taxation that underpins the Mirrlees (1971) approach. The
ability to pay concept stems from an individual’s inherent ability, an unobserved
heterogeneity among individuals (Mankiw et al., 2009). Fleming Jr et al. (2001)
make the argument that
Modi!ed Samuelson Condition For comparability with traditional tax litera-
ture, I can rewrite these !ndings in a modi!ed version of the Samuelson (1955)
condition for optimal public input provision. Rearranging the optimal public
input condition to isolate the bene!t received by the !rm:
eGi πi(k
∗
i , g
i)= τi g i
(
λi
1− ti+λi ti
)
. (4.15)
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Substituting in for λ from the condition for optimal taxation gives:
eGi πi(k
∗
i , g
i)= τi g
i(1+ eTi ) (4.16)
for each !rm type. ByDe!nition4.2 of Lindahl equilibrium, I replace g i withG∗
and sum the above condition across all !rms. I propose a modi!ed Samuelson
condition for the optimal provision of the public input:
∑
eGi πi(k
∗
i ,G
∗)=G∗
∑
τi(1+ e
T
i ) (4.17)
E"ectively this implies that at the second-best optimal provision of the public
input, the sum of the !rms’ marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between public
inputs and private pro!ts is equal to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT)
between them times the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). This is the stan-
dard modi!ed Samuelson condition that arose from the early work of Atkin-
son and Stern (1974) and Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971). As reviewed in Ballard
and Fullerton (1992), this line of work implies a modi!ed Samuelson condition
that takes the form
∑
MRSi =MRT×MCPF. The question then is whether the
marginal cost of public funds is equal to or greater than 1. The size of the MCPF
depends on the aggregate behavioural responses of the !rm. In thismodel, these
behavioural responses are a weighted average
∑
τi(1+ e
T
i
). Under- or over- pro-
vision of the public good depends on each !rm’s share of provision and their
behavioural response.
4.3.3 Pro!t Shifting
Pro!t shifting is likely the biggest concern with the present international cor-
porate taxation system. Any model of optimal corporate taxation must account
for this enormous phenomenon. Tørsløv et al. (2018) estimate that close to 40%
of multinational pro!ts are arti!cially shifted to tax havens. Pro!t shifting is at
the centre of the OECD’s massive and wide-ranging project on Base Erosion and
Pro!t Shifting.
Suppose !rms can shift an amount q of the pro!ts generated in the home
country to a tax haven. While pro!ts booked in the tax haven are not taxed,
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the act of shifting pro!ts itself incurs a cost c(q). The cost of pro!t shifting is
increasing in the amount of pro!ts shifted because it increases the likelihood of
being caught and penalised. Because of this cost, the !rmwill not optimally shift
all of its pro!ts to the tax haven. The !rm receives shifted pro!ts free of tax but
net of the cost of shifting. The !rm’s after-tax pro!ts are now:
(1− ti)[π(ki,G)− qi]+ qi− c(qi) (4.18)
with !rst-order condition for the choice of pro!ts shifted c′(qi) = ti so that the
marginal bene!t of shifting an extra dollar of pro!t ti is equal to themarginal cost
of doing so. The !rm cannot deduct the cost of pro!t shifting from its tax base.
Consider reported pro!ts πˆi to be actual pro!ts less pro!ts shifted: πˆi = πi − qi.
We can simplify the new solution by rede!ning our elasticities to be elasticities
of reported pro!ts. In reality, we observe reported rather than real pro!ts. Re-
de!ning the elasticities as reported pro!t elasticities, the optimal bene!t-based
corporate tax formula remains exactly the same. This is based on the tax eva-
sion mechanism described in Feldstein (1995, 1999). Chetty (2009) shows that
if we do not consider the entire cost of evasion to be lost to society (if costs are
transfers to other agents or !rms overestimate the cost of pro!t shifting), then
we may need to consider some combination of the elasticities of actual pro!ts
and the elasticities of reported pro!ts. This concern, however, extends beyond
the scope of this essay and can be examined in future work.
4.3.4 RelatedWorks
Themodel I present bears some resemblance to Hau%er and Schjelderup (1999).
Hau%er and Schjelderup (1999) model the e*cient provision of public inputs
in the presence of pro!t shifting. The authors focus on the theoretical under-
provision or over-provision of the public input due to pro!t shifting. Pro!t shift-
ing allows !rms to escape contributing to the provision of the public input. Their
main trade-o" is also between the bene!ts of increasing public inputs and the
costs of increased taxation.
The resulting trade-o" of this essay is also similar to the results of Benassy-
Quere et al. (2007). However, Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) consider the e"ects of
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taxation and public investment on foreign direct investment alone. They pro-
pose that the elasticities of foreign direct investmentwith respect to public inputs
and with respect to the tax rate identify the under-provision or over-provision
of public inputs. Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) are concerned with optimal public
input provision, but also suggest that the optimal tax rate should be set based on
the marginal returns of the public input.
A recent set of papers byGugl andZodrow (2015a,b) andMatsumoto andSug-
ahara (2017) measures the e*ciency of production taxes and capital taxes against
the bene!t-based holy grail of user fees. Their !nding is not unambiguous, since
neither tax perfectly substitutes for an explicit user fee. Instead, the relative ef-
!ciency of these taxes depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital
and the public input.
The conceptual mechanisms of bene!t-based taxation resemble the Tiebout
(1956) model. The standard Tiebout model says that individuals will choose to
locate where the local public good provision (and resulting tax) matches their
preferences. In this essay I answer a variant of the policy question deemed im-
portant by Tiebout (1956): how should the government ascertain !rms’ demand
for the public input and the accompanying tax?
The Tiebout (1956) model raised debate whether the property tax used to
fund local public goods is a non-distortionary bene!t tax or whether it acts as a
distortionary capital tax. Most relevant is the proposal that the level of taxation
and public good provision depends directly on whether the tax is considered to
be a bene!t tax or a capital tax. The literature broadly viewed the two charac-
teristics of the tax as opposing, but Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989) attempt to
show that they can be reconciled. Wildasin (1986) suggests a ‘theoretical synthe-
sis’, where the Tiebout property tax is both a bene!t tax and a distortionary tax
instrument. The model I present follows this theoretical synthesis.
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4.4 Empirical Illustration: United States
In this section, I empirically demonstrate the application of the optimal bene!t-
based tax formula. Application requires the estimation of two key elasticities:
the net-of-tax elasticity of pro!ts, and the public input elasticity of pro!ts.
Public corporations, while only 1 percent of the number of United States cor-
porations, contribute 70 percent of corporate tax receipts. When voicing opin-
ions are about !rms not paying their ‘fair share’, it is typically public corporations
that are the source of discontent. These are the most visible and are frequently
attacked by the press for their practices and attempts to limit their tax liabil-
ity. I use available data on public corporations from the Compustat database
published by Standard and Poor’s to implement the optimal bene!t-based tax
formula.
From 1993 until 2017 the United States’ main corporate tax rate was 35 per-
cent. In December 2017, the United States government enacted major tax re-
form, including a substantial revampof the corporate tax system. The tax reform
reduced the top corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent. How does this
reform compare to the optimal corporate tax rate implied under a bene!t-based
corporate tax?
4.4.1 Net-of-Tax Elasticity of Pro!ts
From 1950 until 1992, the majority of United States public corporations in the
Compustat dataset fell into the same corporate tax band. Figure 4.2 shows the
number of !rms which fell into each corporate tax band in a given year. Only
after the tax reform of 1993 did the tax schedule create substantial variation in
the marginal corporate tax rate facing public corporations.
1950 to 1992Reforms Sincemost !rms experienced the same changes inmarginal
tax rates in the 1950 to 1992 period, it means that meaningful identi!cation can
only come from temporal variation in the corporate tax rate. I use a panel di"er-
ences speci!cation, using temporal variation in the corporate tax rate to estimate
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Figure 4.2: Firm-Level Corporate Tax Rates by Year
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The size of the bubble represents the number of !rms with a speci!c tax rate. Each tax
rate is coloured di"erently to di"erentiate between them. Note that the total number
of !rms increases over time.
the tax elasticity of corporate income.
For each !rm i, I express the data in log changes, using one-year (s+1), to
four-year (s+4) di"erences. The variables of interest are therefore expressed as
growth rates. The estimated equation takes the form:
log
(
πis+1
πis
)
= eT · log
(
1− tis+1
1− tis
)
+δi+ f (πis)+uis (4.19)
where eT is the elasticity of interest, δi are !rm-speci!c !xed e"ects, and f (πis)
are a function of base-year pro!ts. Using !rm-speci!c !xed e"ects in this di"er-
ences equation is the equivalent to including !rm-speci!c linear times trends in
the levels model. This eliminates !rm-speci!c di"erences in the average growth
rate. Identi!cation therefore comes fromwithin-!rm changes in the growth rate
of pro!t, eliminating between-!rm variation in the level of the growth rate of
pro!t. I control for base year pro!ts using either the log of base year pro!ts or
a ten-piece spline of log base-year pro!t. The main aim of including controls in
base year pro!ts is to control for the strong possibility of mean reversion. This
is especially important for pro!ts since they are commonly thought to be mean
reverting (De Bondt and Thaler, 1989; Canarella et al., 2013). All variables are
expressed in real terms to control for in%ation-induced common shocks.
As usual, there is mechanical endogeneity present. The corporate tax rate
a !rm faces is determined by the !rm’s pro!ts. To deal with this endogeneity,
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I adapt the standard instrumental variable strategy of Gruber and Saez (2002),
which is also applied to public corporations in Gruber and Rauh (2007). For
year s+1, I calculate the tax rate that the !rm would have faced if it made the
same pro!ts as at time s, but using the tax schedule as at time s+1. This pre-
dicted tax rate tP allows tax policy to vary, holding pro!ts constant. This means
the instrument will be zero whenever the statutory tax schedule is unchanged,
but non-zero when the government makes a policy intervention. The !rst-stage
regression is therefore:
log
(
1− tis+1
1− tis
)
=α · log
(
1− tP
is+1
1− tis
)
+δi+ f (πis)+ǫis. (4.20)
This !rst stage regression limits the identifying variation to tax rate changes that
were induced by policy reform. All estimates are weighted by real sales so that
estimates are e"ectively dollar-weighted. Note that sales are winsorized at the
95th percentile within each year to ensure that very large !rms do not have an
outsized impact on the estimates. All standard errors are clustered at the !rm
level. The results of this estimation are given in Table 4.6.
Table 4.1: Estimate of Tax Elasticity using Temporal Variation from 1950 to 1991
1 Year 2 Year 3 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(1−τ) 0.381∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.097) (0.092) (0.093) (0.095) (0.095)
Base-Year Pro!t Log Spline Log Spline Log Spline
Observations 109,216 109,216 98,932 98,932 90,850 90,850
R2 0.216 0.250 0.294 0.316 0.342 0.356
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
the !rm level. Regressions include !rm-level !xed e"ects. Statisti-
cal signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
The results suggest a net-of-tax elasticity of pro!ts between 0.246 in the short
run to 0.527 in the long run. Adding non-linear base year pro!t controls reduces
the size of the estimated tax elasticities at each di"erence length. Previous works
on tax elasticities have frequently found estimates to be sensitive to the choice
of base-year controls.
Importantly, long-run responses are higher than short-run responses as you
might intuitively expect. Using longer di"erences (beyond a one-year di"erence)
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is important. Not only does it capturemedium- or long-run responses, but it also
allows us to consider cases where tax reformoccurred over a period ofmore than
one year. Multi-year reforms occurred from 1964 to 1965, 1970 to 1971, 1982 to
1984, and 1986 to 1988. The longest multi-year reform was three years. As per
Weber (2014), long-di"erences are one way to encompass the response to multi-
year reforms. One concern, however, is that they might capture overlapping
responses. For example, the three-year di"erence from 1984 to 1986 captures
the di"erence between the response to the 1984 reform and the response to the
1986 reform. On the other hand, one-year responses capture only the initial
response to taxation, ignoring potential longer-run responses. At the same time,
it might pick up second- or third-year responses for other tax changes.
A conservative estimate of the long-run response to changes in the corporate
tax rate is that a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax rate would lead to a 0.427
percent increase in taxable income for United States public corporations over a
period of three years. In the short run, we would expect that 1 percent increase
in the net-of-tax rate to lead to a 0.246 percent increase in pro!ts in the !rst year.
1993 Reform I use the 1993 reform to add graphical evidence of these esti-
mated elasticities. In 1993, a new category of taxation was created for the largest
!rms, with pro!ts over $18.3 million being taxed at 35 percent, up from the pre-
vious marginal tax rate of 34 percent.
I adopt the share-based approach outlined by Saez et al. (2012) and used by
Saez (2017) for the 2013 increase in the capital income tax rate. I consider this
the simplestmethodology given the typically noisy nature of both aggregate and
!rm-level corporate pro!t. The methodology proposes to measure the short-
run elasticity of taxable income by using the share of income going to the top
earners a"ected by the tax rate reform. In this case, the top earners are those
!rms whose pro!ts exceed $18.3 million. The elasticity simply compares the
share of income going to !rms in the top tax band before and after the tax re-
form. It is measured as:
eS =
log(sh1993)− log(sh1992)
log(1− t1993)− log(1− t1992)
(4.21)
That is, it is the di"erence in the logged share of pro!ts above $18.3million from
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1992 to 1993 divided by the change in the logged net of tax rate. This would
provide an unbiased estimate if the assumption holds that the share of income
above $18.3 million had remained the same in the absence of the tax reform. If
this identi!cation assumption holds then the elasticity eS should capture the ef-
fect of the tax rate reform on the log change in income. The substantial bene!t
of this approach is that it controls for changes in economic activity. Pro!ts are
particularly volatile and sensitive to the business cycle. The relative stability of
shares allows for easier and more convincing inference. One concern with this
approach is that !rms with pro!ts above $18.3 million do account for an enor-
mous share of the total pro!ts of public corporations even though they only
accounted for 24 percent of the number of public corporations in 1993.
The share of pro!ts in the range above $18.3 million decreased from 96.58
percent in 1992 to 96.00 percent in 1993. This appears small, but this is in re-
sponse to a 1 percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate from 34 to 35
percent. It therefore implies a short-run tax elasticity of 0.396 using the 1993
corporate tax reform. This behavioural response is shown in Figure 4.3, cap-
tured by the grey shading. Closer inspection of the chart suggests !rstly that the
reform only had a short-run impact, as the share quickly reversed course. This
simple share-based method for the 1993 corporate tax reform provides con!r-
mation that the previous estimates for the 1950 to 1992 period are convincing.
Figure 4.3: Share of Pro!ts of Public Corporations in the Tax Band Above $18.3
Million
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The line represents the share of total pro!t of all
!rms in Compustat going to !rms with pro!ts over
$18.3 million. The grey column represents the
period of change under investigation: from the tax
rate schedule in 1992 to the new schedule in 1993.
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Comparison to Existing Estimates Seegert et al. (2018) !nd an elasticity of 0.55
using a bunching estimator on data for the population of private United States
corporations from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). They use variation in the
net operating losses faced by !rms to estimate the elasticity over a 10-year pe-
riod from 2004 to 2014. While private corporations are typically smaller than
public corporations, the number of public corporations is only 0.5% of all C-
corporations in IRS data during that period. Using temporal variation with stan-
dard regression methods, I !nd a short-run elasticity of 0.246 and a long-run
elasticity reaching 0.527 with data from 1950 to 1991. Using a simple and trans-
parent share-based approach for the largest 24 percent of United States public
corporations, I !nd a short-run elasticity of 0.396.
Gruber and Rauh (2007) provide an early estimate of the elasticity for public
corporations in the United States. They use cross-sectional variation in the tax
rate between industries that arises because some !rms make pro!ts and face a
positive marginal (statutory) tax rate and other make losses and therefore face a
zero marginal tax rate. Their de!nition of pro!t is quite di"erent, since they do
not remove interest payments from total pro!ts. They !nd a large but statisti-
cally insigni!cant (imprecisely estimated) elasticity of 1.122. This elasticity is not
the central result in their paper.
4.4.2 Public Input Elasticity of Pro!ts
Economic research hasmainly focused on estimating the elasticity of outputwith
respect to public inputs. This is a broader measure of the provision of the public
input on the entire economy, rather than simply on the returns to corporations.
This literature was made popular by Aschauer (1989). A meta-study by Bom and
Ligthart (2014b) combines 578 estimates of the public input elasticity of output
from 68 studies from 1983 to 2008 focusing on OECD countries. These studies
typically focus on the tangible capital stock owned by the public sector. Thismay
be measured at di"erent levels of government, from central government to the
local or regional level. Other studies focus on only ‘core’ public capital—roads,
railways, airports, and utilities. The assumption is made that public services %ow
to !rms in proportion to the level of installed public capital. Output is usually
an aggregate measure such as real GDP less public sector output. This is used
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because public capital is also an aggregate measure. The average elasticity of
output in these studies is 0.106, correcting for publication bias. The short-run
elasticity is smaller at 0.083, but considering only core capital installed by local
government raises the elasticity to 0.154. Further extending this measure to the
long run raises the estimated elasticity a bit further to 0.193. Using a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function, these elasticities represent the share of out-
put generated by the public input. If most of the returns to the public input are
captured by pro!ts, and pro!ts make up a small portion of total output, then
one might expect that returns to the public input actually make up a substantial
portion of pro!ts.
I take a simple approach to the estimation of the public input elasticity of
pro!ts. As in the theoretical model, I express pro!ts as a function of public in-
puts. I do not control for private capital because I require the total derivative. I
estimate the model in natural logs for simplicity. The estimated equation is
log(πis)=αi+ e
G
· log(Gs)+uis (4.22)
I also estimate an auxiliarymodel with a single intercept so thatαi =α∀i. Identi-
!cation of the public input elasticity comes from temporal variation in the public
input.
I use data on !rm-level domestic pro!t from Compustat. Using domestic
pro!ts shrinks the sample size substantially, but allows for clear estimation of
the correct public input elasticity. As in most of the literature discussed in Bom
and Ligthart (2014b), I assume that public services %ow from public capital in
proportion to the stock of public capital. I use the stock of public capital as the
measure of the public input. All variables are expressed in real values.
To measure the public capital stock, I follow the methodology of Kamps
(2006) and Gupta et al. (2014) used by the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal
A"airs Department to produce the Investment and Capital Stock Dataset. The
IMF (2017) manual describes the perpetual inventory equation:
Gs+1 = (1−δs)Gs+
(
1−
δs
2
)
Is (4.23)
where δs is the time-varying rate of depreciation and Is is new investment in
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public capital. To measure new investment, I use data for gross federal govern-
ment !xed non-defence investment. To estimate this measure of the public cap-
ital stock, the International Monetary Fund assumes that the public capital stock
is zero in the year 1860 and that investment grew by 4 percent a year to reach its
!ve-year-forwardmoving average in the !rst year of data available. The !rst year
of data available is 1929. I alter this assumption slightly, setting the capital stock
equal to zero in 1790, as the !rst United States Secretary of the Treasury, Alexan-
derHamilton, was sworn in during 1789. While the InternationalMonetary Fund
uses 1860 for consistency across countries, I do not require cross-country con-
sistency. Private capital is measured as gross property, plant and equipment. All
variables are de%ated by the Consumer Price Index (1982-1984=100).
I consider the possibility of changes in both public capital and pro!ts being
driven by the business cycle. To control for this possibility, I use the lag of public
capital as an instrument for public capital. With public investment usually being
decided in the preceding year, using the lag of public capital as an instrument
would mean that public investment is determined a full two years in advance of
pro!ts being realised.
In addition, I consider the possibility that there is some sample selection bias
for those !rms which report domestic pro!ts. In Figure 4.5 I plot the real average
pro!ts, sales, total assets, and plant, property, and equipment for each !rm. I
separate the plot into two histograms to consider whether the distribution of
the size of !rms that report domestic pro!ts is di"erent from the distribution
of the size of !rms that do not. To control for the possibility of selection bias
being incurred by the fact that larger !rms may be more likely to report more
detailed !gures, I re-weight the sample. I put each !rm into a bin that re%ects
the interaction of the decile of total assets and the decile of sales for each year.
I split the bins into !rms that report domestic pro!ts (Dom=1) and !rms that do
not (Dom=0). Suppose that a bin q contains nq !rms in year s. Then the weight
for each bin q in period s is calculated as:
wq =
nq(Dom=0)+nq(Dom=1)
nq(Dom=1)
. (4.24)
This re-weights the sample so that the distribution of !rms reporting domestic
pro!ts matches the overall distribution of !rms. I de!ne the distribution on the
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interaction of total assets and sales. This re-weighting is done within each year.
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 4.2. All estimates are
weighted by real sales, which are winsorized at the 95th percentile for each year.
Note that for the re-weighted speci!cation I multiply the binned weight by real
winsorized sales.
Table 4.2: Public Input Elasticity of Pro!ts for U.S. Public Corporations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(G) 0.535∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Fixed E"ects Yes Yes Yes
IV Yes
Reweighted Yes
Observations 34,051 34,051 33,026 33,026
R2 0.014 0.852 0.852 0.861
Notes: Fixed e"ects, when included, are !rm !xed ef-
fects. When included, the instrument used for
public capital is the one-year lag of public cap-
ital. All estimates are weighted by real sales,
winsorized each year at the 95th percentile.
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the !rm level. Statistical
signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05,
and * p< 0.1.
The results of this estimation are given in Table 4.2. Threemain estimates are
presented: without !rm !xed e"ects, with !rm !xed e"ects, and with !rm !xed
e"ects and the instrumental variable, and re-weighted with !rm !xed e"ects.
The estimated elasticities range from 0.535 to 0.739. Adding !rm !xed e"ects
so as to consider only within-!rm variation increases the estimated elasticity
from 0.535 to 0.653. Using the lag of public capital as an instrument reduces
the elasticity only marginally to 0.647. Re-weighting the estimates so that the
distribution of !rms reporting domestic pro!ts matches the overall distribution
of !rms in Compustat, I retrieve a higher elasticity of 0.739. These estimates
suggest that public capital plays a substantial role in generating corporate pro!ts.
I now consider whether these corporation-level estimates are corroborated by
aggregate elasticities.
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Aggregate Evidence To con!rm whether these !rm-level estimates for public
corporations are plausible, I estimate an aggregate version of the model. I use
quarterly data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ Economic Database.
I calculate the quarterly public capital stock using the quarterly version of the
perpetual inventory equation. I estimate amodel similar to the !rm-levelmodel:
log(Πs)=α+ e
G
· log(Gs)+us (4.25)
I lag public capital by 1, 4, 8, and 12 quarters to eliminate concerns that both
pro!ts and public capital are a"ected by the business cycle. Results are shown in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Aggregate Time Series Estimate of the Public Input Elasticity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(G) 0.611∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Lag of G 0 periods 1 periods 4 periods 8 periods 12 periods
Observations 232 231 228 224 220
R2 0.592 0.588 0.561 0.526 0.503
Notes: Regressions are estimated using quarterly data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis Economic Database. A constant is in-
cluded in all regressions but the coe*cient is excluded. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi!cance is given by ***
p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
The aggregate public input elasticity estimated using this simple method is
quite similar to that estimated using !rm-level Compustat data. Using the con-
temporaneous of public capital gives an estimated elasticity of 0.611. Lagging
the value of public capital reduces the estimated elasticity. Using a 12-quarter
(3-year) lag, the elasticity falls to 0.544. This range is quite nearly the same as
those estimated using !rm-level data. These aggregate estimates appear to cor-
roborate the !rm-level !nding that the public input elasticity of pro!ts is eco-
nomically quite large.
Consider also the average public capital elasticity of output of 0.106 from
Bom and Ligthart’s (2014a) review of 68 studies with 578 estimates. If we make
the assumption of a well-behaved constant returns to scale aggregate produc-
tion function, we can use the shares of total output accruing to factors to make
some statement about the relevant elasticity of output. To move to an elastic-
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ity of pro!t, we need to make the additional assumption that all rents from the
public input accrue to pro!ts. This may be a somewhat ambitious assumption
since workers may also bene!t to some extent from the public input. However,
it would mean that the average public capital elasticity of output from Bom and
Ligthart (2014a) acts as an upper bound. With this assumption, I propose that
the public input elasticity of pro!ts can be recovered from the ratio of the public
capital elasticity of output (σ) divided by total before-tax corporate pro!tability
(π/Y ):
eG =
σ
π/Y
. (4.26)
To approximate before-tax corporate pro!tability, I use data on the aggregate
pro!t per unit of real gross value added of non-!nancial corporate business in
the United Stated from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis. At the
peak, corporate pro!tability in the United States amounted to 15.7 percent of
corporate output in 2014. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with
constant returns to scale would imply that 10.6 percent of total output are ac-
tually returns to the public input. That would imply a public input elasticity of
pro!ts of 0.106÷0.157= 0.675. Once again, this is very similar to the estimated
public input elasticity of pro!ts for public corporations. Average corporate prof-
itability from the !rst quarter of 2010 to the !rst quarter of 2019 has been lower,
at 13.6 percent. This would give an even higher implied public input elasticity.
Further, notice that Bom and Ligthart (2014a) !nds substantial heterogeneity in
the average elasticity—an average short-run elasticity of 0.083, and an average
long-run elasticity of 0.122. Restricting the sample to only studies for the United
States, the average elasticity actually increases to 0.133. This would imply an
even higher public input elasticity of pro!ts of 0.133÷0.157 = 0.847. This re-
%ects an upper bound on the public input elasticity of pro!ts—one which the
!rm-level estimates donot breach. The extent towhich this should be dampened
would depend on the extent to which other factors of production—particularly
labour—manage to extract rents that are due to the public input. This exercise
justi!es the magnitude of the public input elasticities I uncover using !rm-level
data. Together, these aggregate !ndings provide substantial con!dence in the
estimated public input elasticity.
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4.4.3 Estimated Optimal Tax Rates
In December 2017, the United States Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
of 2017. This bill substantially lowered the top corporate tax rate from 35 percent
to 21 percent. Note that under the previous corporate tax schedule, the average
tax rate for !rms over $18.3million was equal to the 35 percentmarginal tax rate.
Many argued both for and against this lower corporate tax rate, mostly on the
grounds of the impact it would have on investment and wages. A few discussed
the normative underpinnings of the corporate income tax and whether the tax
was being used to ful!l a purpose. I focus on deepening the normative discussion
by applying the bene!t principle to the Unites States tax reform.
I focus on the optimal tax rate for one type of !rm—public corporations.
Public corporations generate the largest proportion of revenue as they are the
biggest and most visible corporations. The corporate tax rate on these !rms is
likely to have the greatest impact on revenue and on public perception of the
fairness of the corporate tax. This optimal tax analysis only holds for public
corporations. The estimated elasticities can be used to give guidance as to what
an optimal bene!t-based corporate income tax rate would look like in theUnited
States. I do this by applying the elasticities to the optimal tax formula given in
Equation 4.14:
t∗ =
eG
1+ eT
(4.27)
for public corporations. I treat public corporations as an individual !rm type.
The preferred estimate of the tax elasticity is the longer run (three-year dif-
ferences) estimate with a log-spline of base-year pro!ts: 0.427. The preferred
estimate of the public input elasticity is the within-!rm estimate without the in-
strumental variable: 0.653. These are both estimated using the Compustat !rm-
level data for public corporations. Plugging these estimated elasticities into the
optimal tax formula gives a preferred estimate of the optimal bene!t-based cor-
porate income tax rate of t∗ = 0.653/(1+0.427)= 46 percent.
To present a range of estimated tax rates, I use all combinations of the public
input elasticity and the tax elasticity in the optimal tax formula. The resulting
histogram of 18 estimated optimal tax rates are presented in Figure 4.4. This
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should provide a plausible range for the optimal bene!t-based tax on public cor-
porations in the United States.
Figure 4.4: Histogram of Estimates of Optimal Bene!t-Based Tax in the United
States
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The blue line represents the pre-reform top corporate tax rate of
35 percent. The red line represents the post-2017 reform rate of 21
percent. This histogram shows the estimated optimal bene!t-based
corporate tax rate for all the combinations of tax and public input
elasticities.
Strikingly, these estimated optimal bene!t-based tax rates are all above the
pre-reform corporate tax rate of 35 percent. They range from 35.0 percent to
59.3 percent. The median estimate is substantially higher at 46.1 percent. This
suggests that the pre-reform rate was actually a lower bound on an data-driven
bene!t-based tax rate. The clear implication of these estimates is that large pub-
lic corporations’ ‘fair share’ of tax is actually a much larger proportion of their
pro!ts than they currently pay in tax.
In contrast, a simple revenue-maximising tax rate would be calculated as
1/(1+ eT) = 70 percent. To justify the tax rate cut to 21 percent as revenue-
maximising, the tax elasticity would need to be in the range of 3.8. This is near
the magnitude of elasticity uncovered by Bachas and Soto (2018) for Costa Rica,
a developing economy with poor tax enforcement. In contrast, if we hold the
tax elasticity !xed at 0.427, the public input elasticity would need to be approxi-
mately 0.30—around half the estimated value—to justify the 2017 tax rate cut to
21 percent.
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The reliability of these optimal tax rate depends crucially on the estimated
elasticities. None of these elasticities appear unreasonable. Ifmost of the bene!ts
of the public input accrue to pro!ts, then it appears that these estimated public
input elasticities of pro!ts are consistent with a long line of literature estimating
the public input elasticity of output. Similarly, the net of tax elasticity of pro!ts
is not substantially smaller than that estimated in previous works—particularly
Seegert et al. (2018). In addition, they are consistent with the aggregate-level
estimates I am able to recover.
4.5 Design of the Corporate Tax System
The debate on the optimal design of the corporate income tax commonly en-
compasses four policy questions. First, which country should have taxing rights
over multinational !rms’ pro!ts? Second, what should be the corporate income
tax base? Third, is pro!t shifting good or bad? Fourth, what is the optimal tax
rate? The question of the optimal tax rate is already the central focus of this essay.
But the principle of bene!t-based taxation can also be used to provide guidance
on how to answer the other three questions.
4.5.1 Taxing Rights
Bene!ts-based taxation makes a direct link between the use of a speci!c govern-
ment’s public input and taxing rights it bestows on that government. If Firm A’s
pro!ts are generated by the use of Government A’s public inputs, then it gives
Government A taxing rights over the pro!ts generated using Government A’s
public input. But if Firm A’s pro!ts are not generated by the use of the public
input of Government B, then what claim does Government B have over !rm A’s
pro!ts? Government B provides no bene!ts to Firm A.
Public inputs generate pro!ts by their use in the production process. There-
fore the use of the public input is re%ected in the location of the pro!t-generating
production. Public inputs are almost entirely immobile. I ignore the possibil-
ity of public goods with spillover e"ects for broad applicability and simplicity.
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Some works that consider this possibility include Koide (1985), Bjorvatn and
Schjelderup (2002) and Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007). The use and bene!t of
the public good of Government B is limited to the geographical jurisdiction of
Government B. The geographical jurisdiction of Government B is the link be-
tween the bene!ts of the public input and the taxing rights of the government.
This implies that taxing rights of a government should be limited to pro!t-
generating production taking place within its borders. This is a re-statement of
the source principle of international taxation. The source principle of taxation
is implemented by the territorial tax system. A territorial tax system does not
tax foreign income. Instead, a territorial tax system will tax only pro!ts gen-
erated from production within the country’s borders, disregarding questions of
!rm ownership or !rm nationality. In this sense, bene!t taxation is a matter of
cross-country equity. Bene!t taxation makes a very clear statement about who
should receive the returns to the public input (the government) and which coun-
try should be able to tax those returns (the country of production).
Bene!ts-based taxation provides strong normative support for the source-
based principle of corporate taxation. Kane (2015) writes that “Amore promising
route is to rely on the distinguishing feature of whether the rent is a return on
sovereign investment. This has the advantage that if we de!ne the category in
this way then the taxing right is clear. It should be allocated to only the sovereign
that made the investment.” Given the widespread views aligning with the bene!t
principle, it is unsurprising that the territorial tax system is the most common
corporate tax system in the world today.
In contrast, the residence principle of taxation gives rise to a worldwide tax
system that taxes pro!ts made abroad. Focusing purely on economic e*ciency,
Devereux et al. (2015) show that a worldwide tax system is optimal whether you
wish to achieve national or global optimality. This follows the classical results of
international tax theory, which propose taxing the worldwide income of home
multinational !rms to ensure the global allocation of capital remains undistorted
(Musgrave, 1963). But governments are disregarding this advice, moving towards
territorial tax systems. Devereux et al. (2015) suggest it is either the lower ad-
ministrative cost or the mobility of !rm residence that is causing governments
to shift to the territorial tax system.
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Thebene!t principle provides a normative argumentwhy taxing rights should
not be assigned to where consumption takes place. With the existence of public
inputs, the destination-based tax system transfers taxing power from the country
of production to the country of consumption. Under the destination-based tax
system, a government would not have taxing rights over the returns to its public
input. The destination of !nal sale of a commodity only creates taxing rights
to the extent that value is created in that country by the retail process. That is,
the government should have the right to tax the pro!ts of the retail sector to the
extent that its pro!ts rely on the public input. In practice, however, note that the
pro!t margins of the retail industries are consistently among the lowest globally.
This argument holds for the accounting services provided by tax havens—their
taxing rights should extend only to the economic activity generated within that
jurisdiction.
4.5.2 Tax Base
The central prediction of the classical bene!t principle is that the tax should aim
to capture bene!ts from (or returns to) the public input. It implies that in an
ideal world, the corporate tax base should be narrowly de!ned as returns to the
public input. A tax base narrowly de!ned as returns to the public input would
imply a 100 percent tax rate and would be non-distortionary. This ideal is very
di*cult to achieve. Returns to the public input do not appear as a line item in
the !rm’s income statement. There is no easy way to separate various forms of
location-speci!c rents, or even to separate mobile rents from immobile rents
(Graetz, 2000; Auerbach and Devereux, 2018). In fact, most tax systems do not
separate rents from normal returns to capital.
In this essay, the tax base has been modelled as the sum of the normal and
supernormal returns to equity capital. This re%ects the standard corporate tax
system across most countries. In this model, what would be the optimal cor-
porate tax base? as is standard, I use α to re%ect the corporate tax base where
0≤α≤ 1. However, this is a somewhat narrower de!nition than in the literature,
where α tends to denote the deductibility of debt interest costs and returns to
equity. Here, I focus on returns to equity only, considering whether these are
deductible or not. If α= 1, then the normal returns to equity are fully deductible
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from taxable income. If α= 0 then the normal returns to equity are fully taxed
as is standard. I insist the normal returns to equity accrue to the !rm as hap-
pens in reality. Therefore the normal returns must be added back to the !rm’s
total income after taxable income is calculated by deducting it. The !rm’s pro!t
function is now:
max
ki
(1− ti)[π(ki,G)−αrk]+αrk+ r(K i−ki). (4.28)
And the !rst-order condition for capital is now:
∂πi(ki,G)
∂ki
= r
(1−αti)
(1− ti)
. (4.29)
In the case where α= 1, this condition reduces to ∂πi(ki,G)/∂ki = r and the cor-
porate income tax does not have a distorting impact on the allocation of capital.
Where α = 0, we get the original !rst-order condition from Equation 4.2. This
alters the !nal optimal tax formula substantially. Now eT = 0, so that the corpo-
rate income tax has no behavioural impact on the pro!t of the !rm. Holding the
primitives of the !rm’s pro!t function constant, the optimal bene!t-based tax
rate would now be higher for all !rms. The modi!ed Samuelson condition in
Equation 4.17 tells us that the optimal provision of public inputs would now be
higher. This suggests fully o"setting the normal returns to equity would move
us to a !rst-best Lindahl equilibrium by making the corporate income tax non-
distorting.
This will not hold perfectly in reality due to the existence of unobservable
!rm-speci!c assets. These are also an important source of rents, particularly
for multinational !rms. The importance of the !rm-speci!c asset dates back
to Dunning (1988), and has recently been incorporated by both McKeehan and
Zodrow (2017) and Auerbach and Devereux (2018). For a !rm that can earn rents
on such !rm-speci!c capital in another jurisdiction, the corporate income tax
remains distorting.
Consider a !rm endowed with a limited quantity of an unobservable !rm-
speci!c asset M¯ that is internationallymobile. The !rmcan investmi of that asset
in the country under analysis or it can invest that asset overseas and earn a rate of
returnw. Because the asset is unobservable, there is noway to distinguish returns
to the !rm-speci!c asset and returns to the public input. The !rm’s income is
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given by:
max
ki ,mi
(1− ti)[π(ki,mi,G)−αrk]+αrk+ r(K i−ki)+w(M¯−mi). (4.30)
The !rm’s !rst-order condition for capital remains the same, but it now has to
make a decision over the !rm-speci!c asset:
(1− ti)
∂πi(ki,mi,G)
∂mi
−w= 0. (4.31)
Theoretically, only a single distortion remains if returns to equity capital are
fully deductible. The only potential o"setting feature is the second-order e"ect
of mi on ki and vice-versa through the cross-partial derivatives (complemen-
tarity or substitutability of factors). Practically, however, the distortion is now
limited to a very small number of !rms, but likely large !rms. And the distor-
tion of the tax is limited to only one factor. And if the !rm-speci!c asset is a good
whose supply is not limited—like ideas, intellectual property, reputation—then
there should be no distortion.
Therefore, we can at least propose that the bene!t principle implies that the
tax base should be narrowly de!ned. Since the purpose of the corporate tax un-
der the bene!t principle is not to tax capital owners, then the normal returns
to capital should be excluded from the tax base. This would eliminate an eco-
nomically signi!cant distortion that plagues the use of the corporate income tax
under existing tax regimes. Importantly, we know how to separate rents from
the normal returns to capital. Many authors have dealt with this issue including
Meade (1978); King (1987); Bond et al. (1996) and Bond and Devereux (2003). The
cash %ow tax, allowance for corporate equity or the rate of return allowance tax
systems would achieve a tax on economic rent (Cnossen, 2018).
In the model, the tax base has been de!ned as accounting pro!ts: normal
returns to capital plus total rents, mobile and immobile. Narrowing the tax base
would change the de!nition of the elasticity to be estimated since the de!nition
of pro!ts would change. It would not, however, alter the optimal tax formula
itself or the key principles underlying the bene!t principle. Policy reform to
limit the base of the corporate income tax to rents is supported by the bene!t
principle of taxation.
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4.5.3 Pro!t Shifting
An important question that has been taken for granted is whether there is ac-
tually a signi!cant economic argument against pro!t shifting. Consider that the
corporate tax distorts real economic activity. Pro!t shifting—by reducing corpo-
rate tax liability—limits the real economic distortion of the corporate tax. Pro!t
shifting also reduces the tax burden onmobile factors andmakes real investment
decisions less sensitive to tax rates (Hong and Smart, 2010). Empirically, Suárez
Serrato (2018) shows that closing pro!t shifting loopholes substantially increased
the distorting e"ects of corporate taxation, as !rms reduce investment and em-
ployment in non-haven countries. Liu and De Mooij (2018) !nd that multina-
tional !rms reduce domestic investment after the introduction of transfer pric-
ing regulations, e"ectively increasing the corporate tax burden of the !rm. So
what is the economic argument against pro!t shifting?
Slemrod and Wilson (2009) model tax havens as ‘parasites’ in order to jus-
tify initiatives against them. As is standard, they assume that there is some cost
to pro!t shifting. The !rm optimises pro!t shifting behaviour where the ben-
e!t of shifting an extra dollar of pro!t is equal to the cost of shifting an extra
dollar. Slemrod and Wilson (2009) assume that the entirety of the cost of pro!t
shifting is deadweight loss. However, as modelled by Devereux et al. (2008), if
the cost of pro!t shifting is a probability of being caught and !ned, this does not
imply substantial deadweight loss. Further, Chetty (2009) clari!es that a govern-
ment !ne is not a deadweight loss, but simply a resource transfer from !rm to
government. Combining the ine*ciency-reducing e"ects of pro!t shifting with
limited deadweight costs resulting from pro!t shifting, it seems near impossible
to justify the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Pro!t Shifting Action Plan purely on
e*ciency grounds.
The OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Pro!t Shifting Action (2013) emphasises
three key problems created by pro!t shifting. First, governments are faced with
lower corporate tax revenue, particularly in developing countries. Second, indi-
vidual taxpayers are forced to bear a greater portion of the tax burden as a result.
Third, pro!t shifting creates unfair competition as some !rms can shift pro!ts
to minimise their tax liability while others can not.
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The bene!t principle instead approaches the question from a normative per-
spective of fairness. If the purpose of paying corporate income tax is to support
the provision of public inputs that are used to generate pro!ts, then pro!t shift-
ing is bad because it allows !rms to escape contributing to the provision of the
public input. Even more compelling is the insight that under the bene!t princi-
ple, !rms are not evenpaying tax out of their share of the returns to production—
they aremerely handing over the returns that should rightly accrue to the owner
of the public input: the government. This casts pro!t-shifting multinationals
not just as doing what is best for themselves, but as engaging in a socially egre-
gious activity that undermines the fabric of modern capitalist society. Previous
works have implicitly identi!ed this underlying normative principle. Hau%er
and Schjelderup (1999) examine how multinationals’ evasion of responsibility
leads to under-provision of the public input. Pogge and Mehta (2016b) focus
on how pro!t shifting allows multinational !rms to escape contributing to the
provision of wider public goods in developing countries—impoverishing them
further.
The simple thesis that !rms should contribute to the public input in accor-
dance with the bene!ts they receive from that public input is a strong argument
that pro!t shifting is normatively wrong. This thesis places responsibility for
provision of the public input squarely on the !rm. Using the bene!t principle,
the e"ect of pro!t shifting on global e*ciency does not justify the inter-country
inequity generated by pro!t shifting activity. The bene!t principle implies that
pro!t shifting is normatively bad.
The trivial response to this proposition is that “we already know that pro!t
shifting is bad.” Rather than relying on intuition, I attempt to identify what prin-
ciple we use to de!ne it as bad. Having identi!ed that principle, we can now
think about what it implies for how we try to solve the pro!t shifting problem.
This principle implies, for example, that simply taxingmultinationals anywhere
in the world is not the solution we should seek. Pro!t shifting is fundamentally
a question of taxing rights. And it can only be solved by a global consensus on
how taxing rights should be assigned. The bene!t principle provides a clear nor-
mative principle for how taxing rights should be assigned to solve the arti!cial
pro!t shifting problem.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this essay, I apply the normative principle of bene!t taxation to corporate
income tax. A bene!t-based corporate tax satis!es both a public and policy per-
ception of fairness. It also satis!es within-country and inter-nation notions of
equity. Not only is a bene!t-based corporate tax fair, but it is also feasible even
in a small open economy because it relies on taxing location-speci!c rents.
I propose an optimal corporate income tax rate using the Lindahl (1919) ap-
proach to bene!t taxation. I modify the Lindahl thought experiment to incor-
porate the distortionary e"ects of corporate taxation. The optimal bene!t-based
corporate tax rate formula is a function of two estimable elasticities: the elasticity
of pro!t with respect to the public input, and the elasticity of pro!t with respect
to the net-of-tax rate. The formula tells a simple story about the optimal bene!t-
based tax. A higher public input elasticity of pro!t implies a higher optimal tax
rate because those who bene!t more will be willing to pay more for the public
input. A higher net-of-tax elasticity of pro!t implies a lower optimal tax rate
because a larger behavioural response to taxation implies greater distortion.
The bene!t principle proves to be helpful in providing guidance in the de-
sign of the international corporate tax system. Three simple principles arise.
First, a government should have taxing rights over !rm pro!ts generated using
its public input. Bene!t taxation endorses the source principle of international
taxation. Second, the optimal tax base is the bene!ts generated by the public
input. Narrowing the tax base to economic rents would improve both fairness
and e*ciency. Third, pro!t shifting is unfair even if e*ciency-enhancing. Pro!t
shifting allows !rms to avoid contributing to the provision of public inputs.
Diamond and Saez (2011) propose three conditions an optimal tax theory
should meet to consider it a useful policy proposal. First, it should be based on
a mechanism that is !rst-order to the problem at hand. I propose two mecha-
nisms: the impact of the public input on !rm pro!ts, and the behavioural re-
sponse of !rms to corporate taxation. I show them both to be empirically rel-
evant in the United States. Second, the result should be robust to modelling
assumptions, particularly heterogeneity. I model individual optimal tax rates
for !rm types with heterogeneous production functions. Third, the policy rec-
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ommendation should be socially and administratively implementable. Bene!ts-
based taxation has been shown to be socially acceptable by Weinzierl (2017) and
the demand that !rms contribute a fair share is a !rst-order concern for the pub-
lic.
In this essay, I do not take the existence of the corporate income tax as given.
Instead, I begin from !rst principles and seek a justi!cation for the existence
of the corporate income tax. I argue that bene!t-based taxation can justify the
existence of the corporate income tax, and therefore the corporate tax should be
implemented on a bene!t basis. I show that this is not merely wishful thinking;
I provide an implementable optimal corporate tax rate formula and apply it to
public corporations in the United States.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Derivation of the Optimal Bene!t-Based Tax Formula
I derive the government’s optimal conditions for maximising pro!ts under the
bene!t-based tax. The !rst-order condition with respect to the public input is:
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Note that this uses the government’s !rm-speci!c budget constraint to simplify
τi g i/tiπi = 1. The !rst-order condition with respect to the net-of-tax rate is:
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Combining these two conditions:
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4.A.2 Maximising Total Income
I consider the less intuitive casewhere the governmentmaximises the !rm’s total
income. The Lagrangian for the government’s problem for !rm type i is:
max
ti ,g i
L = (1− ti)πi(k
∗
i , g i)+ r(K i−k
∗
i )+λ
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tiπi(k
∗
i , g i)−τi g i
)
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I rede!ne the elasticities of pro!t with respect to public inputs and the net-of-tax
rate as:
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where I di"erentiate between the partial elasticity of pro!t with respect to public
inputs (eG
i
) and the total elasticity of pro!t with respect to public inputs(εG
i
). The
former is the mechanical impact of a change in the public good on pro!ts, while
the latter also encompasses the !rm’s behavioural response to taxation.
Since the government’s objective function is the !rm’s optimised value func-
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tion, then I can use the envelope theorem to simplify the analysis. I take the
partial derivative of the !rm’s objective function with respect to g i and ti evalu-
ated at k∗
i
. The !rst-order condition with respect to the public input is:
(
eG
i
1−εG
i
)(
1− ti
ti
)
=λ. (4.39)
An increase in public input provision has two e"ects on pro!ts: a mechanical
e"ect through the pro!t function, and an indirect e"ect due to the behavioural
response of the !rm. The term ∂k/∂g has long been thought to be positive. For
example, work by Seitz (1994) suggests there is complementarity between public
and private capital in the manufacturing sector in West Germany. Similarly, the
theoretical literature typically assumes complementarity between private capital
and the public input (Zodrow andMieszkowski, 1986; Keen andMarchand, 1997;
Gugl and Zodrow, 2015b; Feehan and Matsumoto, 2017).
Since !rms are already optimising, the behavioural e"ect does not have a
!rst-order impact on their pro!ts. It does, however, a"ect the government’s tax
base. Holding the tax rate constant, this would increase the dollar amount of the
!rm’s contribution to the public input. I derive the government’s optimal choice
of the net-of-tax rate (1− ti). The !rst-order condition is :
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An increase in the net-of-tax rate of !rm type i induces a mechanical and a be-
havioural e"ect. The mechanical e"ect is the reduction in the tax rate the !rm
faces, holding pro!ts constant. The behavioural e"ect is the !rm’s optimal re-
sponse to the change in the tax rate through its !rst-order conditions and cap-
tures the distorting e"ect of the corporate tax. Normally a higher tax rate leads
to lower pro!ts and vice versa.
The resulting optimal tax formula is
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I can simplify the !rst-order conditions to an optimal bene!t-based corporate
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tax rate formula:
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Since the term εG is the total impact of an increase in the public input on pro!ts
and eG
∗
i
is the partial impact, we can decompose −εG
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I de!ne the new elasticity vG
∗
i
as the indirect public input elasticity of pro!ts,
while eG
∗
i
is the direct public input elasticity of pro!ts. The direct elasticity cap-
tures the impact of the public input directly on the !rm’s pro!ts through the
pro!t function. The indirect elasticity captures e"ect of the !rm’s behavioural
response to public inputs on pro!ts through capital changes. If capital and the
public input are complementary, then the indirect elasticity should be positive.
You might think of the direct elasticity as being an unchangeable part of the
!rm’s technology, while the indirect elasticity depends on the !rm’s behavioural
response. Both elasticities, however, might be de!ned as being the result of the
!rm’s pro!t function. The optimal tax formula can then be rewritten as:
t∗i =
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∗
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∗
i
+ eT
i
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i
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The optimal bene!t-based corporate tax rate is expressed as a function of three
elasticities: the direct public input elasticity of pro!ts, the indirect public input
elasticity of pro!ts and the net-of-tax elasticity of pro!ts. The !rm has two be-
havioural responses: a response to an increased tax rate and a response to an
increased public input. While a higher behavioural response to tax changes will
lower the optimal tax rate, a higher behavioural response to the public input
will increase the optimal tax rate. These behavioural responses can o"set one
another.
Higher direct or indirect public input elasticities both imply a higher corpo-
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rate tax rate. They both imply an increase in the bene!t the !rm receives from
the public input. Interestingly, a pure bene!ts-based tax should not imply that
the indirect e"ects of the public input be accounted for. In this model, they are
not. Instead, the indirect e"ects of the public input are balanced with the be-
havioural response of the !rm to taxation.
4.A.3 Additional Estimates
Table 4.4: First-Stage Regression Results for Estimate of Tax Elasticity
∆ ln(1−τ)
1 Year 2 Year 3 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(1−τP ) 0.996∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Base-Year Pro!t Log Spline Log Spline Log Spline
Observations 109,216 109,216 98,932 98,932 90,850 90,850
R2 0.924 0.944 0.964 0.975 0.975 0.982
Notes: The dependent variable is the actualmarginal net of tax rate, while
the regressor is the predictedmarginal net of tax rate. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the !rm level.
Regressions include !rm-level !xed e"ects. Statistical signi!cance
is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
Table 4.5: Estimate of Tax Elasticity using Sample of Firms Reporting Domestic
Pro!ts
1 Year 2 Year 3 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(1−τ) 1.141∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.318) (0.225) (0.216) (0.284) (0.288)
Base-Year Pro!t Log Spline Log Spline Log Spline
Observations 4,849 4,849 3,685 3,685 2,805 2,805
R2 0.600 0.610 0.722 0.727 0.798 0.801
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
the !rm level. Regressions include !rm-level !xed e"ects. Statisti-
cal signi!cance is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
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Table 4.6: First-Stage Regression Results for Estimate of Tax Elasticity using
Sample of Firms Reporting Domestic Pro!ts
∆ ln(1−τ)
1 Year 2 Year 3 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(1−τP ) 1.002∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
Base-Year Pro!t Log Spline Log Spline Log Spline
Observations 4,849 4,849 3,685 3,685 2,805 2,805
R2 0.976 0.984 0.992 0.996 0.997 0.998
Notes: The dependent variable is the actualmarginal net of tax rate, while
the regressor is the predictedmarginal net of tax rate. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the !rm level.
Regressions include !rm-level !xed e"ects. Statistical signi!cance
is given by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, and * p< 0.1.
4.A.4 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
To show how public inputs directly and indirectly a"ect pro!ts, I consider an ex-
treme example in the United States. In response to the economic recession pre-
cipitated by the !nancial crisis, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA) was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Barack
Obama. The ARRA was designed to stimulate spending and to invest in new in-
frastructure. The bill induced stimulus spending of $831 billion, of which $105.3
billion was to be investment in public infrastructure. Infrastructure targeted by
the bill included transport, water, sewerage, buildings, communications, secu-
rity, and energy. This generated a broad-based shock to the level of public capi-
tal.
I show graphical evidence of the aggregate movements of pro!ts, public in-
puts and private investment just before, during, and after the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was implemented. I plot aggregate quarterly
series for domestic pro!ts, federal gross nondefense investment (not just !xed
investment), private non!nacial !xed investment, and personal consumption ex-
penditures. All variables are de%ated using the Consumer Price Index. The plots
are shown in Figure 4.6.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was signed into law in Febru-
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ary 2009. The observed increase in public investment began in the third quarter
of 2009. Public investment remained at an elevated level until the end of 2012.
During this period, domestic pro!ts rose rapidly, albeit from a depressed level
due to the recession. Two observations suggest that public investment played
a role in the increase in pro!ts. First, while pro!ts and public investment be-
gan to increase in 2009, private !xed investment did not begin to increase until
2010. Even then, private investment grew at a steady pace re%ecting the pre-
crisis trend. Second, when public investment fell back from its elevated level
in 2012, pro!ts stopped growing as well. However, private capital experienced
only a one-quarter pause and continued to grow up until 2015. These visual ob-
servations suggest there might be an economically signi!cant impact of public
investment on corporate pro!ts.
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Figure 4.5: Histograms of AverageDi"erences Between FirmsReportingDomes-
tic Pro!ts or Not
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Figure 4.6: Graphical Evidence of the E"ects of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis takes three small steps towards advancing our understanding of the
international tax landscape. These advances in our knowledge are designed to
help us make better policy. More importantly, these steps aim to help draw us
closer to a consensus on the e"ects and principles of international corporate tax-
ation.
In Chapter 2 I !nd that tax competition is not as substantial a policy concern
as previous estimates might suggest. A combination of appropriate method-
ology and theoretical insight helps me derive a more convincing estimate of
corporate tax competition. The obvious implication I stress is that this implies
much less under-provision of the public good due to tax competition than was
previously suggested. But a more nuanced implication is that the corporate tax
rate around the world has been falling for less nefarious reasons than simply tax
competition. In fact, as shown in the introduction, corporate tax revenue has re-
mained steady around the globe—even growing—despite falling corporate tax
rates and concerns of tax revenue lost to pro!t shifting. It suggests that govern-
ments have beenmaking approximately optimal corporate tax changes over the
past few decades. In particular, if a simple revenue-maximising corporate tax
rate is some negative function of the tax elasticity of pro!ts as in Chapters 2 and
4, then there appears a simple explanation for falling optimal corporate tax rates:
the increasing mobility of the multinational !rm and of capital more generally.
Chapter 3 investigates themagnitude, direction andpotential causes of country-
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pair cross-country tax base spillovers due to corporate tax reforms in Europe.
The key takeaway from this essay is that corporate tax base spillovers are hetero-
geneous and depend critically on the characteristics of the countries involved
and their relationship. This follows on from the idea in Chapter 2 that gov-
ernments do not know exactly how their tax bases will be a"ected by a neigh-
bour’s tax rate cut. In fact, prior to this work, researchers themselves have only
provided evidence of average spillover e"ects that give little guidance on how
a speci!c country’s tax rate change might a"ect another speci!c country’s tax
base. The implication is that a unilateral corporate tax reform in one country
might not cause widespread damage to the international tax community. Even
more importantly, since tax base spillovers are the mechanism through which
tax competition works, the substantial heterogeneity of these elasticities might
give us a clue as to why corporate tax competition is much weaker than we pre-
viously thought. And this substantial heterogeneity in spillovers justi!es the use
of heterogeneous spillover-approximating weights in estimating the size of tax
competition responses in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 switches from a positive to a normative approach, proposing that
the fundamental purpose for the corporate income tax is as a bene!t tax. In
Chapter 4, I account for both the corporate tax landscape and advances in mod-
ern tax theory, in order to design an optimal corporate income tax that satis!es
both our desire for fairness and our need for e*ciency. Not only is such an opti-
mal tax possible, but it is also implementable and provides uswith clear signposts
for what an optimal corporate tax should achieve. The implied message is that
some measure of fairness is required for us to reach a global consensus on tax-
ation. And the past three decades have taught us that the corporate tax system
cannot be !xed without cooperation.
In 1923, the original international tax system was intellectually designed by
four economists: Professor Edwin Seligman from the United States, Professor
Luigi Einaudi from Italy, Professor G.W. J. Bruins from the Netherlands, and Sir
Josiah Stamp from the United Kingdom. The four economists had to contend
with a fundamental tension between the interests of capital-exporting countries
and capital-importing countries. Their report to the League of Nations laid the
foundations for the international tax system by inspiring the 1928 League of Na-
tions Model Treaty. Their report considered two key ideas. First, they proposed
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that we should di"erentiate between active and passive income. Second, they
proposed that it is appropriate for active income to be taxed at source, while
passive income should be taxed at residence. Active income re%ects business
income, the tax base with which this entire thesis is concerned.
Fascinatingly, Avi-Yonah (2005) dubs this period, from 1918 to 1960 (partic-
ularly the interwar years), “The Age of Bene!ts”. The reason for this is that the
principle ideology underpinning the international tax regime’s foundation was
the bene!t principle—that a jurisdiction’s right to tax arose from the provision
of bene!ts. It was the belief of these four economists that the bene!ts principle
should guide the design of the international tax system. But this period was fol-
lowed by a period of distinct emphasis on e*ciency rather than fairness. And
as the emphasis on e*ciency grew, it eventually gave way to tax competitive be-
haviour (Avi-Yonah, 2005). Competitive behaviour has led to a need for coop-
eration. However, cooperation over the past two decades has consistently failed
at almost every level. Governments do not internalise the base spillover e"ects
their tax reforms have on neighbouring countries, and neither do they seem to
consider the potential for strategic responses.
But cooperation on corporate tax is unlikely to ever exist without !rst agree-
ing on a purpose for the corporate tax. The foundations of the corporate tax
system were established by cooperation through the League of Nations. And
the purpose that united various competing interests was the idea that taxation
should re%ect bene!ts received. This particularly holds for active income, which
the four economists recommended should be taxed at source.
Cooperation can exist where we agree that inter-nation equity is just as im-
portant as achieving e*ciency. Inter-nation equity is a notion that has been
broadly forgotten over the past few decades. As in the International Monetary
Fund’s report on Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy (2019), only passing
reference is made to the notion that the design of corporate tax needs to be
fair across countries. Fairness in international corporate tax design is now only
a weapon used to denounce tax havens. But inter-nation fairness should be an
equal partner with economic e*ciency in the determination of the optimal cor-
porate tax system. It is likely that consensus will only arise when fairness is once
again part of the broad discussion.
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Realistically, cooperation by governments is a political topic. We know that
the choice of corporate tax policy is inevitably coloured by political considera-
tion. Policy reforms frequently appear to either be suboptimal in maximising a
nation’s welfare or fail to re%ect the public’s opinions and preferences. This is
particularly relevant in the context of pro!t shifting and tax rate cuts.
First, while pro!t shifting is widely condemned, many governments main-
tain loopholes that allow !rms to reduce their tax liability to almost nothing
(Gardner et al., 2019). There is no doubt that the extent of pro!t shifting is a pol-
icy choice. Our entire tax systemswhich enable pro!t shifting are created by pol-
icy, and can be redesigned to eliminate pro!t shifting if politicians so wished. Yet
the two loudest voices on pro!t shifting—the United States and Europe—have,
in their midst, their very own untroubled tax havens. The European Commis-
sion cannot name European tax havens identi!ed by the European Parliament
(2019) on its own blacklist.
Second, while surveys suggest that voters would prefer increased taxes on
corporations, corporate tax rates continue to fall (Pew Research Center, 2017a,b;
Gallup, 2018). This appears to %out the public will. It ismost commonly assumed
that this is a result of lobbying by large corporations. But is there some rational
reason why government decisions on corporate tax do not appear to re%ect the
preferences of the voting public? As discussed in Bird (1996), it is quite possible
that the government observes constraints—both domestic and international—
that voters do not. For example, the government may internalise the increasing
mobility of the multinational !rm in a manner that individuals do not. The dis-
cussion on the incidence of the corporate tax is one we cannot take lightly. Ever
since Judd (1985) andChamley (1986), we are wary of the negative e"ects that tax-
ing any form of capital might have on labour. The evidence on the incidence of
the corporate tax is mixed (Auerbach, 2006; Clausing, 2011; Arulampalam et al.,
2012; Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016; Fuest et al., 2018). This makes it di*cult to
understand who bene!ts from corporate tax cuts, and who would lose without
them.
Whether these misaligned policy decisions are truly optimal for the entire
country has serious implications for inequality, both from a political and an
economic perspective. From an economic perspective, global markups have in-
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creased by around 45 percent from 1980 to 2016, naturally implying a redistri-
bution of resources fromworkers towards owners of large !rms (De Loecker and
Eeckhout, 2018). Kaymak and Schott (2018) suggests the decline in corporate tax
rates is responsible for 40 percent of the decline in labour’s share in income. And
while Nallareddy et al. (2018) show that corporate tax cuts lead to higher income
inequality in the United States, Boar and Midrigan (2019) propose that pro!t
taxes are too blunt an instrument to e"ectively redistribute income in a closed
economy because it lowers economic growth. But increasing corporate pro!ts
also increases ‘corporate power’, whichmanifests itself in political, economic and
market power (Avi-Yonah, 2004). The political perspective of inequality created
by the corporate tax is possibly more damaging. The increased power of cor-
porations necessarily limits the political power of the voting public. And public
perception that their preferences are being %outed by the government is dam-
aging.
These are all questions that arise from the issues raised in this thesis. This
thesis seeks to interrogate the foundations of today’s international corporate tax
system. Tax competition and corporate tax base spillovers are a key point of con-
tention, along with pro!t shifting to tax havens. Each of these three matters are
fundamental failures of cooperation and coordination. To create successful co-
operation, there must exist a consensus. This thesis seeks to provide the positive
and normative foundations for the re-emergence of an international consensus
on the taxation of corporate income.
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